IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 MICHAEL A. TAITANO, )
N~. DMOSS~::~J~ 3 ) 4 Plaintiff, ) DOMESTIC CASE . ) ' vs. ) ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 6 ROSITA Q. TAITANO, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 7 ) Defendant. ) 8 11------------------------) 9 INTRODUCTION 10 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Plainti:trs complaint for II divorce, filed on August 28, 2012. A bench trial was held on January 16, 2014. Attorney 12 Daniel S. Somerfleck appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Attorney Jeffrey A. Cook represented 13 Defendant. Having considered the parties' evidence, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the 14 Court now issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Guam R. 15 Civ. P. 52 (a). 16 BACKGROUND 17 Tills action arises under an action for dissolution of marriage pursuant to Chapter 8 in 18 Title 19 of the Guam Codes Annotated. On August 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 19 divorce from Defendant based upon the ground of extreme cruelty, and in the alternative, 20 irreconcilable differences. (Compl., 2, Aug. 28, 2012). Plaintiff further requests from the Court 21 the following: an award of the parties' community property to Plaintiff as his sole and separate 22 property; an order against Plaintiff to pay for the "Mortgage with Guam Housing Corporation" 23 on real property located at 349 C. Chalan Manha, Dededo, Guam 96929; a reduction in the time 24 , for a final decree of divorce and a grant of a final decree of divorce; and a reversion of the Defendant's name to her maiden name. Id. at 2-3. On October 29, 2012, Defendant filed an 26 Answer, wherein she denies that she treated Plaintiff with extreme cruelty and she seeks a 27 divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. (Answer, 1-2, Oct. 29, 2012). Defendant 28 further denies Plaintiff's characterization of certain properties as community property and
Page 1 ofll argues that both the house and the lot located at 349 C. Chalan Maoha, Dededo, Guaru 96929 2 (hereinafter "Lot No. l 0067-9-2-1-1 ") are community property. !d. 3 FINDINGS OF FACT 4 In a bench trial, "the judge weighs the evidence, determines the credibility of the 5 witnesses, and finds the facts." United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1293 (4th Cir. 1987). By
6 a preponderance of the evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact: 7 I. Plaintiff began his employment as a police officer with the Guam Port Authority in 8 1990. He had 22 years of service with the Guaru Port Authority when he retired in July
9 2012. 10 2. On September 21, 1991, Plaintiff and Defendant were married. 11 3. Defendant testified that she was arrested twice for family violence against Plaintiff and 12 his son. In the first incident, Defendant was in an argument with Plaintiff. When 13 Defendant tried to get her driver's license out of a vehicle, Plaintiff allegedly choked
14 her. Defendant then bit his hand to release her neck. Plaintiff was not charged with any 15 crime. Defendant testified that she was charged and convicted of family violence 16 regarding the first incident. In the second incident, Defendant was accused of slapping 17 Plaintitrs son. Defendant testified that she was charged and convicted of family 18 violence for the second incident. 19 4. On August 1, 2001. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a stipulated permanent 20 restraining order in domestic case Taitano v. Taitano. DM 0329-01 (Super. Ct. Guam 21 August I, 2001) (hereinafter "DM0329-01") requiring them to stay away and not come 22 within 1,000 feet of each other. 23 5. Defendant testified that the date of separation was in 2002 because Plaintiff allowed 24 Defendant to move back in the house after the second restraining order in 2001. 2s Defendant further testified that the reconciliation lasted for around three months. 26 Plaintiff testified that Defendant lived with him for a few months after the second 27 restraining order. 28
Page 2 of l1 6. Prior to the second restraining order, Defendant testified that she was taking care of
2 Plaintiff's disabled son. 3 7. Plaintiff testified that the reason for the divorce was Defendant's mental and physical
4 violence toward him. 5 8. Plaintiff testified that he was never physically violent toward Defendant. 6 9. Plaintiff did not file for a divorce earlier because it would have disrupted his work. 7 10. On July 7, 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant obtained a loan in the amount of $94,000.00 8 from the Guam Housing Corporation to construct a house on Lot No. 10067-9-2-1.
