THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 MARY TAIE, et al., CASE NO. C21-0526-JCC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 TEN BRIDGES LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to amend judgment for 16 prejudgment interest (Dkt. No. 155), Defendants’ cross-motion to amend judgment (Dkt. No. 17 159), and Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of costs (Dkt. No.161). Having thoroughly considered 18 the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the 19 parties’ motions to amend judgment (Dkt. Nos. 155, 159) and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for an 20 award of costs (Dkt. No. 161) for the reasons explained herein. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Clifford Groves died intestate in 2010, leaving Mary 23 Taie, Moyra Coop, and William Groves (collectively “Plaintiffs”) as his only heirs. (See 24 generally Dkt. No. 56.) They inherited their father’s home, subject to a deed of trust. (Id.) In 25 2014, a foreclosure action was filed in state court against the estate based on this deed of trust. 26 (Id.) 1 Ms. Taie was named a defendant in that action, alongside the “unknown heirs” of 2 Clifford Groves. (See Dkt. No. 15-1 at 2) (foreclosure complaint) (capitalization omitted). After 3 a sheriff’s sale of the Groves home, the surplus foreclosure proceeds of $135,224.51 remained, 4 and were held on deposit in the state court registry. (See generally Dkt. 156 at 4) (case payment 5 and disbursement report). Defendant Ten Bridges LLC then reached out to Plaintiffs and 6 contracted with them to execute quitclaim deeds, selling their rights to the foreclosure surplus 7 proceeds for $5,000 each. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 159 at 2.) Defendant Ten Bridges LLC was able to 8 eventually use the quitclaim deeds to successfully petition King County Superior Court to release 9 the surplus proceeds to it. (See Dkt. No. 91-1 at 2–10) (motion for disbursement of surplus 10 funds). 11 After learning of Ten Bridges’ receipt of these surplus funds, Plaintiffs filed a putative 12 class action against Ten Bridges and its principal, Demian Heald, asserting claims under 13 Washington’s Consumer Protection Act and Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, along with 14 non-statutory claims, namely, conversion, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and 15 abuse of the corporate form. (See generally Dkt. No. 56 at1) 16 Following motions practice, the Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs as to their 17 unjust enrichment claim and to Defendants on the remaining claims. (See generally Dkt. No. 18 144.) The Court then entered judgment for Plaintiffs in the amount of $135,224.51—the surplus 19 proceeds Ten Bridges recovered. (See Dkt. No. 154.) The Court now considers the parties’ 20 requests to amend judgment (Dkt. Nos. 155, 159) and Plaintiffs’ request for an award of costs 21 (Dkt. No. 161). 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 A. Motions to Alter or Amend a Judgment 24 A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted on four grounds: (1) to rectify manifest errors of law 25 or fact that underpin the judgment; (2) to introduce newly discovered or previously unavailable 26 evidence; (3) to avert manifest injustice; or (4) an intervening change in controlling law. See 1 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). And a “postjudgment motion 2 for discretionary prejudgment interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the judgment under 3 Rule 59(e).” Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989). 4 1. Defendants’ Motion 5 Defendant Ten Bridges argues that the amount awarded by this Court should be paid to 6 the King County Superior Court’s registry—not Plaintiffs—as only this would restore parties to 7 their state of affairs prior to the sale of the quitclaim deeds. (See Dkt. No. 159 at 4.) They further 8 argue that only the King County Superior Court may disburse the surplus proceeds to Plaintiffs. 9 (See id. at 5–6.) The Court disagrees. There is no need for the proceeds to be re-deposited with 10 the Superior Court because Plaintiffs were entitled to a disbursement of the funds in the first 11 instance. 12 As part of the contract for the quitclaim deeds, Defendant Ten Rivers LLC paid Plaintiffs 13 a total of $15,000. (See Dkt. No. 56 at 7.) The Court previously found this contract void and that 14 allowing Defendants to retain the surplus proceeds would be “manifestly inequitable.” (Dkt. No. 15 144 at 13.) However, just as allowing the Defendants to retain the proceeds of the void contracts 16 would be inequitable, allowing Plaintiffs to retain the payments they received as part of the void 17 contract would result “in a windfall for [Plaintiffs] and effectively impose[] punitive damages 18 against [Defendants].” See Shoemake ex rel. Guardian v. Ferrer, 225 P.3d 990, 992 (Wash. 19 2010). Accordingly, the judgment amount is corrected to $120,224.51. 