SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D2023-3821 Lower Tribunal No. 2022DR-003161-0000-00 _____________________________
TAMARA LYNN WOLVERTON,
Appellant, v.
CHRISTOPHER WOLVERTON,
Appellee. _____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Keith P. Spoto, Judge.
November 26, 2025
TRAVER, C.J.
Tamara Wolverton (“Former Wife”) appeals a final divorce judgment. We
have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Former Wife challenges many
aspects of the trial court’s parenting, equitable distribution, and child support
decisions, but only two points merit discussion. The trial court erred by failing to
make written factual findings on the best interests factors contained in section 63.13,
Florida Statutes (2023), when it issued its decision awarding shared parental
responsibility to Christopher Wolverton (“Former Husband”). It also improperly imputed income to Former Wife without sufficient supporting evidence. We remand
for written findings on the trial court’s shared parental responsibility decision and
recalculation of its child support award. We otherwise affirm.
I.
Former Wife married Former Husband in 2016, and they have two children
together. Before the parties’ separation, they lived with five other children from
Former Wife’s previous relationship. In 2021, Former Wife petitioned for a
domestic violence injunction against Former Husband, which she later dismissed.
In 2022, Former Wife sought a sexual violence injunction against Former Husband
on behalf of one of her children from her previous relationship. The trial court
entered the injunction.
Following the injunction’s issuance, Former Wife filed for divorce, in which
she sought sole parental responsibility and child support. Former Husband
counterpetitioned, seeking shared parental responsibility and a child support
determination. Following a temporary relief hearing, the trial court restricted
Former Husband’s timesharing to supervised visitation. It also awarded child
support to Former Wife. In calculating Former Husband’s support obligation, it
credited Former Wife’s testimony that she was unemployed but soon expected to get
a job that earned $1,050 per week. The trial court temporarily and without prejudice
imputed this income amount to her.
2 In May 2023, the matter proceeded to trial, where the same judge who entered
the injunction and temporary relief order presided. The trial court skillfully oversaw
a professional and organized proceeding despite the acrimony between the parties
and Former Wife’s pro se status at the time. The parties both testified and called
multiple witnesses. Trial testimony related to the parties’ parenting and
communication abilities, including their capabilities to honor a timesharing
schedule, create a routine for their children, stay involved in school and extra-
curricular activities, and more. This evidence conflicted, with Former Husband
seeking to end his supervised visitation, and Former Wife demanding its
continuation. The parties presented conflicting testimony on the domestic and
sexual abuse allegation issues.
Former Wife also testified that she used to work as a server at a high-end
restaurant, but it fired her for willful insubordination, and she had not yet obtained
full-time employment. She insisted that she had to care for five minor children who
lived with her without assistance while litigating her divorce, so she was working
part-time for Instacart. She explained that she never secured the job that she said
she could get at the temporary relief hearing and multiple other attempts to obtain
full-time employment had failed.
When the trial ended, the trial court made oral factual findings and legal
conclusions. It said that it “took into account all of the factors involved” in section
3 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, and found that shared parental responsibility was in the
children’s best interests. It gave Former Husband two unsupervised overnights per
week and awarded remaining timesharing to Former Wife. It imputed $1,050 per
week in income to Former Wife in imposing a child support obligation on Former
Husband.
In September 2023, the trial court entered a written final judgment that
included a detailed parenting plan. It found that shared parental responsibility and
its parenting plan were in the children’s best interests. It said that it “considered all
relevant statutory factors concerning the best interests of the child, relative to
parental responsibility, the parenting plan, and the time-sharing schedule.” It listed
the section 61.13(3) factors but did not make any specific findings about them,
including the abuse evidence. The trial court imputed $1,050 in weekly gross
income to Former Wife, consistent with its temporary child support order and oral
ruling after trial.
Now represented by counsel, Former Wife filed a motion for rehearing.
Relevant to our ruling, Former Wife argued that the trial court had made no written
factual findings on the section 61.13(3) best interests factors, including abuse, even
though she had presented evidence about abuse. She explained that while the 2022
version of section 61.13(3) in effect at trial did not require written findings on the
best interests factors, the 2023 version in effect when the final judgment issued did.
4 She also reasoned that both versions required written findings on her abuse
allegations. Former Wife separately contended that no competent, substantial
evidence supported her imputed income. After the trial court denied her motion for
rehearing without specifically addressing either issue, Former Wife appealed.
II.
The trial court erred by failing to make written findings on the best interests
factors. It also improperly imputed income to her when no competent, substantial
evidence supported the award. We address these issues in turn.
A. We review the trial court’s decisions on a parenting plan for an abuse of
discretion. See J.N.S. v. A.M.A., 194 So. 3d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing
Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984, 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)). Our
interpretation of the timesharing statute, though, is de novo. See Orosco v.
Rodriguez, 376 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citing McGovern v. Clark, 298
So. 3d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)).
To evaluate whether the trial court erred in failing to make written findings
under section 61.13(3), we must first determine which version of the statute applied.