9 II. Lot No. 10067-9-2-1 is Plaintiff's separate property and Defendant is not claiming any 10 ownership interest in the lot. 11 12. Defendant has not made any payments toward the loan with the Guam Housing 12 Corporation since the parties' separation. Plaintiff has made monthly payments of n $875.96 toward the loan, for a total of$129,641.00. As of July 19, 2013, the remaining 14 principal balance of the loan was $24,076.00. 15 13. Defendant did not make a payment toward the loan with the Guam Housing Corporation 16 after separating with Plaintiff. 17 14. In a realtor's assessment on November 11, 2013 obtained by Plaintiff, the recommended 18 low listing price was $100,000.00, the recommended high listing price was $240,000.00, 19 and the recommended listing price was $195,167.00. 20 15. Based on the valuation by the Department of Revenue and Taxation (hereinafter 21 "DRT"), in 1996, the appraised value of the lot was $78,152.00 and the appraised value 22 ofthe house was $90,000.00. 23 16. Based on the valuation by DRT, in 2012, the appraised value of the lot was $56,808.00 24 and the appraised value of the house was $90,000.00. 25 17. The parties have the following community property: 26 a. Plaintiff's Port Authority of Guam retirement fund accumulated during the 21 parties marriage; 28 b. House Improvements located at Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1;
Page 3 of 1l c. Household furnishing and appliances. 2 18. The parties have the following community debts: 3 a. Mortgage with Guam Housing Corporation for the house located at Lot No. 4 10067-9-2-1-1. 5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 6 The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursnant to 7 GCA § 3105. The Court will 1 first discuss whether there are grounds for divorce under 19 GCA § 8205, and then discuss the
8 appropriate division of property nnder 19 GCA § 8203. 9 I. Grounds for Divorce to Plaintiff seeks a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, and in the alternative, 11 irreconcilable differences. Defendant disputes extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce, but does 12 not contest irreconcilable differences as a ground for divorce.
13 Under Guam law, "[e}xtreme cruelty is the wrongful infliction of grievous bodily injury, 14 or grievous mental suffering, upon the other by one party to the marriage." 19 GCA §8205 15 (2005). Section 8205 derives from former California Civil Code § 94, and therefore, California 16 cases interpreting section 94 are persuasive. See Cruz v. Cruz, 2005 Guam 3 ~ 9. The 17 California Courts have recognized that this provision "neither sharply defines nor definitely 18 limits the phrase 'extreme cruelty' but merely describes it in general terms, leaving a wide range 19 of discretion with the trial court." Mcfall v. Mcfall, 136 P.2d 580, 582 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 20 1943) (citing Andrews v. Andrews, 52 P. 298, 299 (Cal. 1898)). Therefore, "[e]ach case must 21 be determined according to its own particular circumstances, by the good sense and judgment of 22 the court, keeping always in view the intelligence, apparent refmement and delicacy of
23 sentiment of the complaining party." Id. (citations omitted). 24 In this case, Plaintiff seeks divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty based on
25 Defendant's alleged physical and mental abuse against Plaintiff and his son. In support of this 26 contention, Plaintiff raises two charges against the Defendant for family violence. In DM0329- 27 01, the parties entered into a stipulated permanent restraining order, but the parties continued to 28 live together for a few months after the issuance of the order. Furthermore, Plaintiff filed for
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divorce approximately ten years after the issuance of the order. Plaintiff's reason for the delay 1 2 is that he did not want to be disrupted with his work. Considering that the parties continued to 3 live together even after the pennanent restraining order and that Plaintiff did not commence the 4 suit until approximately 10 years after the parties -separated, the Court finds that extreme cruelty 5 cannot be a ground for divorce given the evidence presented at trial. /d. 6 In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. 7 Defendant does not contest this ground for divorce. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff a 8 divorce from Defendant on the ground of irreconcilable differences. 9 II. Division of Property 10 Under Guam law, "[i]n a divorce action, a trial court has broad discretion to divide 11 community assets in any fashion which complies with the provisions of the applicable statute."