20 2. Plaintiffs’ Motion 21 Plaintiff s contend they are entitled to prejudgment interest. This “make-whole remedy [] 22 is grounded in the sense of justice . . . that he who retains money which he ought to pay to 23 another should be charged interest on it.” Crest Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 115 P.3d 349, 24 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Washington courts typically 25 grant prejudgment interest solely on claims that are either liquidated or readily assessable, rather 26 than on unliquidated claims. Hansen v. Rothaus, 730 P.2d 662, 664 (Wash. 1986). “A liquidated 1 claim arises from the availability of data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the 2 amount with exactness, without reliance on opinion or discretion.” McLelland v. Paxton, 453 3 P.3d 1, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “Prejudgment interest accrues from the date the claim arose to 4 the date of judgment.” Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Washington Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 972 P.2d 1282, 5 1291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Hansen, 730 P.2d at 666). 6 Defendants argue Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest because, had the 7 funds remained in the King County Superior Court, those funds would not have accrued interest. 8 (See Dkt. No. 159 at 6.) But given the ruling above, the argument is inapt and besides the point: 9 Defendants have enjoyed full use of the funds and deprived Plaintiffs of the same since Plaintiffs 10 quitclaimed their interest(s) in the property to Ten Bridges. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to 11 prejudgment interest of 12% per annum on their liquidated claim (as the amount outstanding is a 12 sum certain). See RCW 19.52.010. And since Plaintiffs are entitled to an amended award of 13 $120,224.51, at 12%, this amounts to prejudgment interest of $81,265.19. 14 B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Costs 15 Separately, Plaintiffs’ move for an award of $7,279.26 for court and service fees, 16 deposition costs, and statutory attorney fees. (See Dkt. No. 161.) Defendants do not oppose this 17 motion. (See Dkt. No. 167.) 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that: 20 1. Defendants’ motion to amend judgment (Dkt. No.
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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 MARY TAIE, et al., CASE NO. C21-0526-JCC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 TEN BRIDGES LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to amend judgment for 16 prejudgment interest (Dkt. No. 155), Defendants’ cross-motion to amend judgment (Dkt. No. 17 159), and Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of costs (Dkt. No.161). Having thoroughly considered 18 the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the 19 parties’ motions to amend judgment (Dkt. Nos. 155, 159) and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for an 20 award of costs (Dkt. No. 161) for the reasons explained herein. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Clifford Groves died intestate in 2010, leaving Mary 23 Taie, Moyra Coop, and William Groves (collectively “Plaintiffs”) as his only heirs. (See 24 generally Dkt. No. 56.) They inherited their father’s home, subject to a deed of trust. (Id.) In 25 2014, a foreclosure action was filed in state court against the estate based on this deed of trust. 26 (Id.) 1 Ms. Taie was named a defendant in that action, alongside the “unknown heirs” of 2 Clifford Groves. (See Dkt. No. 15-1 at 2) (foreclosure complaint) (capitalization omitted). After 3 a sheriff’s sale of the Groves home, the surplus foreclosure proceeds of $135,224.51 remained, 4 and were held on deposit in the state court registry. (See generally Dkt. 156 at 4) (case payment 5 and disbursement report). Defendant Ten Bridges LLC then reached out to Plaintiffs and 6 contracted with them to execute quitclaim deeds, selling their rights to the foreclosure surplus 7 proceeds for $5,000 each. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 159 at 2.) Defendant Ten Bridges LLC was able to 8 eventually use the quitclaim deeds to successfully petition King County Superior Court to release 9 the surplus proceeds to it. (See Dkt. No. 91-1 at 2–10) (motion for disbursement of surplus 10 funds). 11 After learning of Ten Bridges’ receipt of these surplus funds, Plaintiffs filed a putative 12 class action against Ten Bridges and its principal, Demian Heald, asserting claims under 13 Washington’s Consumer Protection Act and Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, along with 14 non-statutory claims, namely, conversion, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and 15 abuse of the corporate form. (See generally Dkt. No. 56 at1) 16 Following motions practice, the Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs as to their 17 unjust enrichment claim and to Defendants on the remaining claims. (See generally Dkt. No. 18 144.) The Court then entered judgment for Plaintiffs in the amount of $135,224.51—the surplus 19 proceeds Ten Bridges recovered. (See Dkt. No. 154.) The Court now considers the parties’ 20 requests to amend judgment (Dkt. Nos. 155, 159) and Plaintiffs’ request for an award of costs 21 (Dkt. No. 161). 