Tague v. Board of Trustees
Opinions
To decide this cause, we need only determine whether the amendment to R. C. 4123.519 1 denies appellee, with respect to her then pending claim with the board,2 a previously accorded statutory remedy of direct appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. Since the amendment is silent on this question, we resort to R. C. 1.58.3 Pursuant to R. C. 1.58, we determine that appellee’s remedy of direct appeal is preserved.
[138]*138Under former R. C. 1.204 the predecessor to R. C. 1.58, it was well established that once an action was pending, associated remedial rights extended by statute could not be eliminated by later amendment or repeal, unless a contrary legislative intent was expressly stated. Smith v. N.Y. Central Rd. Co. (1930), 122 Ohio St. 45, 52. Moreover, this rule was equally applicable to actions pending with agencies. State, ex rel. Cleveland Ry. Co., v. Atkinson (1941), 138 Ohio St. 157. The terms of R. C. 1.58 indicate that thie General Assembly intended it to be as protective in this regard as was R. C. 1.20. In pertinent part, R. C. 1.58 provides:
“(A) The reenactment, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not, * * *:
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“(2) Affect any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder;
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“(4) Affect any* * * proceeding* * *in respect of any such privilege***; and the***proceeding***may be instituted, continued, or enforced***, as if the statute had not been repealed or amended.”
R. C. 1.58(A)(2) preserves appellee’s remedy of direct appeal. Once her claim was pending with the board, pre[139]*139amendment R. C. 4123.519 extended her the right or privilege to choose between direct appeal to the Court of Common Pleas and a more circuitous route to that same end (i.e., by first exhausting her appeal with the Industrial Commission). R. C. 1.58(A)(2) prohibits R. C. 4123.519 as amended from affecting this right or privilege. Cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Lindley (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 1, 9.
Additionally, R. C. 1.58(A)(4) preserves appellee’s remedy of direct appeal. An appeal to the board is a “proceeding” within the meaning of R. C. 1.58(A)(4). Cf. State, ex rel. Cleveland Ry. Co., supra, at page 161. R. C. 1.58(A)(4) assures that this proceeding can be “continued***as if***[R. C. 4123.519] had not been repealed or amended.”
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
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399 N.E.2d 1240 (Tague v. Board of Trustees) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.