12 Navarro v. Navarro, 2000 Guam 31 , 8. The applicable Guam statute here, the Dissolution of 13 Marriage statute, provides that community property shall be divided equally between the parties
14 unless the ground for divorce was adultery or extreme cruelty. 19 GCA § 84ll(b) (2005). 15 Having determined above that extreme cruelty is not a ground for divorce in this case, the 16 community property shall be divided equally between the parties. /d. However, division does
17 not have to be mathematically equal. Sinlao v. Sinlao, 2005 Guam 24 ~ 23. 18 a. Community Debt: The Mortgage with the Guam Housing Corporation 19 A community debt is a "debt contracted or incurred by either or both spouses during 20 marriage which is not a separate debt." 19 GCA § 6102(b) (2005). The Supreme Court of 21 Guam has adopted the well-settled rule in California that "the community property to be divided 22
23 1 According to Guam law, a dissolution of marriage must be denied "[i]n all other cases when there is an
unreasonable lapse of time before the commencement of the action." 19 GCA § 8314(c) (2005). "Unreasonable 24 lapse oftime is such a delay in commencing the action as [sic] establishes the presumption that there has been a connivance, collusion, or condonation of the offense, or full acquiescence in the same, with intent to continue the 25 marriage relation notwithstanding the commission of such offense." 19 GCA § 8315 (2005). This presumption "arising from lapse oftime may be rebutted by showing reasonable grounds for the delay in commencing the 26 action." 19 GCA § 8316 (2005). The parties do not dispute the fact that Plaintiff filed for divorce approximately I 0 years after the parties separated. The Court fmds that Plaintiff's reason that he did not commence the suit earlier 27 due to a potential disruption to his work is not a sufficient ground to overcome this presumption. Therefore, there is a presumption of a connivance, collusion, or condonation of the offense, or full acquiescence in the same, with 28 intent to continue the marriage relation. 19 GCA § 8315 (2005).
Page5ofll upon dissolution of marriage is the residue which remains after the discharge of the community
2 obligations." Babauta v. Babauta, 2011 Guam 15 ~ 36 (citing Wong v. Super. Ct. (Wong), 54
3 Cal. Rptr. 782,784 (Ct. App. 1966)). Furtbermore, 19 GCA § 6104 (a) (2005) provides:
4 Community debts shall be satisfied first from all community property and all 5 property in which the spouses own an undivided equal interest as joint tenants or tenants in common, excluding the residence of the spouses. Should such property 6 be insufficient, community debts shall then be satisfied from the residence of the spouses. Should such property be insufficient, only the separate property of the 7 spouse who contracted or incurred the debt shall be liable for its satisfaction. If 8 both spouses contracted or incurred the debt, the separate property of both spouses is jointly and severally liable for its satisfaction. 9 19 GCA § 6104 (a) (2005). 10 In this case, during their marriage on July 7, 1994, the parties executed a mortgage on II Lot No. 10067-9-2-l-1 with Guam Housing Corporation in exchange for $94,000.00. Because 12 the debt was incurred during their marriage and both parties are named on the mortgage, the 13 Court finds that the mortgage is community debt. 14 Pursuant to Guam law, the "[i]ncome of a spouse while living separate and apart from 15 the other spouse is separate property." Babauta, 2011 Guam 15 ~ 32; 19 GCA § 6101(a)(2) 16 (2005). The Supreme Court of Guam has found that "[a]s a general rule, a spouse who, after 17 separation of the parties, uses his or her separate funds to pay preexisting community 18 obligations should be reimbursed upon divorce." Babauta, 2011 Guam 15 ~ 32 (citing In re 19 Marriage of Epstein, 592 P.2d 1165, 1170 (Cal. 1979)). However, the Supreme Court of Guam 20 has recognized that reimbursement may be inappropriate in the following situations: 21 where there was an agreement between the parties that the payment would not be 22 reimbursed; where the paying spouse truly intended the payment to constitute a 23 gift; where the payment was made on account of a debt for an asset which the paying spouse was using and the amount paid was not substantially in excess of 24 the value of the use; or where the payment constituted in reality a discharge of 25 the paying spouse's duty to support the other spouse or a dependent child of the parties. 26 Id. (citing Epstein, 592 P.2d at 1170). 27 In this case, it is uncontroverted that Plaintiff expended his separate funds to make the 28 mortgage payments after the parties' separation. It is further uncontroverted that Plaintiff made
