Talge Mahogany Co. v. Yeager Manufacturing Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Talge Mahogany Co. v. Yeager Manufacturing Co.

164 S.E. 349, 202 N.C. 814, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 233

DecidedJune 15, 1932

StatusPublished

This text of 164 S.E. 349 (Talge Mahogany Co. v. Yeager Manufacturing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Talge Mahogany Co. v. Yeager Manufacturing Co., 164 S.E. 349, 202 N.C. 814, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 233 (N.C. 1932).

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Opinion

*815 Stagy, 0. J.

Tbe language of tbe agent’s authorization, -“to sit in and plug for us” at creditors’ meeting, reasonably lends itself to tbe interpretation placed upon it in good faitb by Carter and tbe defendant, and tbe jury was justified in taking tbe same view of it. 2 C. J., 559. Cole v. Fibre Co., 200 N. C., 484, 157 S. E., 857.

Tbe expression “plug for us,” to say tbe least, is ambiguous and equivocal, and tbe principle applies that a letter or telegram of instruction from a principal to an agent should be expressed in clear language, and if not expressed in “plain and unequivocal terms, but tbe language is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, and tbe agent in fact is misled and adopts and follows one, while tbe principal intends another, then tbe principal will be bound, and tbe agent will be exonerated.” Story on Agency, sec. 74; Winne v. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y., 185.

Tbe telegram of authorization did not ask for a report of tbe meeting. However, a report was made in keeping with tbe agent’s reply, and it is to be presumed that Carter informed tbe plaintiff, of bis execution of tbe compromise agreement. We have failed to find on tbe record any specific repudiation of Carter’s action in this respect. Gordon J. Talge, a witness for plaintiff, does say that be expressed great surprise on 20 June, 1930, when Yeager informed him of Carter’s signature to tbe agreement and that Carter made no reference to it in bis report. It is also in evidence by John H. Talge, witness for plaintiff, that Carter bad no authority to compromise plaintiff’s claim. But no repudiation seems to have been made. Tbe plaintiff cannot in-justice defeat tbe compromise agreement by putting an interpretation upon its instructions at variance with that of its agent and tbe defendant, since tbe language clearly warrants tbe latters’ interpretation. 21 R. C. L., 907.

No error.

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*815 Stagy, 0. J.

Tbe language of tbe agent’s authorization, -“to sit in and plug for us” at creditors’ meeting, reasonably lends itself to tbe interpretation placed upon it in good faitb by Carter and tbe defendant, and tbe jury was justified in taking tbe same view of it. 2 C. J., 559. Cole v. Fibre Co., 200 N. C., 484, 157 S. E., 857.

Tbe expression “plug for us,” to say tbe least, is ambiguous and equivocal, and tbe principle applies that a letter or telegram of instruction from a principal to an agent should be expressed in clear language, and if not expressed in “plain and unequivocal terms, but tbe language is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, and tbe agent in fact is misled and adopts and follows one, while tbe principal intends another, then tbe principal will be bound, and tbe agent will be exonerated.” Story on Agency, sec. 74; Winne v. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y., 185.

Tbe telegram of authorization did not ask for a report of tbe meeting. However, a report was made in keeping with tbe agent’s reply, and it is to be presumed that Carter informed tbe plaintiff, of bis execution of tbe compromise agreement. We have failed to find on tbe record any specific repudiation of Carter’s action in this respect. Gordon J. Talge, a witness for plaintiff, does say that be expressed great surprise on 20 June, 1930, when Yeager informed him of Carter’s signature to tbe agreement and that Carter made no reference to it in bis report. It is also in evidence by John H. Talge, witness for plaintiff, that Carter bad no authority to compromise plaintiff’s claim. But no repudiation seems to have been made. Tbe plaintiff cannot in-justice defeat tbe compromise agreement by putting an interpretation upon its instructions at variance with that of its agent and tbe defendant, since tbe language clearly warrants tbe latters’ interpretation. 21 R. C. L., 907.

No error.

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164 S.E. 349, 202 N.C. 814, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 233, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/talge-mahogany-co-v-yeager-manufacturing-co-nc-1932.

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