Taiwan Civil Rights Litigation Organization v. Kuomintang Business Management Committee

Ninth Circuit

Taiwan Civil Rights Litigation Organization v. Kuomintang Business Management Committee

486 F. App'x 671

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 17, 2012

Docket11-17717

StatusUnpublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 486 F. App'x 671 (Taiwan Civil Rights Litigation Organization v. Kuomintang Business Management Committee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Taiwan Civil Rights Litigation Organization v. Kuomintang Business Management Committee, 486 F. App'x 671 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs Fort Night Holdings LLC and Pacific Sentry Associates, LLC appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging quasi-contract and other claims as barred by the statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See Stanley v. Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that plaintiffs’ quasi-contract claim began to accrue in 1950 and, thus, was barred by the statute of limitations. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir.2008) (under California law “[a] cause of action accrues when the claim is complete with all of its elements”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ first amended complaint without leave to amend after concluding that the quasi-contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the related claims similarly failed. See id. at 1060 (where plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations, amendment would be futile).

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the district court did not err by addressing the *672 statute of limitations issue sua sponte in ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 686-87 (9th Cir.1993) (permitting district courts to sua sponte consider the issue of statute of limitations where defendant has not waived the defense and plaintiff has been given a chance to address the issue); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986) (requiring district courts in addressing a motion for default judgment to evaluate the “sufficiency of the complaint”).

Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the statute of repose are unavailing because their claims would still be untimely.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs Fort Night Holdings LLC and Pacific Sentry Associates, LLC appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging quasi-contract and other claims as barred by the statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See Stanley v. Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that plaintiffs’ quasi-contract claim began to accrue in 1950 and, thus, was barred by the statute of limitations. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir.2008) (under California law “[a] cause of action accrues when the claim is complete with all of its elements”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ first amended complaint without leave to amend after concluding that the quasi-contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the related claims similarly failed. See id. at 1060 (where plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations, amendment would be futile).

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the district court did not err by addressing the *672 statute of limitations issue sua sponte in ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 686-87 (9th Cir.1993) (permitting district courts to sua sponte consider the issue of statute of limitations where defendant has not waived the defense and plaintiff has been given a chance to address the issue); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986) (requiring district courts in addressing a motion for default judgment to evaluate the “sufficiency of the complaint”).

Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the statute of repose are unavailing because their claims would still be untimely.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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486 F. App'x 671, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taiwan-civil-rights-litigation-organization-v-kuomintang-business-ca9-2012.

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