Taber v. Hall

51 A. 432, 23 R.I. 613, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 164
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedFebruary 26, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 51 A. 432 (Taber v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taber v. Hall, 51 A. 432, 23 R.I. 613, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 164 (R.I. 1902).

Opinion

Rogers, J.

This is an equitable proceeding under Gen. Laws R. I. cap. 266, for the settlement and determination of the boundary lines of land covered by public tide-water, said chapter having been originally enacted April 24, 1885, and being Pub. Laws cap. 510.

So much of section 1 of said chapter as applies to land in Providence county, is as follows, viz.:

“Section 1. Any person having any interest in land bordering on public tide-water, whenever a harbor-line shall have been confirmed and established in front of or adjacent to said land, may apply by petition to the appellate division of the supreme court in Providence . . . for the settlement and determination of the lines and boundaries of his interest and of the interests of all others in the land covered by public tide-water within such harbor-line.”

The act further provides that the court may appoint three commissioners to make a survey of said land within and adjacent to said harbor line, covering such area of land as said *615 commissioners may deem 'necessary to include the interests of all persons whose rights may he affected by the determination of such lines, and to determine the boundary lines of the interests of all the persons interested as aforesaid, and to report to the court the boundaries so established, with a plat of said land, said report and plat when approved by the court and recorded as required by said act shall forever fix and determine the rights of all persons and parties, except when definite boundary lines have been established by parties legally authorized so to do.

The petitioners, Sidney R. Taber and Mary Taber, derive their title under the will, and succeed to the rights of, Henry M. Taber, deceased, who was the grantee of the respondent, Henry L. Aldrich. The latter acquired title by deed from the heirs of Benjamin Allen, who purchased the interests of several of the heirs of Joseph Burgess other than James (or James P.) Burgess, the interests of the latter having been purchased by the respondent, William H. Hall, and being now held by him.

The respondents are the said Henry L. Aldrich, the said William H. Hall, one William M. Harris, who acquired title by deed from the petitioners since the beginning of these proceedings and who has since been made a party by amending the petition, and a number of other riparian owners who need not be more particularly mentioned as no one, other than said Hall, has taken any exception to the commissioners’ report, and none of their interests will be affected by the determination of said exception.

The commissioners have filed their report with the accompanying plat in the clerk’s office, and the question now before us is upon approving said report and plat. But one of the respondents, William H. Hall, has excepted to the report, and that exception relates only to his south line as determined by the commissioners, which divides his land from that of the petitioners or of their releasee, the said respondent William M. Harris.

(1) In determining the boundary lines of adjoining interests, as appears by their report, the commissioners have taken as *616 a governing principle by which to proceed, that, wherever the parties in interest or their respective ancestors in interest, have heretofore fixed and established boundary lines for themselves by agreement or recorded conveyance, or where boundary lines have been heretofore fixed by some legal proceedings, they would as such commissioners adopt such lines to be the proper boundary lines of such interests; and that wherever no boundary lines had been so agreed upon between the owners of adjoining interests, or their ancestors in interest, or by some legal proceedings, then they would follow the principle adopted in the case of Aborn v. Smith, 12 R. I. 370.

The causes of exception by the said Hall are :

“First. That the commissioners have entirely omitted from their consideration the fact that it appears from the testimony and the plats introduced in said cause that the boundary between the estate now owned by said Hall and that now owned by William M. Harris has heretofore been fully determined.
“Second. That from the evidence it clearly appeared that the entire tract now owned by both said Hall and said Harris was originally a portion of the estate of one Joseph Burgess who was a common ancestor in title of both the parties hereto; that the estate of the said Burgess was divided by commissioners, a copy of the plat accompanying the report of said commissioners was duly filed before the commissioners in this cause; that the land now occupied by the said Hall was delineated upon the said plat showing the southerly boundary of the said Hall towards the said Harris ; that the Benjamin Allen plat, it appears from the testimony and from inspection of the plat itself, reproduces and prolongs the dividing line between the parties as delineated upon the Burgess Partition plat; that it is a principle of law that cannot be gainsaid that when one party to a partition has acted upon the same, - he is estopped from disputing the validity of said partition and of any apportionment or partition made thereby.
“ Third. That it clearly appears that the line between the parties Hall and Harris has been marked out and delineated *617 and that there is privity between the partitioner Harris and the respondent Hall, and the said facts being established, there is a boundary line that has been recognized between the parties which the commissioners, according to the principles which they announced as determining this case, are not at liberty to disregard ; that the line between the parties as delineated in the plat of the partition of the Joseph Burgess estate and as prolonged upon the Benjamin Allen plat and as recognized by one of the parties in privity to that partition, to wit, by Benjamin Allen, in his plat as filed, is conclusive of the rights of the parties.”

The general principles adopted by the commissioners in this cause were, in our opinion, sound, and, practically, the only question to be determined by us is whether the southerly boundary line of the said Hall’s interest, being the northerly line of the petitioners’ or said Harris’s interests had been settled and determined by their ancestors in title, or those in privity with them.

All of the tide-flowed land embraced in this suit lay between upland formerly owned by Joseph Burgess, and the harbor line as now established. As said by this court in Aborn et al. v. Smith et al., supra, by Durfee, C. J., delivering the opinion, — “The establishment of a harbor line, we have held, amounts to an implied permission to the riparian proprietors within it to fill out to it. The question is, how fill out to it ? We answer, fill straight out to it. The owners of the upland are impliedly permitted to carry the upland forward to the harbor line so that each owner will occupy the pai’t which is abreast his own land.

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Related

Hall v. Nascimento
594 A.2d 874 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
51 A. 432, 23 R.I. 613, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 164, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taber-v-hall-ri-1902.