Page 6 of 11 monthly payments of $875.96 toward the mortgage since the separation. There being no 2 evidence of an agreement that the payments would not be reimbursed or that they constituted a 3 gift, Plaintiff is thus entitled to credit or reimbursement for half of the payments he made on the 4 residence after separation of the parties. See Babauta, at ~ 34. Considering the fact that the 5 parties both testified that they lived together for a few months after the stipulated permanent 6 restraining order was issued on August 1, 2001, the Court finds that the parties entered into 1 permanent physical separation on or about November 1, 2001. Having so determined, Plaintiff s has expended his separate funds for 11 years and 8 months, for a total of 140 months, up to the 9 July 7, 2013 date when there was a remaining principal balance of $24,076.13. (Defendant's 10 Exhibit 2, Jan. 13, 2014). Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a reimbursement of $60,057.20, 11 calculated as follows: 140 months multiplied by $857.96 divided by two, which equals 12 $60,057.20. The remaining principal balance of $24,076.13 shall be satisfied first from all 13 community property and all property in which the spouses own an undivided equal interest as 14 joint tenants or tenants in common, and if such property is insufficient, then the remaining 15 balance shall be satisfied from the residence of the parties. See Babauta, 2011 Guam 15 ~ 36; 16 19 GCA § 6104 (a) (2005). 11 b. Retirement Fund 18 Under Guam law, the "right to retirement benefits is a property interest, and to the extent 19 that the interest derives from employment during the marriage, it is a community asset." Hart v. 20 Hart, 2008 Guam II ~ 26 (citing In reMarriage of Lehman, 955 P.2d 451, 459 (Cal. 1998)); 21 see also 19 GCA § 6101 (b) (2005) ("Community property means property acquired by either 22 spouse during marriage which is not separate property."). Therefore, the right to Plaintiff's 23 retirement fund is a property interest that may be characterized as community property which 24 may be divided in the dissolution of a martiage. Hart, 2008 Guam II ~ 26. 25 In determining the amount of the retirement fund assets to be divided between each 26 party, the Supreme Court of Guam has adopted the use of the apportionment equation in Sablan 21 v. Sablan, 1979 WL 15117 at *1-2 (D. Guam App. Div. Feb. 15, 1979). !d. at~ 26. In Sablan, 28 the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam approved the use of the following
Page 7 of II apportionment equation to calculate a party's entitlement to the community property of a 2 retirement fund: one half times the total retirement pay times the fraction represented by the 3 length of marriage in the numemtor and the total length of military service in the denominator. 4 Hart, 2008 Guam II ~ 28 n.20 (citing Sablan, 1979 WL I 5117 at *I). 5 In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff retired in July 2012. Between August 7, 2012 6 and November 15, 2013, Plaintiff has been receiving disbursements of his retirement benefit in 7 the accumulated amount of $105,043.67. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Jan. 10, 2014). Because the s parties were married on September 21, 1991 and separated on or about November I, 2001, the
9 Court finds that the parties were together for approximately 10 of Plaintiff's 22 years of service. 10 Applying the above formula to this case, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to one 11 half times $105,04 3.67 (total retirement pay) times I 0/22 (the fraction represented by the length 12 of marriage in the numerator and the total length of service in the denominator), which equals
13 $23,873.56. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to $23,873.56 as her interest in the already 14 disbursed retirement benefits, and the Court hereby orders that Defendant is entitled to 5/22 15 (approximately 22.72%) of Plaintiff's future benefits from the retirement fund.
16 c. Increase in the Value of Lot No.10067-9-2-1-1 11 It is undisputed that the house is an enhancement to Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1, Plaintiff's
18 separate property. Defendant seeks reimbursement for funds she expended to improve the 19 value of Plaintiff's separate property. (Defendant's Proposed Finds. Fact & Cone!. L., 2, Feb.
20 14, 2014). 21 Guam law directs that an enhancement made to separate property allows the community 22 property holder to seek reimbursement for community funds contributed during the marriage 23 toward that asset. Rinehart v. Rinehart, 2000 Guam 14 m!l9-20. However, "absent proof of 24 the enhancement of a spouse's separate property, there should be no reimbursement to the
25 community." Navarro v. Navarro, 2000 Guam 31 ~ 16 (citing Rinehart, 2000 Guam 14 n 19- 26 20). 27 In this case, the house was constructed with the proceeds from the loan the parties 28 obtained during the marriage. The house was constructed with community funds during the
Page 8 of 11 marriage and is therefore community property. 19 GCA § 610l(b) (2005). Thus Defendant is 2 entitled to reimbursement for the amount that the house improved the value of Lot No. I0067-9- 3 2-1-1. 4 Defendant seeks $24,096.00 for the increased value of Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1. 5 (Defendant's Proposed Finds. Fact & Cone!. L., 4, Feb. 14, 2014). This amount is deduced 6 from the following calculation: 7 I. Based on DRT's valuation in 1996, Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1 was valued at $78,152.00 8 and the house was valued at $90,000, for a total of$168,152.00. (Defendant's Exhibit 4, 9 Jan. 13, 2014). w 2. On November 11, 2013, a realtor assigned a recommended listing price for the house
