Tacke v. Wynia

853 P.2d 87, 258 Mont. 405, 50 State Rptr. 587, 1993 Mont. LEXIS 153
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedMay 20, 1993
Docket92-438
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 853 P.2d 87 (Tacke v. Wynia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tacke v. Wynia, 853 P.2d 87, 258 Mont. 405, 50 State Rptr. 587, 1993 Mont. LEXIS 153 (Mo. 1993).

Opinion

JUSTICE McDONOUGH

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County bench trial judgment in a consolidated case regarding easements. We affirm.

There are three issues before the Court:

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Wynias’ use of the easement across Ekmans’ and Kellenberger’s property was permissive?

2. Did the District Court err in failing to conclude that Tacke’s easement across Wynias’ property was extinguished when Tacke’s predecessor sold Lots 18 and 19 to Ekmans?

*407 3. Did the District Court err when it located Tacke’s easement across the Wynias’ property on the “trailer pad” road?

This case is a consolidation of two cases, one filed by Victor Tacke (Tacke) against Robert and Winona Wynia (Wynias), William Smith (Smith), Tacke’s predecessor in title and RE/MAX of Bigfork, a real estate company (RE/MAX) and the other action filed by the Wynias against C. John Ekman and Susan Ekman (Ekmans) and Alma Jean B. Kellenberger (Kellenberger). The Wynias, Ekmans, Tacke and Kellenberger own property in Lac Cygne Shores, a platted subdivision on Swan Lake in Lake County. Tacke owns Lot 15, Wynias own Lots 16 and 17, Ekmans own Lots 18 and 19 and Kellenberger owns Lots 20 and 21. The following is a plat for reference:

See diagram on page 413.

Smith is the former owner of Lots 15,18 and 19. He listed the Lots for sale through RE/MAX and subsequently sold Lots 18 and 19 to Ekmans in 1988 and Lot 15 to Tacke in 1989. Wynias bought Lot 16 from the original owners of the entire subdivision, Dr. Virgil Ferree and Gladys Ferree (Ferrees) in 1965. They bought Lot 17 from the Ferrees in 1973.

When the Wynias purchased Lot 16 in 1965, the only access to the lots in the subdivision was by boat. In 1967, the Ferrees built a road leading to the subdivision which they subsequently deeded to the county. They also built an access road from the “county” road near Lot 2 to an area in Lot 16. At that point, the Ferrees discovered that if they continued building the road toward Lot 21, the road would have to be very steep and individual driveways leading to the road would also have to be very steep. Consequently, the Ferrees abandoned the road within Lot 16.

There was an old skid road located near the end of the “abandoned” access road and the Wynias used this road for access to their boat launch. The trial court concluded that the Ferrees acquiesced in Wynias’ use of the road and Wynias’ use did not interfere in any way with the Ferrees’ use and enjoyment of the Ferrees’ property. The trial court further concluded that Wynias’ use of the skid road was permissive from its inception and at no time adverse or hostile to the rights of the Ferrees, Smith or Kellenberger.

At about the time that the Wynias bought Lot 17 in 1973, Dr. Wynia, Dr. Virgil Ferree and William Walterskirschen, Ferree’s attorney, met to discuss the appropriate placement of easements and access roads from the Wynias to the Ferrees and vice versa. The first *408 easement went from Dr. Ferree to the Wynias across Lots 18 and 19, providing access to Lots 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. The second easement went from the Wynias to the Ferrees across Lots 16 and 17 for access to Lots 15, 18, 19, 20 and 21. “The easements locate the roads in the SW1/2 of Lots 19, 18, 17, and 16 to approach from the Northwest.” After the signing and recording of easements, Dr. Ferree and Dr. Wynia met on the property and Dr. Ferree instructed Dr. Wynia as to where to build the easement access road. The Wynias instructed Jim Herron to construct an access road across Lots 16,17, 18 and 19 in the fall of 1973.

During summers after the access road was built, Wynias parked their 32 foot trailer on Lot 16 near the boundary of Lot 15. The trial court concluded that the Wynias could park their trailer in the road turnouts on Lot 16 without disturbing vehicle use on the road. It further concluded that Ferrees acquiesced in the trailer being parked on the roadway and it did not interfere with any use of the road by Ferree or Smith, the subsequent owner. Further facts will be presented as necessary.

Our standard of review of a district court’s findings of fact is clear. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.R, provides in pertinent part:

Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses...

In interpreting this rule, we have adopted the following three-part test:

First, the Court will review the record to see if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Second, if the findings are supported by substantial evidence we will determine if the trial court has misapprehended the effect of evidence. Third, if substantial evidence exists and the effect of the evidence has not been misapprehended, the Court may still find that “[A] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

Interstate Production Credit v. DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287. (Citations omitted.)

To establish an easement by prescription, the party claiming an easement “must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement claimed for the full statutory period. The statutory period is five years.” Keebler v. Harding (1991), 247 Mont. 518, 521, 807 P.2d 1354, 1356. (Citation omitted.) See also; Downing v. Grover (1989), 237 Mont. 172, 175, 772 P.2d 850, 852.

*409 1. WYNIAS v. EKMANS AND KELLENBERGER

Wynias contend they had perfected an easement by prescription across Ekmans’ and Kellenberger’s properties on the skid trail near the lake. They further state that they had established that their use was open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted, creating the presumption that their use was adverse. They believe there was insufficient evidence to show that their use was permissive, especially given that they established the presumption of adverse use. Ekmans and Kellenberger counter that the presumption in this case is that the use is permissive.

“To be adverse, the use of the alleged easement must be exercised under a claim of right and not as a mere privilege or license revocable at the pleasure of the owner of the land; such claim must be known to, and acquiesced in by, the owner of the land.” Keebler, 807 P.2d at 1356-1357. (Citation omitted.) “District courts sitting as fact finders occupy the best position to determine if the use was permissive or adverse.” Granite County v. Komberec (1990), 245 Mont. 252, 258, 800 P.2d 166, 169.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Tomlin Enterprises, Inc. v. Althoff
2004 MT 383 (Montana Supreme Court, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
853 P.2d 87, 258 Mont. 405, 50 State Rptr. 587, 1993 Mont. LEXIS 153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tacke-v-wynia-mont-1993.