RENDERED: APRIL 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-1294-ME
TAD E. RUSSELL APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DAVID A. LANPHEAR, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-D-00123-001
TARA N. SMITH APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Tad E. Russell (“Russell”), seeks review of an
Interpersonal Protection Order (“IPO”) issued on August 18, 2025, by the Warren
Family Court in favor of Appellee, Tara N. Smith (“Smith”). After careful review
of the briefs, relevant law, and record on appeal, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Beginning in 2021, Smith worked at the Vitamin Shoppe in Bowling
Green, Warren County, Kentucky. Over the following years, Russell became an increasingly frequent customer, and he often initiated interactions with Smith
during his visits. Although these exchanges started as typical conversations
between a customer and employee, Russell began to ask Smith personal questions
that made her feel progressively more uncomfortable. After an escalating series of
events in late 2024 and the first weeks of 2025 that are set forth below, the Warren
Family Court (“Family Court”) granted Smith’s petition for a temporary IPO on
February 21, 2025. Record (“R.”) at 1-5. After several agreed continuances, the
Family Court held a hearing on August 18, 2025. Smith offered testimony at the
hearing, but Russell chose not to testify on advice of counsel due to outstanding
criminal charges related to the same series of events that resulted in Smith’s
petition for an IPO.
At the hearing, Smith testified that she had first encountered Russell
through her employment at the Vitamin Shoppe and that she had no relationship
with him outside of an employee-customer relationship. In September of 2022,
Russell left a gift of a food item that Smith had mentioned liking, along with a
handwritten note asking for her phone number. The note requested that she contact
him outside of work, because “Trying to hunt you down at work makes me feel
like a stocker [sic]. Not my thing[.]” At the hearing, Smith authenticated the
original note, and the Family Court admitted it as Smith’s Exhibit 1. Video Record
(“V.R.”) 08/18/2025 at 12:45:39-12:47:30; R. at 20.
-2- After reading the note into the record, Smith testified that she felt that
the note accurately described Russell’s behavior and that she did indeed feel as
though he had been trying to “hunt her down” at work. She described an increase
in the frequency and length of Russell’s visits around the time that he had left the
note. She related that he would often enter the store during times when she was
working alone and could not avoid interacting with him. However, she did not
describe any harassing behavior during that period, and no actions were taken to
prevent Russell from continuing to frequent the Vitamin Shoppe as a customer at
that time. Instead, Smith testified that she had arranged with her manager to take
her breaks at times when Russell had entered the shop so that she could avoid him.
However, Smith reported that, sometime in approximately 2023 or
2024, Russell had followed her out to her car during one of her breaks and had
approached her driver’s side door to offer her an energy drink that he had
purchased for her. Smith testified that she had tried to decline the gift politely at
first but finally accepted after he continued to insist that she take it. During that
exchange, Russell asked Smith to go on a date with him, which she declined.
Russell responded by complaining that she had given him mixed signals. In
response to questioning, Smith testified that she had explicitly stated to Russell
during that encounter that she felt that she had made it clear that she was not
interested and that she had informed him of this fact previously on multiple
-3- occasions. Smith confirmed that her manager came out to the parking lot during
that incident and then helped her file a report with the Vitamin Shoppe about
Russell’s behavior.
Sometime in late 2024 or the first weeks of 2025, another incident
occurred in the Vitamin Shoppe parking lot. Smith testified that she had again
gone out to her car during a break when Russell pulled his truck behind her car at
an angle that blocked her into the space, gunned the engine, and then “laid on the
horn” before speeding away onto a side road. Id. at 12:52:18-12:53:15. Smith
explained at the hearing that this behavior felt very threatening, especially in light
of her inability to escape by leaving her vehicle or driving away from him.
Because this incident was interpreted as an escalation of Russell’s inappropriate
actions with Smith, management of the Vitamin Shoppe officially banned Russell
from the store.
After the ban, Smith received a message from Russell through her
public, LinkedIn profile on February 7, 2025, which the Family Court admitted as
Smith’s Exhibit 2. R. at 21. The Family Court overruled an objection from
Russell that it would be duplicative to read the note into the record and allowed
Smith to do so. While reading the message, Smith became visibly emotional as
she read the following lines:
-4- I heard some of what you said then I ran over a little girl . . . haha. Then I lost track of you. I miss you too and want to be able to see you again.
I really want to talk. I think a lot of wires got crossed and need to be straightened out. I care about you and hate that I can’t see you on Mondays.