The 2023 version became effective between the trial’s conclusion and the final
judgment’s entry. The 2022 version did not require written findings on the best
interests factors. See generally § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (2022). By contrast, the 2023
5 version required written factual findings on all best interests factors. See §
61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2023) (“Except when a time-sharing schedule is agreed to
by the parties and approved by the court, the court must evaluate all of the factors
set forth in subsection (3) and make specific written findings of fact when creating
or modifying a time-sharing schedule.”).
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D2023-3821 Lower Tribunal No. 2022DR-003161-0000-00 _____________________________
TAMARA LYNN WOLVERTON,
Appellant, v.
CHRISTOPHER WOLVERTON,
Appellee. _____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Keith P. Spoto, Judge.
November 26, 2025
TRAVER, C.J.
Tamara Wolverton (“Former Wife”) appeals a final divorce judgment. We
have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Former Wife challenges many
aspects of the trial court’s parenting, equitable distribution, and child support
decisions, but only two points merit discussion. The trial court erred by failing to
make written factual findings on the best interests factors contained in section 63.13,
Florida Statutes (2023), when it issued its decision awarding shared parental
responsibility to Christopher Wolverton (“Former Husband”). It also improperly imputed income to Former Wife without sufficient supporting evidence. We remand
for written findings on the trial court’s shared parental responsibility decision and
recalculation of its child support award. We otherwise affirm.
I.
Former Wife married Former Husband in 2016, and they have two children
together. Before the parties’ separation, they lived with five other children from
Former Wife’s previous relationship. In 2021, Former Wife petitioned for a
domestic violence injunction against Former Husband, which she later dismissed.
In 2022, Former Wife sought a sexual violence injunction against Former Husband
on behalf of one of her children from her previous relationship. The trial court
entered the injunction.
Following the injunction’s issuance, Former Wife filed for divorce, in which
she sought sole parental responsibility and child support. Former Husband
counterpetitioned, seeking shared parental responsibility and a child support
determination. Following a temporary relief hearing, the trial court restricted
Former Husband’s timesharing to supervised visitation. It also awarded child
support to Former Wife. In calculating Former Husband’s support obligation, it
credited Former Wife’s testimony that she was unemployed but soon expected to get
a job that earned $1,050 per week. The trial court temporarily and without prejudice
imputed this income amount to her.
2 In May 2023, the matter proceeded to trial, where the same judge who entered
the injunction and temporary relief order presided. The trial court skillfully oversaw
a professional and organized proceeding despite the acrimony between the parties
and Former Wife’s pro se status at the time. The parties both testified and called
multiple witnesses. Trial testimony related to the parties’ parenting and
communication abilities, including their capabilities to honor a timesharing
schedule, create a routine for their children, stay involved in school and extra-
curricular activities, and more. This evidence conflicted, with Former Husband
seeking to end his supervised visitation, and Former Wife demanding its
continuation. The parties presented conflicting testimony on the domestic and
sexual abuse allegation issues.
Former Wife also testified that she used to work as a server at a high-end
restaurant, but it fired her for willful insubordination, and she had not yet obtained
full-time employment. She insisted that she had to care for five minor children who
lived with her without assistance while litigating her divorce, so she was working
part-time for Instacart. She explained that she never secured the job that she said
she could get at the temporary relief hearing and multiple other attempts to obtain
full-time employment had failed.
When the trial ended, the trial court made oral factual findings and legal
conclusions. It said that it “took into account all of the factors involved” in section
3 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, and found that shared parental responsibility was in the
children’s best interests. It gave Former Husband two unsupervised overnights per
week and awarded remaining timesharing to Former Wife. It imputed $1,050 per
week in income to Former Wife in imposing a child support obligation on Former
Husband.
In September 2023, the trial court entered a written final judgment that
included a detailed parenting plan. It found that shared parental responsibility and
its parenting plan were in the children’s best interests. It said that it “considered all
relevant statutory factors concerning the best interests of the child, relative to
parental responsibility, the parenting plan, and the time-sharing schedule.” It listed
the section 61.13(3) factors but did not make any specific findings about them,
including the abuse evidence. The trial court imputed $1,050 in weekly gross
income to Former Wife, consistent with its temporary child support order and oral
ruling after trial.
Now represented by counsel, Former Wife filed a motion for rehearing.
Relevant to our ruling, Former Wife argued that the trial court had made no written
factual findings on the section 61.13(3) best interests factors, including abuse, even
though she had presented evidence about abuse. She explained that while the 2022
version of section 61.13(3) in effect at trial did not require written findings on the
best interests factors, the 2023 version in effect when the final judgment issued did.
4 She also reasoned that both versions required written findings on her abuse
allegations. Former Wife separately contended that no competent, substantial
evidence supported her imputed income. After the trial court denied her motion for
rehearing without specifically addressing either issue, Former Wife appealed.
II.
The trial court erred by failing to make written findings on the best interests
factors. It also improperly imputed income to her when no competent, substantial
evidence supported the award. We address these issues in turn.
A. We review the trial court’s decisions on a parenting plan for an abuse of
discretion. See J.N.S. v. A.M.A., 194 So. 3d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing
Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984, 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)). Our
interpretation of the timesharing statute, though, is de novo. See Orosco v.
