Talmadge v. Houser

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 18, 2025
Docket23-3898
StatusUnpublished

This text of Talmadge v. Houser (Talmadge v. Houser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Talmadge v. Houser, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRETT ALAN JAMES TALMADGE, No. 23-3898 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 3:22-cv-00202-SLG-MMS v. MEMORANDUM* EARL HOUSER, Superintendent,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 14, 2025** Anchorage, Alaska

Before: GRABER, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Brett Talmadge was, when the district court ruled, awaiting trial in

Superior Court in Alaska on 2019 charges of incest and sexual abuse of a minor.

While that case was pending, in 2022 Petitioner filed the present habeas petition in

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). federal district court in the District of Alaska. We granted a certificate of

appealability on this issue: “whether the district court properly dismissed

[Petitioner’s] 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971).” Reviewing de novo, McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir.

2003), we affirm.

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner sought dismissal of the state

prosecution before trial. He argued at the district court that the state violated his

speedy-trial rights as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that his counsel was

ineffective by agreeing to continuances. Applying Younger’s “fundamental policy

against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions,” 401 U.S. at 46, the

district court dismissed the petition without prejudice.

Younger abstention normally applies when a petitioner who has not yet been

convicted in state court asserts a speedy-trial affirmative defense to the state

prosecution, that is, when the petitioner asks for a dismissal of the state charges

before trial. Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2012). None of the

extraordinary circumstances identified in Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 84 (9th

Cir. 1980), is present here to preclude application of Younger. Petitioner seeks to

enjoin an ongoing state-court criminal proceeding that implicates the important

state interest of enforcing Alaska’s criminal laws prohibiting incest and sexual

abuse of minors.

2 23-3898 Petitioner can raise his speedy-trial arguments in the Alaska state courts. If

convicted, he will be able to challenge his conviction in a new federal habeas

petition, raising speedy-trial claims and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,

once he has exhausted his state remedies. See Carden, 626 F.2d at 84–85

(“[Defendants’] appropriate remedy is to proceed to trial and thereafter raise their

speedy trial claim if they wish to do so.”).

AFFIRMED.

3 23-3898

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Brown v. Ahern
676 F.3d 899 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Dock McNeely v. Lou Blanas
336 F.3d 822 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Talmadge v. Houser, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/talmadge-v-houser-ca9-2025.