UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DAKARAIEL IKHANA TAHUTI,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 24-2003 (RDM)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Dakaraiel Ikhana Tahuti, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the United
States Department of Commerce, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, the United States
Census Bureau, and the United States (collectively “Defendants”). A little over four months after
Plaintiff filed suit, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which purports to assert claims under
the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the law of nations, the treaties of the United States,
customary international law, and common law. Dkt. 7 (Am. Compl.). Although the factual basis
for Plaintiff’s claims is difficult to discern, it appears that he contends that the Census Bureau
incorrectly classified his racial and ethnic identity as “Black,” even though he is “an American
aborigine Arawak descendant” and is thus “a foreigner to United States citizenship” and “a
beneficiary of the Maipuri Arauan nation.” Id. at 6, 14. He contends that he is, accordingly, a
victim of fraud, identity theft, forced identity, ethnic cleansing, and various forms of oppression,
id. at 4, and he seeks an order directing the Commerce Department and Census Bureau to correct
their records, $10,000,000 in damages “for each year of identity fraud” that he has endured, id. at
1 1516, 19, and a declaration of his “right to plenipotentiary protections as provided by
international law,” id. at 22.
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Dkt. 9, and the Court
directed that Plaintiff file an opposition to that motion, Dkt. 10. Rather than respond to the
substance of Defendants’ arguments, however, Plaintiff filed what he referred to as a “Rule 15
Response,” but which was, in fact, simply a second amended complaint. Dkt. 12. Because
Plaintiff filed that second amended complaint without Defendants’ consent or leave of the Court,
Defendants moved to strike. Dkt. 14. The Court, in turn, construed Plaintiff’s “Rule 15
Response” as a motion for leave to amend and treated Defendants’ motion to strike as an
opposition to that motion. Min. Order (Feb. 27, 2025). Plaintiff subsequently filed a reply in
support of his motion for leave to amend. Dkt. 16. Although the Court cautioned Plaintiff that
Defendants’ motion to dismiss remained pending and that, if he failed to respond, the Court
might treat the motion as conceded or might dismiss the case for failure to prosecute, Min. Order
(Feb. 27, 2025), Plaintiff did not timely respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. He has,
however, filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, Dkt. 17, which seeks to join
additional parties, and a motion to take judicial notice of administrative facts, Dkt. 18, which, in
substance, responds to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
Dkt. 9, and will DENY Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend, Dkt. 12, Dkt. 17, as futile. The
Court will DENY Defendants’ motion to strike, Dkt. 14, as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff identifies as a tribal and national citizen of the Maipuri Arauan Nation of the
Americas. Dkt. 7 at 3 (Am. Compl.). He filed this action on July 10, 2024, Dkt. 1, and filed an
2 amended complaint on November 13, 2024, Dkt. 7, seeking to “resolve issues related to
[Plaintiff’s] status and rights as a citizen of the Maipuri Arauan Nation,” id. at 4. Although far
from a picture of clarity, Plaintiff’s amended complaint appears to allege that Defendants
violated the Alien Tort Statute, the U.S. Constitution, international law, and the common law by
misclassifying him as “Black” rather than “American Aborigine.” Id. at 3.
Pointing to a letter dated February 6, 2015 from the Office of Inspector General of the
United States Department of Commerce (“Inspector General”), Plaintiff alleges that the
“Inspector General agreed that fraud had been committed against [him] and ordered the [United
States Commerce Department and Census Bureau] to make changes and adjust their records
related to the identity of [Plaintiff].” Id. Plaintiff, however, also attaches a copy of that letter to
his amended complaint, and the letter merely notes that, “[a]fter careful consideration, [the
Office of the Inspector General] decided to refer [his] allegations(s) to management officials at
the U.S. Census Bureau and have requested that they take any action they deem appropriate.”
Dkt. 7-1 at 36. Plaintiff alleges that despite this letter, the Census Bureau has failed to “adjust[]
their records to reflect” Plaintiff’s status as an “American Aborigine as declared in [his
administrative] complaint.” Dkt. 7 at 3.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have committed “crimes against humanity [by]
denying and interfering with [his] rights to access plenipotentiary protections, as provided by
[Plaintiff’s] nations representatives and the laws of the United States of America.” Id. at 4. He
claims that Defendants engaged in “Constructive Fraud, Identity Theft, Forced Identity as a
means to suppress and oppress, Unlawful Conversion, Economic Deception, and Ethnic
Cleansing” in violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. And he
claims that Defendants committed various torts in violation of international law, including
3 “unlawful possession of human beings to be used as human capital, as described in U.S.