Tad aka Ta Russ
R. at 21; V.R. 08/18/2025 at 12:54:35-12:56:35. Smith testified that the message
scared her. She interpreted this post as a threat to run her over based on the
previous parking lot incident and a reference that Russell had made in the past
about how young and small Smith looked.
The final incident between Russell and Smith occurred on February
20, 2025, the day before Smith filed the petition for an IPO against Russell. Smith
testified that, due to the escalating behavior from Russell, she generally did not
close the Vitamin Shoppe alone at night without another employee present.
However, she testified that on the night of February 20, 2025, she did agree to try
closing the store on her own since Russell had been banned from the premises.
Smith described walking through her closing procedures that evening and noticing
that a truck that resembled Russell’s had pulled into the parking lot. However, she
could not see into the cab without leaving the store. Smith testified that, prior to
walking out to her car, she watched the truck appear to pull away and drive to the
-5- other end of the parking lot, where it sat parked and idling just outside of her line
of sight until she left the store and walked further into the lot.
Smith testified that she could finally see the truck clearly once she
reached her car and rolled down her window. From that angle, she identified
Russell in the cab of the truck and said that she could see him reach into the back
of the cab as though grabbing some item, prompting her to call 911. While she
was on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, Russell exited his truck and began to
approach her vehicle. Smith testified that she had yelled at him to stay away from
her and told him that she had called 911 for help. On hearing this, Russell turned
and ran back to his truck before speeding away from the lot.
Smith testified that this behavior had left her scared for her life
specifically because Russell seemed to be lying in wait for her in his truck on the
only night that she had closed alone in months. She expressed concern that the
pattern of escalating incidents in the weeks before had left her afraid that he might
do something worse, such as following her home or trying to hurt her, especially
because the most severe incidents had occurred after repeated instructions from
both Smith and her employer to leave her alone. Smith reported that Russell had
also attempted to contact her sister on LinkedIn, and he had even done so after the
February 20, 2025, incident resulted in criminal charges and the issuance of the
temporary IPO.
-6- Although Russell offered no testimony, he did exercise the
opportunity to cross-examine Smith through counsel. On cross-examination,
Smith agreed that Russell had never behaved in a sexually aggressive manner
towards her and never forced his way into her personal space in any of their
encounters inside the Vitamin Shoppe. She also confirmed that Russell had never
contacted her on her cell phone, although she clarified on re-direct that she had
also never given Russell that phone number. While Russell attempted to elicit a
different statement of the timeline of events through questioning, Smith confirmed
that the LinkedIn message on February 7, 2025, and the final parking lot incident
on February 20, 2025, both occurred after Russell had been officially banned from
the Vitamin Shoppe. Russell did not call any witnesses or submit any evidence.
Following the hearing, the Family Court completed Administrative
Office of the Courts’ Form 275.3 (“the AOC Form”) and properly checked the box
to issue an IPO. R. at 17. Under the section identifying Russell’s relationship to
the petitioner, the Family Court checked the box indicating that “none of the above
relationships apply, but Respondent is alleged to have committed stalking.” Id.
On the second page of the AOC Form, the Family Court selected the option to find
“For Petitioner against Respondent in that it was established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that an act(s) of stalking has occurred and may again occur[.]” R.
at 18. The Family Court clearly declined to select the option for finding that an act
-7- of domestic violence and abuse had occurred; it instead selected only the option for
stalking. Id. In addition to making all required findings on the AOC Form, the
Family Court also issued oral findings from the bench that demonstrate its
reasoning in issuing the IPO.
Noting that Russell had followed the advice of his counsel to exercise
his right to decline to testify given his pending criminal charges, the Family Court
found that Smith’s testimony and exhibits established that Russell had become
“enamored” with her and had made repeated efforts to contact Smith despite her
rejection of every overture. V.R. 08/18/2025 at 1:11:24-1:12:25. The Family
Court found that this pattern of repeated contact, against Smith’s (and her
employer’s) express wishes, eventually led Smith to fear for her safety.
Specifically, the Family Court found that the letter that Russell had left for Smith
at the Vitamin Shoppe constituted a “very instructive” sign that Russell understood
that even his repeated, less threatening efforts to interact with Smith at work could
be “misread” as stalking. Id. at 1:12:53. Although the Family Court stopped short
of finding that Russell had actually intended to harm Smith during the parking lot
incidents involving his truck, it did conclude that these threatening incidents had
“scared the liver out of her.” Id. at 1:13:58-1:14:45.
Russell filed a motion with the Family Court on August 29, 2025,
asking the Family Court to reconsider its issuance of the IPO. R. at 22. The
-8- Family Court denied the motion on September 8, 2025. R. at 23. This appeal
followed.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, we review the Family Court’s issuance of an IPO to
determine whether its findings were clearly erroneous or if it abused its discretion.