11 and the lot of$195,000. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, Jan. 10, 2014). 12 3. Based on DRT's valuation in 2012, Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1 was valued at $56,808.00, a 13 reduction of $21,344.00 from the valuation in 1996. (Defendant's Exhibit 6, Jan. 13, 14 2014). 15 4. Defendant subtracts the 2012 valuation of the lot ($56,808.00) from the value assigned 16 by the realtor ($195,000.00) to artive at the calculation that the house's value is 17 $138,192.00. 18 5. Defendant takes this $138,192.00 amount and subtracts $90,000.00 (the valuation of the 19 house by DRT in 1996) to artive at the fignre $48,192.00. Defendant suggests that this 20 is the amount by which Plaintiff's separate property lot increased. 21 6. Defendant states that he is entitled to one half of this increased value, in the amount of
22 $24,096.00. 23 (Defendant's Proposed Finds. Fact & Cone!. L., 2-4, Feb. 14, 2014). 24 The above calculation is problematic on multiple fronts. First, the calculation is based 25 on figures from DRT and a realtor, and their methods of calculating may not necessarily be
26 consistent. Thus the Court is apprehensive toward calculating the increase in the value of a
27 property when the calculation is based on valuations from two different sources. Second, the
28 Court is perplexed as to why Defendant failed to incorporate DRT's 2012 valuation of the house
Page 9 of! I in its calculations and instead relied on a single realtor's valuation, when Defendant adopted 2 DRT's 1996 valuation of the house for its calculation. The use ofDRT's valuation of the house 3 in 2012 would have led to a more consistent calculation as to the change in the value of the lot. 4 Third, Defendant is seeking reimbursement for the increase in the value of separate property for 5 a period after she separated with Defendant on November 1, 2001. However, Defendant is only 6 entitled to reimbursement for the amount of community property that was expended to enhance 7 Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1 during their marriage. Rinehart, 2000 Guam 14111119-20. Accordingly, 8 Defendant is not entitled to reimbursement for the enhancement of Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1 after 9 separation. 10 The Court was not presented with sufficient evidence relating to the value of Lot No. 11 10067-9-2-1-1 before or at the time of their marriage and the value of Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1 at 12 the time of separation. Therefore, the Court is unable to calculate the amount of the increased 13 value of the separate property lot at this time. However, Defendant is entitled to one half of the 14 enhancement to Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1 from the time of their marriage to the date of their
15 separation. 16 d. Household Furnishings and Appliances 17 Plaintiff claims that household furnishings and appliances are community property. 18 (Compl., 2, Aug. 28, 2012). Defendant argues that the household furnishings and appliances are 19 her separate property. (Answer, 1-2, Oct. 29, 2012). Neither the evidence presented at ttial nor 20 the submitted trial briefs specifically address these items for this Court to adequately determine 21 the nature of these items and the amount of each item. Thus this Court is unable to determine 22 the division of the property as to the household furnishings and appliances at this time. 23 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 24 In accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, the Court
25 orders that: 26 1. Plaintiff and Defendant are entitled to a divorce from Defendant on the ground of 27 irreconcilable differences. Since six months have expired after the filing of Plaintiff's 28
Page 10 of 11 complaint for divorce, an entry of a Final Decree of Divorce is ordered at this time 2 pursuantto 19 GCA § 8322 (2005). 3 2. The mortgage with the Guam Housing Corporation is deemed to be community debt. 4 Defendant shall reimburse Plaintiff $60,057.20 for the mortgage payments already paid. 5 The remaining balance of$24,076. 13 shall be paid off evenly by the parties. 6 3, The property of the marriage is to be distributed as follows: 1 a. Defendant is entitled to $23,873.56 of the already disbursed retirement benefits 8 from Plaintiff, and the Court hereby orders that Defendant is entitled to 5/22 9 (approximately 22.72%) of Plaintiff's future benefits from the retirement fnnd. 10 4. Defendant shall submit further documentation and briefs relating to Defendant's 11 entitlement to the enhancement of Lot No. 10067-9-2-1-1, the house on the lot, and 12 household furnishing and appliances consistent with the Court's analysis within seven 13 (7) days of the issuance of this order? Plaintiff shall submit its own documentation and brief within seven (7) days of the filing of Defendant's documentation and/or briefs.
This matter is set for further proceedings on April 16, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. 17
18 SO ORDERED this 28th day of March, 2014. 19
21 SERVICE VIA COURT BOX H6N. JAMES L. CANTO II ---=::: 22 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 23
27 2 The burden to prove valuation "lies with the party who seeks the division of community property." Sinlao v. 28 Sina/o, 2005 Guam 24 '1128 (quoting Navarro v. Navarro, 2000 Guam 31 "19).
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