President Bill Clinton’[s] Executive Order 13037, . . . [v]iolations of United Nations
International Covenant Convention on Political and Civil Rights, . . . Conspiracy to deprive
rights, Negligence, Intentional, and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress causing
irreparable mental injury.” Id. at 5.
Plaintiff seeks an adjustment in federal records for the claims against the Department of
Commerce and Secretary Raimondo, id. at 19, and a “[d]eclaration of [Plaintiff’s] right to
plenipotentiary protections as provided by international law and awarding such other and further
relief, both special and general, at law or in equity, as the Court may deem just and proper,” id. at
22. He also seeks monetary relief of $10,000,000 per year “for each year of identity fraud”
related to the claim against the Census Bureau. Id. at 15–16.
Shortly after Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. 9. The Court, in turn,
issued a Fox/Neal order, directing Plaintiff to respond to the motion on or before January 17,
2025. Dkt. 10. Plaintiff sought an extension of time to respond, Dkt. 11, and the Court granted
that motion, extending his time to respond to February 15, 2025, Min. Order (Jan. 16, 2025). On
February 16, Plaintiff filed his response, but rather than address the arguments raised in
Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff merely asserted a right to file an amended complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B); asserted that he “can fix the problems the
[Defendants] identified in the motion” by filing an amended complaint; and asserted that “[t]he
amended complaint automatically moots a pending motion to dismiss in most circuits.” Dkt. 12
at 4. The remainder of his response, then, took the form of a putative, second amended
complaint. Id. at 4–23. That putative pleading added new parties, dropped the United States as a
4 party, and revised Plaintiff’s substantive averments while maintaining the same overall theory of
his case. Id.
Defendants, in response, moved to strike the second amended complaint, noting that
Plaintiff had already amended his pleading once as permitted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) and that Plaintiff was not entitled to file a second, amended complaint
without Defendants’ “written consent” or leave of the Court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Dkt. 14 at
3. Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, however, the Court construed his response, Dkt. 12,
as a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and it construed Defendants’ motion to strike
as an opposition to that motion, arguing that the amendment was futile. Dkt. 14. The Court
ordered Plaintiff to file a reply brief in support of his motion for leave to amend on or before
March 14, 2025. Min. Order (Feb. 27, 2025). The Court also cautioned Plaintiff that
Defendants’ motion to dismiss remained pending and that if he did “not respond to that motion
on or before March 14, 2025, the Court may treat the motion as conceded, may decide the
motion without the benefit of Plaintiff’s views, or may dismiss the action for failure to
prosecute.” Id. On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed his (untimely) reply in support of his motion
to amend, Dkt. 16.
Finally, on May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed what the Court will construe as a motion for
leave to file a third amended complaint, adding “two California state officials as defendants,”
Governor Newsom and Director of Public Health Erica Pan. Dkt. 17 at 1. Although that motion
asserts that these additional defendants are necessary parties, a separate filing—Plaintiff’s
Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts—asserts that the California Department of Public Health
has declined “to correct” the challenged Census Bureau classification of Plaintiff’s racial identity
5 in violation of California law and the Alien Tort Act, jus cogens, and Plaintiff’s civil rights. Dkt.
18 at 4-5.
II. ANALYSIS
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will hold his pleadings “to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But “a pro se plaintiff still bears
the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the case,” Price v. College Park Honda,
No. 05-cv-0624, 2006 WL 1102818, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006), including demonstrating that
he has “standing [to pursue] each claim” raised and to pursue “each form of relief” sought,
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). At the motion to dismiss stage, a
challenge to the plaintiff’s standing “may take one of two forms”—it may pose a facial challenge
to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations, or it may pose a factual challenge based on evidence
outside the bounds of the pleadings. Hale v. United States, No. 13-cv-1390, 2015 WL 7760161,
at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015). Here, Defendants raise a facial challenge, which requires the Court
to consider whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also Owner-Operator Indep.
