Talyosef v. Comm�r of Soc. SEC.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-3051-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-3051-cv Talyosef v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ‘SUMMARY ORDER’). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in 3 the City of New York, on the 30th day of March, two thousand twenty-six. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 7 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 8 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 _____________________________________ 11 12 Caryn Talyosef, 13 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 v. 24-3051 17 18 Commissioner of Social Security, 19 20 Defendant-Appellee. 21 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 1 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Caryn Talyosef, pro se, 2 Norwich, CT. 3 4 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Fergus Kaiser, Special 5 Assistant U.S. Attorney, 6 Baltimore, MD (Suzanne 7 M. Haynes, Acting 8 Associate General 9 Counsel, on the brief), 10 Social Security 11 Administration, for Marc 12 H. Silverman, Acting 13 United States Attorney for 14 the District of Connecticut. 15

16 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of

17 Connecticut (Spector, M.J.).

18 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

19 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

20 Caryn Talyosef appeals from the district court’s judgment that reversed the

21 Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her claim for disability benefits and

22 remanded the matter to the agency for a rehearing pursuant to sentence four of section

23 405(g) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). A magistrate judge, presiding in

24 the district court for all purposes on the parties’ consent, granted the Commissioner’s

25 motion to vacate and remand for further administrative proceedings, while denying

26 Talyosef’s motion to reverse and remand for the calculation of benefits.

27 This Court reviews district court remands pursuant to the fourth sentence of 1 § 405(g) for abuse of discretion. Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384–85 (2d Cir. 2004).

2 The fourth sentence of § 405(g) of the Social Security Act permits district courts to affirm,

3 reverse, or modify a decision of the Commissioner “with or without remanding the cause

4 for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C § 405(g). A remand for a rehearing is proper “when ‘further

5 findings would so plainly help to assure the proper disposition of [the] claim.’” Butts,

6 388 F.3d at 385 (quoting Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 1999)).

7 Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to reverse

8 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits and order a remand pursuant to sentence four of

9 § 405(g). The district court’s decision identified an inconsistency in the administrative

10 record: both the administrative law judge and the vocational expert who testified at

11 Talyosef’s hearing, when concluding that Talyosef had the residual functional capacity

12 to perform certain existing jobs in the national economy, appeared to assume that she

13 could perform jobs requiring her to occasionally lift up to ten pounds, despite evidence

14 indicating she was limited to occasionally lifting only five pounds. A remand to correct

15 this error is within the range of permissible decisions, and thus not an abuse of discretion.

16 See, e.g., Butts, 388 F.3d at 379 (affirming § 405(g) sentence four remand “to determine

17 whether adequate jobs exist in the national economy that Butts could perform”); Schaal v.

18 Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming sentence four remand because, among

19 other reasons, “it is not clear what legal standard the [ALJ] applied in weighing the 1 medical opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician”).

2 We have considered Talyosef’s remaining arguments and find them to be without

3 merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

4 5 FOR THE COURT: 6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court