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 A. Motions to Alter or Amend a Judgment 24 A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted on four grounds: (1) to rectify manifest errors of law 25 or fact that underpin the judgment; (2) to introduce newly discovered or previously unavailable 26 evidence; (3) to avert manifest injustice; or (4) an intervening change in controlling law. See 1 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). And a “postjudgment motion 2 for discretionary prejudgment interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the judgment under 3 Rule 59(e).” Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989). 4 1. Defendants’ Motion 5 Defendant Ten Bridges argues that the amount awarded by this Court should be paid to 6 the King County Superior Court’s registry—not Plaintiffs—as only this would restore parties to 7 their state of affairs prior to the sale of the quitclaim deeds. (See Dkt. No. 159 at 4.) They further 8 argue that only the King County Superior Court may disburse the surplus proceeds to Plaintiffs. 9 (See id. at 5–6.) The Court disagrees. There is no need for the proceeds to be re-deposited with 10 the Superior Court because Plaintiffs were entitled to a disbursement of the funds in the first 11 instance. 12 As part of the contract for the quitclaim deeds, Defendant Ten Rivers LLC paid Plaintiffs 13 a total of $15,000. (See Dkt. No. 56 at 7.) The Court previously found this contract void and that 14 allowing Defendants to retain the surplus proceeds would be “manifestly inequitable.” (Dkt. No. 15 144 at 13.) However, just as allowing the Defendants to retain the proceeds of the void contracts 16 would be inequitable, allowing Plaintiffs to retain the payments they received as part of the void 17 contract would result “in a windfall for [Plaintiffs] and effectively impose[] punitive damages 18 against [Defendants].” See Shoemake ex rel. Guardian v. Ferrer, 225 P.3d 990, 992 (Wash. 19 2010). Accordingly, the judgment amount is corrected to $120,224.51. 20 2. Plaintiffs’ Motion 21 Plaintiff s contend they are entitled to prejudgment interest. This “make-whole remedy [] 22 is grounded in the sense of justice . . . that he who retains money which he ought to pay to 23 another should be charged interest on it.” Crest Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 115 P.3d 349, 24 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Washington courts typically 25 grant prejudgment interest solely on claims that are either liquidated or readily assessable, rather 26 than on unliquidated claims. Hansen v. Rothaus, 730 P.2d 662, 664 (Wash. 1986). “A liquidated 1 claim arises from the availability of data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the 2 amount with exactness, without reliance on opinion or discretion.” McLelland v. Paxton, 453 3 P.3d 1, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “Prejudgment interest accrues from the date the claim arose to 4 the date of judgment.” Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Washington Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 972 P.2d 1282, 5 1291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Hansen, 730 P.2d at 666). 6 Defendants argue Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest because, had the 7 funds remained in the King County Superior Court, those funds would not have accrued interest. 8 (See Dkt. No. 159 at 6.) But given the ruling above, the argument is inapt and besides the point: 9 Defendants have enjoyed full use of the funds and deprived Plaintiffs of the same since Plaintiffs 10 quitclaimed their interest(s) in the property to Ten Bridges. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to 11 prejudgment interest of 12% per annum on their liquidated claim (as the amount outstanding is a 12 sum certain). See RCW 19.52.010. And since Plaintiffs are entitled to an amended award of 13 $120,224.51, at 12%, this amounts to prejudgment interest of $81,265.19. 14 B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Costs 15 Separately, Plaintiffs’ move for an award of $7,279.26 for court and service fees, 16 deposition costs, and statutory attorney fees. (See Dkt. No. 161.) Defendants do not oppose this 17 motion. (See Dkt. No. 167.) 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that: 20 1. Defendants’ motion to amend judgment (Dkt. No. 159) is GRANTED in part and 21 DENIED in part. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue an amended judgment in the 22 amount of $120,224.51. 23 2. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend judgment (Dkt. No. 155) is GRANTED in part and 24 DENIED in part. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue an amended judgment to include 25 $81,265.19 in prejudgment interest. 26 3. Plaintiffs’ motion for costs (Dkt. No. 161) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to 1 issue an amended judgment reflecting $7,279.26 in costs. 2 3 4 DATED this 18th day of April 2024. 5 A 6 7 8 John C. Coughenour 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26