Tamara Fulmer-Stewart v. CRP/Maple Alamo Heights Owner, L.P. D/B/A Allora Alamo Heights

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 4, 2025
• Docket: 04-25-00248-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00248-CV

Tamara FULMER-STEWART, Appellant

v.

CRP/MAPLE ALAMO HEIGHTS OWNER, L.P. d/b/a Allora Alamo Heights, Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-CV-00291 Honorable Cesar Garcia, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 4, 2025

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

On May 12, 2025, the clerk’s record was filed in this appeal. The clerk’s record reflects

that Appellee CRP/Maple Alamo Heights Owner, LP d/b/a Allora Alamo Heights (“Allora Alamo

Heights”) brought a forcible detainer action against Appellant Tamara Fulmer-Stewart in the

Justice Court Precinct 3 Place 1. A judgment against Fulmer-Stewart was signed by the justice

court, and Fulmer-Stewart appealed to the county court at law. On March 28, 2025, the county

court at law signed an order explaining that the plaintiff, Allora Alamo Heights, had filed a notice

of nonsuit and requested that the county court at law dismiss the case without prejudice. The county 04-25-00248-CV

court at law “ORDERED that the entirety of this case be, and it hereby is dismissed without

prejudice, effective immediately.” On April 17, 2025, Fulmer-Stewart filed a pro se notice of

appeal, stating that “even though the judgment was in [her] favor, [she] desire[s] to appeal all

portions of said judgment in the 4th Court of Appeals in San Antonio, Texas.”

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 provides that “[a]t any time before the plaintiff has

introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take

a non-suit, which shall be entered in the minutes.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. “A plaintiff has an absolute

right to take a nonsuit.” In re Estate of Garza, No. 13-14-00730-CV, 2015 WL 3799370, at *3

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 18, 2015, no pet.). “A nonsuit nullifies the controversy

and renders interlocutory orders in the case moot.” Id. “After a nonsuit, a trial court retains

jurisdiction to address collateral matters, such as motions for sanctions, even when such motions

are filed after the nonsuit, as well as jurisdiction over any remaining counterclaims.” Travelers

Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010). Thus, even though a court signs an order

on a plaintiff’s nonsuit, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims “does not prevent the defendant from

being heard on his own claims for affirmative relief, if any.” In re Estate of Garza, 2015 WL

3799370, at *3; see CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, 390 S.W.3d 299,

300 (Tex. 2013) (stating that a plaintiff’s nonsuit without prejudice does not affect a defendant’s

pending claim for affirmative relief, including a request for dismissal with prejudice and an award

of fees, expenses, costs, and sanctions). “However, after a plaintiff takes a nonsuit against a

defendant, a defendant who has no outstanding claims for affirmative relief is no longer a party to

the suit with standing to appeal.” In re Estate of Garza, 2015 WL 3799370, at *3 (citing United

Oil & Minerals, Inc. v. Costilla Energy, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-

Edinburg 1999, pet. dism’d)). “When the plaintiff nonsuits her claims, there is no longer a case or

controversy, and the court of appeals has no jurisdiction over the suit.” Id.

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Based on our review of the clerk’s record, we determined that following the entry of the

nonsuit, there were no collateral matters left to adjudicate in the underlying case, and Fulmer-

Stewart had no claims for affirmative relief pending. Because Fulmer-Stewart had no such claims,

she “ceased to be a party to the suit with standing to appeal.” Id. We therefore ordered Fulmer-

Stewart to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id.

Fulmer-Stewart has now filed a response, stating that she is appealing “civil rights

violations and state laws and statutes broken by” the county court at law judge and “all clerks” in

that court. She further alleges that after the forcible detainer action against her was dismissed, she

received an anonymous and threatening phone call. Thus, Fulmer-Stewart in her response alleges

possible civil actions she could file in a separate civil lawsuit. None of these claims were pending

in the underlying forcible detainer action at the time it was dismissed. See Kirkland v. V & S Total

Trade, LLC, No. 04-22-00409-CV, 2024 WL 2947292, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 12,

2024, no pet.) (“The only dispute in a forcible detainer case is the issue of which party has the right

to immediate possession of the property.”).

Because Fulmer-Stewart had no outstanding claims for affirmative relief at the time of the

nonsuit, Fulmer “is no longer a party to the suit with standing to appeal.” In re Estate of Garza,

2015 WL 3799370, at *3. Therefore, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. (“When the

plaintiff nonsuits her claims, there is no longer a case or controversy, and the court of appeals has

no jurisdiction over the suit.”). This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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