Holt v. Holt, 458 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Ky. App. 2015).
Abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. More specifically, a court abuses the discretion afforded it when (1) its decision rests on an error of law . . . or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision . . . cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.
Allen v. Eder, 682 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Ky. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, which has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person. We review questions of law de novo.
Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Ky. App. 2017).
Our Supreme Court has held that a Family Court issuing a protective
order need make only two essential findings of fact:
(1) whether an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has occurred, and (2) whether it may occur again. . . . Any
-9- additional factual findings the trial court makes in issuing a protective order are merely supporting those ultimate factual findings and are not “essential.”
Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Ky. 2021). After conducting a hearing
under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 456.040, if a Court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that stalking has occurred and may again occur, the
Court may issue an IPO. KRS 456.060. A preponderance of the evidence in
protective order proceedings occurs when the alleged victim was more likely than
not to have been a victim. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007).
In order to find that stalking has occurred for the purposes of a
protective order, KRS 456.010(8) directs use of the criminal definitions of stalking
under KRS 508.140 or 508.150. Under those statutes, stalking occurs when an
individual has intentionally engaged in two or more acts that were directed at the
victim that seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed the victim; served
no legitimate purpose; and would have caused a reasonable person to suffer
substantial mental distress. Halloway, 532 S.W.3d at 162. Additionally, there
must have been an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim
in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death. Id.
III. Analysis
On appeal, Russell argues that the Warren Family Court based its IPO
issuance upon insufficient evidence, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.
-10- More specifically, Russell asserts that “neither domestic violence and abuse, nor
the future likelihood of domestic violence and abuse was established.” Appellant’s
Brief at 5. While this claim is true, it is a red herring, as it is both misleading and
distracting from the true issue. Because Smith requested an IPO based upon
stalking, the Family Court was not required to make findings, and thus made none,
relative to domestic violence, which requires an established relationship between a
petitioner and respondent. While domestic violence orders and IPOs carry the
same burden of proof and standard of review, they are both creatures of statute
with entirely different findings of fact that must be made by the Family Court
before granting a request. See KRS 403.720(2) and KRS 456.060. Due to
Russell’s frequent conflation of the domestic violence and IPO statutes in his
briefs, our review has been frustrated by Russell’s immaterial arguments regarding
the lack of relationship between the parties, his status as an invitee of the Vitamin
Shoppe, and the potential prejudice of an improperly entered domestic violence
order.
Despite Russell’s having two briefs (an appeal and reply), he
squanders these opportunities to provide convincing argument and controlling law
by focusing on the peripheral requirements that must be satisfied for a domestic
violence order. Yet he only identifies one case that directly addresses the central
question here of the sufficiency of the evidence for the issuance of an IPO. Russell
-11- cited Guenther v. Guenther, in which we held that a petitioner’s “monosyllabic
responses to her attorney’s leading questions regarding verbal abuse and her fear of
future abuse similar to the altercation between the parties is insufficient to base a
finding that domestic violence may occur again.” 379 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Ky. App.
2012) (emphasis in original). However, the passive, elicited facts alleged there are
in complete contradiction to Smith’s active, unsuggested narration of the events
that unfolded here. As we held in Ashley v. Ashley, which Russell declined to cite,
a hearing in which the petitioner “testified more fully upon questioning by both her
attorney and the family court as to her fears” constitutes sufficient evidence and is
thus distinguishable. 520 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Ky. App. 2017).
When Russell did turn, at least partially, to the elements of stalking
that must be established in order to grant an IPO, he suggested that Smith’s
testimony did not include sufficient evidence to establish the pattern of conduct or
the implicit or explicit threat required by statute. However, he made no direct
arguments addressing any of the individual statutory requirements other than
asserting that “Smith testified that his [sic] conversations with him made her feel
subjectively uncomfortable, but nothing more.” Reply Brief at 2. In so doing,
Russell repeatedly neglected to address significant portions of Smith’s testimony.
Under Russell’s argued-for version of events for which he failed to provide any
evidence, he only spoke with Smith in her capacity as a Vitamin Shoppe employee,
-12- but then also asked her out on a date on one occasion and offered her gifts twice.
Reply Brief at 2. The brief asserts that he never contacted her on her cell phone,
never contacted her anywhere else in the community, and never sent her any other
communications. Reply Brief at 2. But Russell avoids noting that the statute does
not require cell phone contact or specify the location, nature, and/or number of
contacts required to constitute stalking.