Drivers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 346–47 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plausibly allege the “three elements”
that comprise the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”: injury in fact, causality, and
redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. That is, the plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) a
“concrete,” “particularized,” and “actual or imminent” “invasion of a legally protected interest”
that is (2) “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and (3) “likely” to be
“redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560–61 (quotation marks and citations omitted);
6 Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In this posture, the Court must
accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, Erby v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 2d 180,
182 (D.D.C. 2006), but also assess the “plausibility” of the plaintiff's standing allegations in light
of the relevant context and the Court’s “judicial experience and common sense,” Humane Soc’y
of U.S., 797 F.3d at 8 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)); see also Jerome
Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
In some cases, moreover, a complaint is “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be
absolutely devoid of merit,” thus leaving the court without jurisdiction. Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579
(1904)). Fanciful or conspiratorial allegations, for example, fail to raise a “federal question
suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best
v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C.Cir.1994)); see also Roum v. Bush, 461 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46
(D.D.C. 2006) (“Complaints that are comprised of ‘fanciful claims’ and ‘bizarre conspiracy
theories’ are generally subject to dismissal on that basis.” (quoting Bestor v. Lieberman, No. 03-
cv-1470, 2005 WL 681460, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2005)). Similarly, where the Court is unable
to discern any conceivable federal cause of action or other jurisdictional hook, the Court must
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Alternatively, where a complaint is overly vague or fails to identify any plausible basis
for granting relief, a court may conclude that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or failure to set forth “a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” or a “claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to “test[]
the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
7 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, a court need not accept as true any “legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” “naked assertion[ ] devoid of further factual
enhancement,” or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (cleaned up). Rule 8(a), in contrast, does not focus on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
claims but, rather, on fair notice and judicial efficiency. The rule is designed to ensure that the
defendant is “able to discern what a plaintiff is alleging in order to know how to defend against
the claims,” Watkins v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 23-cv-766, 2024 WL 4362166, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept.
30, 2024), and to ensure that the Court can fairly and efficiently identify and address whether the
complaint complies with Rule 12(b).
A.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has placed his eggs in one basket.
Despite repeated warnings from the Court, Plaintiff did not timely respond to Defendants’ long-
pending motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appears to concede the legal insufficiency of his amended
complaint, merely asserting that he can, if permitted, fix those flaws in a second (or third)
amended complaint. Although the Court might reasonably dismiss Plaintiff’s amended
complaint on that basis alone, the Court will give Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, the benefit
of the doubt, and will consider the legal sufficiency of his amended complaint along with the
sufficiency of his proposed, second and third amended complaints, Dkt. 12, Dkt. 17, and his
motion to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, Dkt. 18, together in an effort to determine
8 whether any plausible basis exists to proceed based on the allegations set forth in any of those
documents.
B.
None of the four complaints that Plaintiff has filed in this action alleges facts sufficient to
establish Article III standing. As explained above, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if proven,
would demonstrate that he has, or will imminently, suffer a concrete injury as a result of the
challenged action and that a favorable decision would redress his injury. As far as the Court can
discern, the action that Plaintiff challenges is the Census Bureau’s failure to amend its records
accurately to reflect his racial and ethnic identity as American Aborigine and as a member of the
Maipuri Arauan Nation, and, in his more recent filings, the failure of the California Department
of Public Health to correct its records. It is far from evident, however, what (if any) concrete
injury in fact that Plaintiff has suffered due to this alleged omission.
He asserts in conclusory and vague terms, for example, that the alleged “misclassification
has caused [him] to be denied his indigenous identity,” has “excluded [him] from tribal rights,”
and has “subjected [him] to systemic discrimination.” Dkt. 18 at 6. He asserts that Defendants’
actions have “left [him] fearful of government enacted commercial and economic schemes of
constructive fraud, identity theft and ethnic cleansing of [his] right to recognized in [his] true
capacity as American aborigine,” id., and have “[disenfranchised]” him by incorrectly skewing
“the ratios of demographics of the states” that are used to allocate government funds and
programming, id. at 8. He asserts that these actions have also “barred [him] from the pursuit of
happiness in his homeland,” have prevented him from “using his tribal name,” and have “barred
[him] from opening a bank account.” Id. at 9. And, finally, he asserts that these
9 misclassifications have subjected him to taxation, even though “he has an ‘Indian not Taxed’
status.” Id.
