Talley v. Beever & Hindes

78 S.W. 23, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 675, 1903 Tex. App. LEXIS 599
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 9, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 78 S.W. 23 (Talley v. Beever & Hindes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Talley v. Beever & Hindes, 78 S.W. 23, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 675, 1903 Tex. App. LEXIS 599 (Tex. Ct. App. 1903).

Opinion

JAMES, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff, aged 17 at the time of injury, suing by his father and next friend, J. E. Talley, alleged in substance that Beever & Hindes, a partnership firm, sold to J. E. Talley a “pear burner,” a machine of their own manufacture, to be operated by the use of gasoline for the purpose of burning prickly pear on his ranch; that plaintiff while pumping air into the cylinder or tank containing the gasoline in order to form the gas, and while he was following directions for using the machine, the cylinder burst from the pressure of the gas within, and the gas expelled therefrom becoming ignited at a fire close by, caused plaintiff his injuries. The petition alleged, among other grounds for defendant’s liability, that they were negligent in using weak nd defective' material in making the machine, and also negligent in *676 having the top of the cylinder insecurely fastened or attached to the cylinder.

Although other issues than negligence were set up in the petition, such as misrepresentations and warranty concerning the machine as to its safety for use, the trial court submitted the case on negligence alone, and plaintiff did not request- any other submission. The verdict was for defendants. Under these circumstances we must treat all other issues or grounds for defendant’s liability as properly out of the case.

We have come to the conclusion that the evidence does not show that defendants were guilty of negligence, and if this be corréct, the errors assigned are immaterial.

The machine was not sold to plaintiff, but as the father testified that h'e informed defendants’ agent of whom he bought it that he was buying it for his sons to use on his ranch, and as the court proceeded upon the theory that plaintiff was a person entitled to complain of defendants’ negligence, we shall, without discussing that question, assume that defendants were liable to him for negligence.

Defendants could dn this case be held to the exercise of ordinary care in the construction of the machine, but not to that high degree of care which is required of persons selling articles which are inherently, imminently and necessarily dangerous when used. In Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y., 397, a widely approved case, a dealer in drugs labeled a deadly poison as harmless, and he was held to be liable to all persons injured in consequence of such label, through whomsoever hands the drug may have passed. The same court refused to extend this rule to a case such as the one before us. Losee v. Chute, 51 N. Y., 494. The rule seems to be that one who deals with a thing which is inherently very dangerous; involving both death and bodily harm to some person as the natural and almost inevitable consequence of lack of care, owes to the public at large the duty of extreme caution. The machine in question was not a thing of that nature, and only the standard of ordinary care applies. Reiss v. N. Y. Steam Co., 128 N. Y., 103.

It appears that on this machine there were "directions for its use, and we are of opinion that when a machine is sold accompanied by directions for its use, the maker should not be held to a greater degree of care in its construction than to construct it of reasonable strength and fitness when used in accordance with directions. Such use is contemplated, and the thing is manufactured to be so used. However, plaintiff testified that he was following the directions, with which he was familiar, Rt the time he was hurt. He says he was pumping air into the cylinder, which! contained the gasoline, and had made the proper number of strokes, when the top blew off. He also .testified that the machine had not been exposed to the heat of the fire, so that according to his testimony and that of his brother who was with him, the machine may be said to have burst when operated substantially in accordance with the directions, and from the pressure of the gas formed in the cylinder.

The explosion, it is contended, was evidence of the defendant’s negli *677 gence. The rule is that such presumption does not arise from the fact alone. McCray v. Railway Co., 89 Texas, 168; Broadway v. Gas Co., 24 Texas Civ. App., 603; Reiss v. N. Y. Steam Co., 128 N. Y., 103.

As explained in the McCray case the circumstances attending the occurrence may be sufficient to estMlish negligence without any direct proof of the fact. The only departure which plaintiff shows he made from the directions was that he did not see that the jet was open. We can not see how this omission contributed to the explosion. The stopcock was to be closed while the air was -being pumped in, therefore it seems that whether the jet was open or obstructed was of no- consequence. There is some probability that the heat from the fire had something to do with the explosion, but not if plaintiff’s testimony be accepted as true. Hence it might seem that plaintiff having testified that he was using the appliance according to directions and while so doing was himself not guilty of negligence, the jury would have been authorized to infer defendant’s negligence from the fact of the explosion under these circumstances. This might with some reason be claimed if the further fact had been shown that the machine was in the same condition as when it left defendant’s hands. There was nothing to show this. The machine had been bought for use on the ranch in procuring feed for cattle in winter. It had been on the place some time. It had been used, the evidence does not show to what extent. The father testified he did not know how many times plaintiff had used it. Plaintiff says .he had used it before that morning, but says nothing more on this subject. It appears to have been turned over to the boys to use, and it is well known- that boys are not ordinarily careful in handling appliances of that character. What that machine had been through was not explained. It ought not to be presumed, in order to support the other presumption, that- it was in the same condition and had not been impaired by use or ill treatment. We are therefore of opinion that the circumstances shown were not sufficient to constitute the explosion proof of defendant’s negligence.

It is also claimed that negligence appears from the fact that defendants since this accident have constructed their cylinders of brass, a stronger material than lead plate iron of which the cylinder in question was made, and have riveted the tops of the cylinders instead of double seaming them, the former making a stronger fastening. This we think was not evidence of former negligence. It was evidence that defendants built their new machines of stronger material and by stronger fastenings than their old ones, but was not evidence that the old ones were defective and not reasonably safe for the uses intended or that defendants had not exercised reasonable care in their manufacture.

The testimony of witness Chatfield is referred to as showing negligence, as follows: “I live in San Antonio and am a metal worker. Have had twenty-seven years experience as such. I am acquainted with the different kinds and classes of material. This [referring to pear burner] is made of a 22 or 24 lead-plated iron. No. 20 and 16 lead *678 plate is stronger and thicker than this. Lead is put on to keep the rust' from eating iron.

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Bluebook (online)
78 S.W. 23, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 675, 1903 Tex. App. LEXIS 599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/talley-v-beever-hindes-texapp-1903.