Talbot v. Fear

89 F. 197, 32 C.C.A. 186, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2366
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 26, 1898
DocketNo. 485
StatusPublished

This text of 89 F. 197 (Talbot v. Fear) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Talbot v. Fear, 89 F. 197, 32 C.C.A. 186, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2366 (9th Cir. 1898).

Opinion

BUNN, District Judge.

The bill in this case is brought for an injunction and damages for infringement of letters patent No. 450,435, issued to Evert M. Thompson on April 14, 1891. There are three claims set forth in the patent, as follows: (1) A shipping case or box, the ends of which each consist of a single thickness of lumber readjusted as to its fiber so that one face is less compact than the normal condition of the wood, and less dense than the other face, and the box sides having a single thickness of similarly readjusted lumber, less in thickness, and having fess difference between the density of its faces than the end pieces, said side pieces held to the end pieces by nails, substantially as described. (2) A shipping case or box, the ends of which consist of a single thickness of lumber readjusted as to its fiber so that one face is less compact than the normal condition of the wood, and less dense than the other face, and box sides which are composed of similar readjusted lumber, the compact faces of all the readjusted lumber being in the same direction with reference to the interior of the box, and all secured together by nails, substantially as described. (3) A shipping case or box, the ends of which are composed of lumber readjusted as to its fiber so that one surface is less dense than the normal wood, and less dense than the other face, and side pieces of similar readjusted lumber, the denser faces of all the readjusted lumber being inward, substantially as described. It cannot be said to be very clear what the invention claimed by complainants is. Apparently, the evidence was taken and the case tried in the court below, and a decision rendered, upon the theory that the claim of complainants was for an alleged new article of manufacture, designated as "readjusted lumber.” On this appeal this claim is distinctly repudiated by plaintiffs’ counsel, for he says in. his brief that "the patent sued on in this case is for a new article of manufacture, and that new article of manufacture is a box, and not a new kind of lumber or a new machine.” And again he says, "The new product to be considered in this case is a shipping box, and not ■a new kind of lumber or a new machine.” If this had been the claim made on the trial, it seems very singular that the court should hare made no mention of it in his decision of the ease dismissing the bill. The court, by Judge Baker, gives several reasons for holding the patent invalid; and it may be well to quote the memorandum of the opinion in full, given by complainants in their brief, as follows:

“In view of the prior state of the art, in my opinion, there was no invention in cutting thicker sheets of lumber- than had been previously cut. [199]*199Tlie lumper, except in hieren sed thickness, is identically the same as the common veneer. The fact Unit the complainant first produced lumper of sufficient; thickness to form the ends of egg cases simply shows that he was the first to discover Unit an old machine could Pe used to cut thicker lumper than had been heretofore produced. It was simply carrying a well-known process a step in advance. The advanced step involved the invention of no new mechanism, nor does it produce any new article of manufacture, because file so-called new ‘readjusted lumber’ differs in no essential respect from common .veneers. And, if the production of the thicker sheets of readjusted lumber constituted invention, I still think the patent insufficient to secure it. The method of producing the readjusted lumber is not sufficiently described; and, besides, there is no means pointed out whereby the readjusted lumber may lie differentiated from ordinary veneers. The claims are broad enough to cover common veneers. The bill will be dismissed for want of equity, at complainants’ costs.”

This opinion is fully borne out by the testimony. Another reason which might also have been given for not allowing the invention as a claim for a new kind of lumber is that the complainants were fairly anticipated three years by others in the production of thick veneering, or "readjusted lumber,” as it is called in complainants’ patent. The evidence shows that veneering from three-eighths to five-eighths of an inch in thickness was made in the summer of 1888, before the plaintiffs’ patent issued. Veneering for the making of all kinds of boxes for the shipping of eggs, bananas, oranges, lemons, berries, celery and vegetallies, harnesses, etc., had been manufactured and in common use for more than 20 years previous to complainants’ patent. But until three years before, in 1888, it had been cut thin (that is to say. from one-eighth to three-sixteenths of an inch in thickness), and employed to form the sides of boxes used for all these various purposes of shipping; the side pieces being nailed to thicker lumber, constituting the ends made by the usual process of sawing. And even now, or at the time the evidence was taken, very many manufacturers refused to use veneering for the end pieces, for the reason that sawed lumber was stronger and better, and was not so likely to split in nailing, and that it could be made at about the same cost, because refuse lumber could be used in sawing, while the veneering, or lumber pared from ihe circumference of a log by a rotary knife, to be of any value, had to be cut from a fairly-good quality of timber. But the curious thing about this case is that, if this claim for the manufacture of a common box from readjusted lumber was made and litigated in The court below, no mention of it: should have been made by the court in its decision. But, however that may be, this court is inclined to agree with the counsel for complainants that: the claim for the manufacture of a new kind of lumber is not covered by either of the three claims of the patent, by any fair construction. Still, if the claims were fairly capable of such a construction, it might be well supposed that such a view of the patent would be more favorable to the plaintiffs’ claim for infringement than the one he is now putting forth, of making a box from veneering, — a kind of lumber that has been in common use for a quarter of a century. To state a proposition claiming a monopoly for the manufacture of such a box is its own best refutation. If it required no invention, afler a machine had been constructed to cut veneering three-sixteenths of an inch in thickness, to [200]*200change the set or gauge of the machine so as to cut See xeueering one-half inch thick, it required quite as little, after the lusuber was made and put upon the market, to make a box of it. Until the advent of complainants’ patent, and even since, no one except the complainants had thought it of any utility to turn the compressed sides of the lumber either in or out, but the lumber was made up without any reference to that conception. The evidence shows that the defendants have been engaged in the manufacture of egg boxes made of veneering, but they have paid no attention whatever to the matter of turning the sides of the lumber in any particular way. And, indeed, if the claims of the patent are valid, the making of these boxes would constitute an infringement of the plaintiffs’ monopoly, no matter how made. The first claim seems to be for a box, the ends of which consist of a single thickness of readjusted lumber, with the sides of similar lumber, but less in thickness than the ends, with the side pieces held to the end pieces by nails. Under this claim there is no requirement that the lumber shall be of any particular thickness, or that the compact sides should be turned in any particular way. Any making of a box from any kind of veneering, if there were a difference in thickness between the sides and the ends, would violate the patent.

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Bluebook (online)
89 F. 197, 32 C.C.A. 186, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2366, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/talbot-v-fear-ca9-1898.