None of these allegations suffices to aver a cognizable injury in fact for purposes of
Article III. To allege an injury in fact, a plaintiff must identify some “invasion of a legally
protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). An injury is
“concrete” if it is “direct, real, and palpable—not abstract.” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 489
F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Here, many of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, such as his loss of
identity and fear of government schemes to defraud, are too abstract to support standing. Others
are insufficiently particularized or nonspeculative, such as any (extraordinarily) remote
possibility that his misclassification might affect the allocation of government benefits based on
demographic ratios. And still others, such as his alleged inability to open a bank account or his
loss of “Indian Not Taxed” status are too conclusory and are unsupported by any factual
allegations that back up those conclusory allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff’s claims are similar to those at issue in Angeni v. U.S. Department of Commerce,
24-cv-2006, 2024 WL 4582972, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2024), where, as here, the plaintiff
alleged that the Census Bureau violated the Alien Tort Statute and the Constitution by
misclassifying the plaintiff “as ‘Black’ rather than ‘American Aborigine.’” As here, the plaintiff
sought “$10,000,000 a year” in damages and “an order direct[ing] the Bureau to correct its
records.” Id. And, as here, the Court concluded that it lacked Article III jurisdiction because the
plaintiff had not alleged, as required by TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 413, any “concrete harm [that]
followed from the Census Bureau’s misclassification of her.” Id. at 2. The same holds true here;
10 Plaintiff has not alleged that the Census Bureau shared his information or that any concrete harm
resulted from the alleged misclassification.
The Court, accordingly, concludes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint, as well as his
proposed second and third amended complaints, fail to allege facts sufficient to sustain the
Court’s jurisdiction, even at this preliminary stage of the proceeding. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
C.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to recover damages, moreover, he fails to identify a waiver of
sovereign immunity that would permit him to proceed against either the United States or the
State of California. Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature and protects the federal
government, its agencies, and its employees acting in their official capacity from suit, F.D.I.C. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), as well as the states and state agencies, see College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the Alien Tort Statute “provides jurisdiction for violations of
international law, including violation of peremptory norms such as the prohibition against racial
discrimination, forced identity, and cultural genocide” and that “[their] norms override sovereign
immunity under international law and are actionable in federal courts.” Dkt. 18 at 5. For
support, Plaintiff cites the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980). Neither the United States nor any state, however, was a party to that action, and,
accordingly, the Second Circuit says nothing about their immunity from suit. The D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, in contrast, recognized that the Alien
Tort Statute “does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity.” 957 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (affirming district court decision dismissing action for lack of jurisdiction). Plaintiff
identifies no authority to the contrary.
11 Plaintiff’s common law tort claims against Defendants also fail because the waiver of
sovereign immunity contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is limited to the United
States and does not extend to agencies or government officials sued in their official capacity. See
Seitu v. Rutherford, No. 96-cv-575, 1997 WL 122919, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1997) (“[T]he
United States is the only proper party defendant in actions brought under the FTCA.”).
Moreover, to the extent that the complaint might be construed to allege an FTCA claim against
the United States, the Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim because Plaintiff has not alleged
that he has exhausted his administrative remedies by “first present[ing] the claim to the
appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675; see also Leji v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 15-
cv-387, 2015 WL 1299361, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2025). The exhaustion requirement is
jurisdictional. See Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed. App’x 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of unexhausted FTCA claim “for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction”); accord Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
The Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. Constitutional
claims for money damages against the United States “are barred by sovereign immunity.” Benoit
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 608 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff asserts a host of
constitutional claims but fails to identify any applicable waiver of sovereign immunity.
D.
Finally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over those portions of Plaintiff’s complaint that are
“so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–
37 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). His contention that Defendants have
committed “[c]rimes against humanity” that “have no statute of limitations and [that] provide no
12 immunity,” Dkt. 12 at 10, or have committed acts that constitute a “breach[] of jus cogens
norms,” id. at 19, are so far-fetched that they lie beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, even
if the Court were able to reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, it would conclude that his
complaints fail to satisfy the dictates of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6).
None of his complaints allege specific facts sufficient to provide Defendants and the Court with
adequate notice of the operative facts and of why he is allegedly entitled to relief and, instead,
merely “offer[] ‘labels and conclusions,’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that do not suffice to state a
claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 9;
Plaintiff’s operative complaint, Dkt. 7, is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
and Plaintiff’s requests for leave to amend, Dkt. 12, Dkt. 17, are DENIED as futile. Defendants’
motion to strike Plaintiff’s Federal “Rule 15 Response,” Dkt. 14, is DENIED as moot.
A separate order shall issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge
Date: August 4, 2025