Tai v. Varanasi

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: August 15, 2022
• Docket: 3:20-cv-08669
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

10 ALYSSA TAI, 11 Plaintiff, No. C 20-08669 WHA

12 v.

13 CHANDRA VARANASI, et al., ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS 14 Defendants.

15 16 Plaintiff Tai applied for a job via Craigslist to be a housekeeper for Chandra Varanasi 17 whereupon Varanasi allegedly made unwarranted comments and physical advances. Plaintiff 18 argues defendant Varanasi and others should be held liable for the emotional and financial 19 damages she continues to suffer a result of the attack, which took place in September 2019 (Dkt. 20 No. 26-28). Plaintiff’s form complaint cumulatively names Varanasi, “Equinix,” and Craigslist as 21 defendants. However, at a motion hearing on July 28, 2022, plaintiff stated she wishes to pursue 22 the complaint only as to defendant Varanasi. Subject-matter jurisdiction is predicated on federal 23 question and diversity of citizenship. Defendant moves to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) for 24 failure to state a claim and 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that 25 follow, this case is DISMISSED. 26 ANALYSIS 27 A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to 1 to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim is facially plausible when there are 2 sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 3 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a court must take all of 4 the factual allegations in the complaint as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 5 couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual 6 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Ibid. A Rule 7 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that 8 the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. 9 By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 10 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 11 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). 12 1. Federal Question 13 Under federal question jurisdiction “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 14 all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 15 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff argues there is a federal question because “it is a violation of the United 16 States Constitution that the defendant intentionally assaults women at the Silicon Valley for 17 pleasure and declaring free country free rape” (Dkt. 26 at 3). The Constitution, however, does not 18 govern private actions by private individuals. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 19 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield 20 against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” Similarly, that decision 21 involved allegations against defendants who sexual assaulted plaintiff and made vulgar remarks. 22 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned the principle limiting the Constitution to government-only action 23 must stand to “prevent from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between 24 States and the National Government” Id. at 602, 620-1. So too here. Plaintiff’s sexual assault 25 allegations cannot implicate jurisdiction based on the Constitution. 26 Although plaintiff does not allege it, her complaint might fall under Title VII of the Civil 27 Rights Act of 1964. Title VII’s protections, however, apply only to employers with fifteen or 1 certainly fewer than fifteen. Thus, Title VII cannot be a basis for federal jurisdiction. 2 Accordingly, this order finds plaintiff has failed to state a claim arising under federal law. 3 2. Diversity Jurisdiction 4 In relevant part, the diversity jurisdiction statute provides that: 5 “(a) the district court shall have original 6 jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 7 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 8 between…(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district 9 courts shall not have original jurisdiction. . .of an action between citizens of a State and citizens or 10 subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully 11 admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State.” 12 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges she is a citizen of California. 14 Further, it is undisputed that defendant Varanasi is an Indian-citizen currently legally domiciled in 15 California. What remains unclear, however, is whether he has been admitted as a permanent 16 resident as used under Section 1332(a)(2). During the hearing, defense counsel vaguely alluded to 17 defendant’s “resident” status and argued the fact that he is domiciled in California is enough to 18 destroy complete diversity. Plaintiff, on the other hand, repeatedly asserted defendant is on a work 19 visa which he continuously renews. This is a significant issue, as some courts have interpreted 20 “permanent residence” under Section 1332(a)(2) as having the same meaning under the 21 immigration laws, that is, referring to a person lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 22 permanently in the United States. See Talece Inc. v. Zheng Zhang, 2020 WL 5366633 at *2 23 (N.D.Cal., 2020) (Judge Freeman) (distinguishing permanent resident from temporary H-1B 24 worker); Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1348 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1997) 25 (same). The complaint is inadequate on this point, although possibly this point can be cured. 26 Furthermore, this order finds the complaint fails to allege an adequate amount in 27 controversy against defendant Varanasi. In all of the complaints and letters submitted, she only 1 “Equinix” and one billion against Brodcom, Inc. — for theories such as negligent hiring and 2 || failure to train. (Dkt. No. 27 at 5; Dkt. No. 57 at 4). Not once does plaintiff ever allege defendant 3 Varanasi himself is responsible for any damages. (Dkt. No. 1, 25-28, 57). As plaintiff has stated 4 she only wishes to pursue the complaint against defendant Varanasi, this order finds a specific 5 amount in controversy lacking. 6 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The case is 7 DISMISSED. On or before SEPTEMBER 9, 2022, AT NOON, plaintiff may file an amended complaint 8 seeking to cure the foregoing issues, failing which the case shall be dismissed without leave to 9 amend. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 Dated: August 15, 2022.

yes PCoce

15 = 2 LLIAM ALSUP 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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