Talbert v. PLANNING COMMISSION, CITY OF BOGALUSA

230 So. 2d 920, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 5281
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 2, 1970
Docket7858
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 230 So. 2d 920 (Talbert v. PLANNING COMMISSION, CITY OF BOGALUSA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Talbert v. PLANNING COMMISSION, CITY OF BOGALUSA, 230 So. 2d 920, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 5281 (La. Ct. App. 1970).

Opinion

230 So.2d 920 (1970)

Charlie J. TALBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The PLANNING COMMISSION, CITY OF BOGALUSA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 7858.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

February 2, 1970.

*921 Roy M. Lilly, Jr., Bogalusa, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert T. Rester, Bogalusa, for defendants-appellees.

Before LANDRY, SARTAIN and ELLIS, JJ.

SARTAIN, Judge.

The plaintiff is the owner of property situated adjacent to other property in the City of Bogalusa whose owners sought and obtained a change in zoning to "P" Planned Commercial. This suit was instituted to seek injunctive relief against the Planning Commission and the Mayor and Council of the City of Bogalusa to prevent the proposed change in zoning. The property was rezoned prior to a hearing on the injunction. Plaintiff, reiterating the allegations and prayer of his original petition, filed a supplemental and amending petition seeking to have the ordinance adopted by the Commission Council declared void and invalid on the grounds that the applicants for the change in zoning had applied to the Planning Commission, and, accordingly, that the Council of the City of Bogalusa had acted on the recommendation of the wrong body contrary to the ordinances of the City of Bogalusa and the applicable provisions of our statutory law.

Defendants filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action which was sustained by the trial judge. Our review of this case leads us to the conclusion that the trial judge erred when he sustained the exception and his decision in this respect should be reversed and the matter remanded.

L.R.S. 33:101 et seq. provides for the creation of a planning commission for the physical development of parishes and municipalities. Section 106 prescribes its powers and duties.[1]

L.R.S. 33:4726 et seq. provides for municipal zoning regulations, the creation of a zoning commission and the procedure to be followed in changing previously existing zoning regulations.[2]

*922 Acting pursuant to the aforementioned statutes the City of Bogalusa created a planning commission[3] and delegated to it certain responsibilities.[4] The city ordinances also provided that the planning commission thus created would also serve as the zoning commission.[5]

Counsel for defendants in his peremptory exception alleged that the petitions, original and supplemental, of plaintiff do not allege the violation of any state statute permitting or a city ordinance establishing the creation of the Planning and Zoning Commission for the City of Bogalusa; that the petitions failed to disclose a violation of any city ordinance or state statute regulating the meetings of the Planning and Zoning Commission for the City of Bogalusa, and that the petitions of plaintiff failed to allege that proper notice was not given prior to the hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Bogalusa. Alternatively, defendants allege that if the petitions of plaintiff disclose violations of the zoning laws of the City of Bogalusa or of the State of Louisiana, then the governing authority of the City of Bogalusa had the unquestioned right "to independently make any changes relative to zoning" under the provisions of Section 24-15 of Article VIII of the city's Code of Ordinances.[6]

*923 In consideration of an exception of no cause of action, it is fundamental that the court consider every reasonable hypothesis of facts admissible under the pleadings and in addition thereto the allegations of fact contained in the petition for the purpose of considering the exception are accepted as true. See Poynter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 140 So.2d 42 (3d La.App., 1962, cert. den. 1962); Steagall v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., et al, 138 So.2d 433 (3d La.App., 1962); Rogers v. T. L. James & Company, 128 So.2d 829 (3d La.App., 1961); Granger v. Stine, 127 So.2d 228 (3d La.App., 1961); and Bergeron v. Greyhound Corporation, 100 So.2d 923 (1st La.App., 1958).

With these considerations in mind we look to the plaintiff's petition and find that in essence he alleges that application for the change in zoning was erroneously made to the Planning Commission instead of the Zoning Commission of the City of Bogalusa. The question then arises as to whether or not there is a distinction between the Planning Commission and the Zoning Commission as authorized by L.R.S. 33:101 et seq. and L.R.S. 33:4721 et seq. We are of the opinion that though these bodies are composed of the same personnel, they have different functions, possess different authority, and when acting as either the Planing Commission or the Zoning Commission they must hold separate meetings with separate minutes.[7]

Plaintiff's petition alleges specifically that at the public hearing conducted by the Planning Commission he opposed their action on the application. His objection was not adhered to. Plaintiff's petition further alleges that when the matter was acted on by the Commission Council of Bogalusa, he again urged that the wrong commission had considered the application for the change in zoning and therefore any followup action by the Council would be invalid as being contrary to L.R.S. 33:4726.[8] His objection again went unheeded.

In Mills v. City of Baton Rouge, 210 La. 830, 28 So.2d 447 (1947) the Supreme Court of Louisiana considered in detail L.R.S. 33:4726 and particularly the last paragraph thereof which states that "Where a municipal planning commission exists it shall be the zoning commission". In Mills the Commission Council of the City of Baton Rouge had acted upon a recommendation of the Zoning Commission after there was created a Planning Commission. These two independent bodies were composed of different personnel and continued in existence. In upholding the decision of the trial court which declared the ordinance null and void, the Supreme Court of Louisiana declared that when the Planning Commission was created it became the Zoning Commission and the latter ceased to exist. In explaining its reasons the court stated: (28 So.2d 447, 449, 450, 451)

"Act No. 240 of 1926 is patterned after a standard zoning enabling act prepared by the advisory committee on zoning of the Department of Commerce. 15 A.B.A. Jour. 536; 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed.Rev., Section 1032, page 431; Legal Aspects of Local Planning and Zoning in Louisiana, 6 La.L.Rev. 495, 504. The Secretary of Commerce, Hoover, had this committee appointed to prepare a standard enabling act to meet the great demand for zoning legislation. This standard enabling act is a general *924 delegation of power to a city to regulate and control the use of property in zoning districts established by ordinance. By 1926, the year in which the Louisiana zoning statute was adopted, this standard act had been the basis of the enabling acts of 20 states. City of Bismarck v. Hughes et al., 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711.
The last sentence of the section of the standard enabling act which corresponds to Section 6 of the Louisiana act reads as follows: `Where a city plan commission already exists, it may be appointed as the Zoning Commission.' McQuillin, loc. cit. supra.

* * * * * *

It is true that Act No. 305 of 1926 does not contain any provision regulating and restricting the erection, construction, alteration, or use of buildings, structures, or land.

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Bluebook (online)
230 So. 2d 920, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 5281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/talbert-v-planning-commission-city-of-bogalusa-lactapp-1970.