Moreover, as in Ashley, Smith’s testimony significantly exceeded
terse answers to “yes or no” questions posed by her attorney, and it included
substantially more detail than Russell’s mere allegations of the facts in his briefs.
Despite Russell’s desire to avoid engaging with Smith’s uncontroverted testimony
regarding the events that occurred in February of 2025, we must conclude that
ignoring the incidents that establish a course of conduct does not negate a finding
that the course of conduct occurred.
A review of the record shows that the Family Court heard testimony
from Smith that she became increasingly fearful for her safety in the months
leading up to the final, inciting events. The original statement that Smith provided
in support of the petition for an IPO clearly establishes a timeline of events that
included multiple confrontations in the Vitamin Shoppe parking lot that offer
context for Smith’s interpretation of Russell’s LinkedIn message referencing
running over a little girl. R. at 4, 21. Consistent with this original petition, Smith
-13- testified that less than two weeks had passed between the LinkedIn message and
the final nighttime incident in February of 2025 that resulted in her call to 911. We
cannot say that the Family Court erred in finding this testimony established a
course of conduct of two or more incidents that seriously alarmed and intimidated
Smith, which also served no legitimate purpose, and which would have caused a
reasonable person mental distress.
Other than emphasizing on cross-examination that all in-person events
occurred at the Vitamin Shoppe and attempting to establish an alternate timeline of
the events that Smith rejected on redirect, Russell offered no evidence to contradict
Smith’s testimony or the two exhibits that she offered. In light of this essentially
unchallenged evidence, Russell’s interpretation of the underlying facts appears
disingenuous at best and misrepresentative of the actual evidence at worst.
In contrast, Smith offered detailed arguments aligning the facts at
issue with the applicable case law. After identifying the elements of stalking and
the hearing testimony that substantiated each item in her brief, Smith directly
addressed Russell’s uncorroborated suggestion that he had never threatened Smith
and that she had experienced only discomfort from his attentions. Citing to this
Court’s holding in Allen v. Eder, Smith noted that KRS 508.150(1)(b) allows to
suffice either an explicit or implicit threat of sexual contact, physical injury, or
-14- death. 682 S.W.3d 32 (Ky. App. 2023). In Allen, the majority1 found that
substantial evidence existed to support an IPO based on a pattern of threatening
behavior, even when the petitioner conceded that the respondent had never acted
violently toward her in any of their interactions and had sent “only” menacing text
messages suggesting that he was using his authority as a law enforcement officer to
surveil guests at her home. Id.
As Smith observed in her brief, the case sub judice offers much more
direct evidence of threatening behaviors than the parties in Allen described. Unlike
those episodes of stalking that occurred after the end of a dating relationship
without any allegations of prior threatening behavior, the only contact between
Russell and Smith has been his repeated attempts to gain greater access to her at
the only place that he could reliably contact her, countered by her consistent
rejection and firm statements that she did not appreciate the contact and wanted it
to stop. Smith never dated Russell, interacted with him in a non-professional
capacity, or even visited him personally. She had him banned from her place of
employment; and he had no right to be there. Cf. Allen, 682 S.W.3d 32. Smith has
repeatedly expressed that the shift in Russell’s behavior over time resulted in her
interpretation of his LinkedIn communication as a threat. She also noted a contrast
1 This Opinion’s author dissented in that case on grounds that are not applicable here, i.e., that a law enforcement officer was being held to a different standard than other persons in different professions or no occupation at all.
-15- between her reaction to that message in February of 2025 and her reaction to
Russell’s initial overtures, which she found distressing but seemingly non-
threatening. Given the totality of the circumstances, the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the Family Court’s finding that stalking had occurred.
Finally, Smith argued to the Family Court, and maintains
on appeal, that the evidence from February of 2025 established that incidents of
stalking may occur again. As Smith testified, the LinkedIn message on February 7,
2025, and the parking lot incident on February 20, 2025, both occurred after
Russell’s ban from the Vitamin Shoppe. Despite attempts to insinuate otherwise
through questioning, Russell offered no evidence that would contradict Smith’s
clear testimony and his own LinkedIn message that refers to missing her and to the
fact that he could no longer see her on Mondays as he used to do. Smith testified
before the Family Court that this escalation in behavior that occurred after Russell
lost his only access to Smith suggests that future similar incidents were likely to
occur in the absence of a protective order, and the Family Court was well within its
discretion to find her testimony credible.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the Family Court’s
issuance of the IPO.
ALL CONCUR.
-16- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew J. Baker Katina B. Miner Bowling Green, Kentucky Bowling Green, Kentucky
-17-