Tabb's adm'rs v. Gist

23 F. Cas. 595, 1 Brock. 33, 10 Va. 279
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Virginia
DecidedDecember 15, 1802
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 23 F. Cas. 595 (Tabb's adm'rs v. Gist) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tabb's adm'rs v. Gist, 23 F. Cas. 595, 1 Brock. 33, 10 Va. 279 (circtdva 1802).

Opinion

Marshall, Chief Justice.

This suit is brought to enjoin judgments to a large amount obtained by the defendant Samuel Gist, against the intestate of the complainants, as surviving partner of Moss Armstead Co., Richard Hill &f Co., Richard Booker fy Co., and William Watkins &f Co.

The points made by the counsel for the complainants are,

1st. That their intestate was in such a state of mental derangement when the suits were instituted, and the judg[290]*290ments complained of were rendered, that those judgments not to bind him; and his representatives ought yet to be permitted to defend his estate against the claims on which they are founded.

2ndly.. That he is not liable for the debts of Moss Arm-stead Co., and Richard Hill if Co.; because he was never a member of either of those firms.

3dly. That Samuel Gist is greatly indebted to their intestate on private account; which debt ought to be opposed to the debts due from him as surviving partner of Richard Booker if Co., and William Watkins if Co.

Without going into a minute investigation of the testimony respecting Mr. Tabb’s state of mind for several years before his death; or determining, whether its derangement was so complete, during the whole of that time, as to invalidate any specific contract he might have entered into, it is sufficient to observe, that the condition of his mind was certainly such, as might well account for his having failed to search out, and set up, a real defence, at law; and therefore, if he possessed such real defence, the judgments ought not to preclude his representatives from it now.

The question, whether he was a partner of either or both the concerns of Richard Hill &/■ Co., and Moss Arm-stead if Co., is therefore considered as now perfectly open, to be decided on such testimony as may be adduced by either party.

It is admitted that Mr. Tabb was a partner of Richard Hill if Co., and that Richard Booker if Co. held an interest in Moss Armstead if Co. and Richard Hill if Co.: But it is denied, that Mr. Tabb knew of that interest; and it is contended, that he could not be made a partner of those firms by any act of his copartners, or otherwise, than by his . own consent.

It is also admitted, that Gist was unacquainted with the members of either Richard Hill if Co., or Moss Armstead if Co.; that he did not credit them on the confidence, that Richard Booker if Co. were of the partnership: and, of [291]*291consequence, that the accountability of Mr. Tabb, for them, cannot be maintained, on the ground of their being led to consider him as a partner.

It was stated by one of the counsel for the defendants, that, being bound by all the acts of the company, Mr. Tabb became a member of any copartnery into which Richard Booker &¡- Co., should enter, whether he did, or did not, assent individually to being engaged.

To this opinion, in the latitude in which it was laid down, I cannot subscribe; and, if in the progress of the suit, it should be deemed necessary to insist upon it, and the gentleman who has advanced it, still retains it, I will thank him to furnish me with those authorities, on which, he may rely. The opinion to which I now incline is, that the assent of any member of a particular firm, is necessary to engage him as a member of a new firm; and that the general authority given by all to each, or even to the acting or managing partners, to bind the whole company, does not extend to the erection of new companies, composed of new members.

In order to subject Mr. Tabb as a partner of Richard Hill Co., and J\ioss Armstead Co., his consent to become a partner must be shown. But to show this consent, an express declaration from himself cannot be considered as indispensible; other testimony ought to be received, and circumstances must be resorted to in order to ascertain the fact.

It is relied upon, by the counsel fcr the defendant, as prima facie evidence of his assent, that Booker and Field cannot be presumed to have engaged the firm in a new partnership, without his approbation.

The circumstances of the company strongly support this presumption. The members of it resided at no great distance, and its business was conducted almost under the eye of Mr. Tabb. In the ordinary course of human affairs, he must frequently have fallen in with his partners, and have made some enquiries into the affairs of the company. It is presuming too much to suppose he could have remained [292]*292uninformed of a circumstance so interesting to himself, as that Richard Booker &r Co., of whom he was one, had entered into a new partnership; and, if he did know it, and made no objection to it, his consent to the transaction would very certainly be implied. It is not stated that the members composing the firms of Richard Hill $/• Co., and Moss Armstead 8f Co., were concealed from the world ; or less known than is usual on such occasions. Nor is it stated, not to have been a matter of notoriety, that a share in each was held by Richard Booker 8f Co. I cannot, therefore, presume any extraordinary concealment to have been used, or that Mr. Tabb■ was unacquainted with a circumstance which it so much concerned him to know, and which it was so much in his power to know.

This presumption has been met by the complainants, who state that their intestate withdrew himself in 1771 from the copartnery of Richard Booker &f Co., and might therefore very well be presumed no longer to enquire concerning their transactions.

The articles of agreement entered into with Shore, in 1774, seem to me to be very strong on this point. In that paper, Tabb states himself one of the surviving partners of the company: he contracts with an agent for the management of its affairs; binds himself for.the salary of that agent, whom he obliges to account to him as well as to Theophilus Field, and to pay him as well as Field, the money which might be collected. If he had left only his name to the company, and had no real interest in it, this agreement would, most probably, have been expressed in very different terms. Another evidence on this subject is, I think, his opening a letter to Richard Booker Co. It is a liberty which only a member of that company would have taken. The counsel for Mr. Tabb’s administrators, endeavour to account for it by stating that the London mark was on the letter, and might well be considered by him as containing a dun. That, I believe, does not follow. Letters from London to American merchants are not necessarily written for the purpose of [293]*293demanding money. But should this even be conceded, the fact would still evidence a solicitude to enquire into the affairs of Richard Booker Co.; and that solicitude would have informed him they had taken an interest in the other

Another circumstance of some weight with me, is furnished by the correspondence with Gist. Richard Booker Co. (which Gist considered as Tabb), had recommended Moss Armstead Co., and Richard Hill Co.; and Gist complained of their want of punctuality. He enquires who they are, and employs

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Bluebook (online)
23 F. Cas. 595, 1 Brock. 33, 10 Va. 279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tabbs-admrs-v-gist-circtdva-1802.