Rodriguez, 376 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citing McGovern v. Clark, 298
So. 3d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)).
To evaluate whether the trial court erred in failing to make written findings
under section 61.13(3), we must first determine which version of the statute applied.
The 2023 version became effective between the trial’s conclusion and the final
judgment’s entry. The 2022 version did not require written findings on the best
interests factors. See generally § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (2022). By contrast, the 2023
5 version required written factual findings on all best interests factors. See §
61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2023) (“Except when a time-sharing schedule is agreed to
by the parties and approved by the court, the court must evaluate all of the factors
set forth in subsection (3) and make specific written findings of fact when creating
or modifying a time-sharing schedule.”). These factors included “[e]vidence of
domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect
. . . regardless of whether a prior or pending action relating to those issues has been
brought.” § 61.13(3)(m), Fla. Stat. (2023). 1
To the extent the 2023 statutory amendment required a trial court to include
specific factual findings in a timesharing order, it applied to the subsequently entered
judgment because it was procedural—i.e., it did not attach new legal consequences
to the trial that ended before its enactment.2 See Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177, 187
(Fla. 2019) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994)); City
1 Although only the 2023 version of the statute required the trial court to make specific findings regarding evidence of “domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect,” both the 2022 and 2023 versions required the trial court, if it “accept[ed] evidence of prior or pending actions regarding” such matters, to “specifically acknowledge in writing that such evidence was considered when evaluating the best interests of the child.” Compare § 61.13(3)(m), Fla. Stat. (2022), and § 61.13(3)(m), Fla. Stat. (2023). 2 Former Wife does not argue that the 2023 version applies to any other aspect of this appeal. We otherwise apply the 2022 version based on her acknowledgment of (1) its applicability, (2) the substantive nature of its provisions to the remaining appellate issues, and (3) the legal consequences of its application at trial.
6 of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So. 2d 133, 136–37 (Fla. 1961) (“[S]tatutes relating to
. . . procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come
within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against
retrospective operation of statutes.” (citing Cunningham v. State Plant Bd. of Fla.,
112 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959))). Former Wife preserved this issue for
our review by raising it in her motion for rehearing. See Fla. Fam. L.R.P. 12.530(a)
(“To preserve for appeal a challenge to the failure of the trial court to make required
findings of fact in the final judgment, a party must raise that issue in a motion for
rehearing under this rule.”).
The trial court erred by not making written findings on the section 61.13(3)
factors that supported its determination of shared parental responsibility, including
the abuse allegations that Former Wife raised at trial. On remand, the trial court
must enter an amended final judgment that includes these written findings. This
does not require a new trial unless the trial court cannot make the necessary
determinations from the trial transcript. We do not disturb the trial court’s shared
parental responsibility finding unless its written findings cannot justify it. See §
61.13(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2022) (“The court shall order that the parental responsibility
for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental
responsibility would be detrimental to the child. . . . Whether or not there is a
7 conviction of any offense of domestic violence or child abuse or the existence of an
injunction for protection against domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence
of domestic violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child.”).
B. We review a child support award for an abuse of discretion. See Phara v.
Robert, 406 So. 3d 983, 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (citing Smith v. Loffredo-Smith,
230 So. 3d 898, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). We assess a trial court’s findings
supporting imputation of income for competent, substantial evidence. See Girard v.
Girard, 351 So. 3d 27, 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citing Niederman v. Niederman, 60
So. 3d 544, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).
Subject to exceptions not relevant to this appeal, trial courts “shall” impute
monthly income if they find a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
See § 61.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022). Trial courts determine an unemployed or
underemployed parent’s employment potential and probable earning level “based
upon his or her recent work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing
earnings level in the community if such information is available.” See id.
No competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s imputation of
income. As the party seeking to impute income, Former Husband had the burden to
show “both employability and that jobs are available.” See Jorgensen v. Targarelli,
312 So. 3d 505, 507 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (quoting Dottavino v. Dottavino, 170 So.
8 3d 98, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). He adduced no evidence on Former Wife’s job
search, her potential earning capacity, or available positions. Former Husband also
did not challenge Former Wife’s testimony that she could not obtain full-time
employment because she was caring for the five minor children who lived with her
without assistance. The trial court imputed income to Former Wife based on her
testimony at a temporary hearing that occurred over ten months before trial. But
Former Wife said that her stated expectations of getting a job at that income never
came to fruition, and multiple other attempts to obtain work had failed. Based on
our record, the trial court’s decision to impute $1,050 per week to Former Wife had
no factual basis supporting it. This, in turn, affected the trial court’s child support
award. On remand, the trial court must recalculate the child support award based on
the parties’ current earning abilities, taking evidence as needed. See Jorgensen, 312
So. 3d at 507.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with directions.
SMITH and GANNAM, JJ., concur.
Debra J. Sutton, of Sutton Law Firm, Bartow, for Appellant.
Christopher Wolverton, Lakeland, pro se.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED