[Cite as Tabbosha v. Abdelrehim, 2025-Ohio-3133.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
MONIR TABBOSHA, : APPEAL NO. C-250001 TRIAL NO. A-2400524 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY LEMIAA ABDELREHIM, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/3/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Tabbosha v. Abdelrehim, 2025-Ohio-3133.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
MONIR TABBOSHA, : APPEAL NO. C-250001 TRIAL NO. A-2400524 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : OPINION LEMIAA ABDELREHIM :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed as Modified
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 3, 2025
The Quraishi Law Office, LLC, and Nadeem Quraishi, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Blake P. Somers, LLC, and Blake P. Somers, for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} After an Egyptian court ruled that plaintiff-appellant Monir Tabbosha
and defendant-appellee Lemiaa Abdelrehim were married under Egyptian law,
Tabbosha filed a complaint in the General Division of the Hamilton County Court of
Common Pleas seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not married to
Abdelrehim. The trial court granted Abdelrehim’s motion to dismiss, finding that there
was no actual controversy at issue in the case and that Tabbosha’s claims were barred
by res judicata. Tabbosha appeals, arguing that the trial court misapplied the law.
{¶2} The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain portions of Tabbosha’s
declaratory-judgment request and should have dismissed that part of the complaint
without reaching the merits. Because a special statutory proceeding governs much of
the relief Tabbosha seeks—an annulment—he cannot circumvent that proceeding
through a declaratory judgment. We therefore modify the trial court’s judgment to
reflect that Tabbosha’s third, fourth, and fifth requests for declaratory relief are
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court properly dismissed
the remainder of Tabbosha’s complaint. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as
modified.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} In 2019, Tabbosha and Abdelrehim had “a brief extra-marital
relationship” that resulted in the birth of a child. Tabbosha had been married to a
different woman since May 2003.
Egyptian proceeding
{¶4} In 2021, Abdelrehim, a citizen of Egypt, initiated a legal proceeding in
Cairo, Egypt, “seeking a finding that she and [Tabbosha] were in a ‘common-law
marriage’” under Egyptian law. In the Egyptian case, Abdelrehim produced an
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“Islamic Marriage Certificate” from Michigan containing Tabbosha’s purported
signature.
{¶5} Tabbosha, however, alleged that his signature had been forged. While
he acknowledged that he was the child’s father, Tabbosha denied that he was married
to Abdelrehim, noting that he had been married to his wife since 2003.
{¶6} The Egyptian court determined that the Islamic Marriage Certificate
was a forgery. Nevertheless, it held that Tabbosha and Abdelrehim were in a “marital
relationship” under “Islamic law.” Tabbosha unsuccessfully appealed the decision.
Hamilton County proceedings
{¶7} In February 2024, after the Egyptian court proceedings concluded,
Tabbosha filed his declaratory-judgment action in the Hamilton County Court of
Common Pleas, General Division. He alleged he was entitled to a judgment declaring
that (1) the English version of the “Islamic Marriage Certificate” was forged, (2) the
Arabic version of the “Islamic Marriage Certificate” was forged, (3) the “Islamic
Marriage Certificate” did not establish a legal marriage under Ohio law, (4) the
Egyptian court ruling did not establish a marriage under Ohio law, and (5) Tabbosha
and Abdelrehim are not married, or alternatively, that the Egyptian court’s finding of
marriage was void as a matter of law.
{¶8} Tabbosha attached to the complaint copies of the original and translated
versions of the Egyptian lower court and appellate judgments. His complaint alleged
that neither he nor Abdelrehim had ever resided in Michigan and Abdelrehim never
obtained a marriage license as required under Michigan law. Tabbosha also asserted
that he had initiated child-support and shared-parenting actions in Hamilton County
and that he had been paying Abdelrehim about $4,000 each month in child support.
{¶9} Abdelrehim moved to dismiss Tabbosha’s complaint under Civ.R.
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12(B)(6). Her motion asserted that (1) Tabbosha’s claims that the Islamic Marriage
Certificate was forged and that he and Abdelrehim were not married were barred by
res judicata, and (2) Tabbosha’s claims that the “Islamic Marriage Certificate” and the
Egyptian court rulings do not establish a marriage under Ohio law failed to allege an
actual controversy for the purpose of a declaratory judgment.
{¶10} Tabbosha moved for leave to amend his complaint, seeking to add
allegations that Abdelrehim had since initiated additional proceedings in Egypt, in
which she sought spousal support and child support from Tabbosha.
{¶11} The trial court granted Abdelrehim’s motion to dismiss and denied
Tabbosha’s motion for leave to amend. The court held that while there was no question
that a person could not be married to multiple people under Ohio and Michigan law,
Abdelrehim “ha[d] not sought a declaration in Ohio that she is married to Plaintiff,
nor has she sought spousal support.” The court also found that Tabbosha’s claims were
barred “by collateral estoppel and the judgment of the Egyptian Court is res judicata.”
{¶12} Tabbosha appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶13} In three assignments of error, Tabbosha asserts that the trial court erred
by (1) denying his motion for leave to amend, (2) finding no “justiciable controversy,”
and (3) dismissing the action based on res judicata. We address these assignments out
of order.
A. Jurisdiction
{¶14} After briefing was complete, we ordered the parties to file supplemental
briefing on whether the General Division of the Hamilton County Court of Common
Pleas had jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment that a purported marriage did
not occur. See Kennedy v. Dottore, 2020-Ohio-3451, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (“Lack of subject
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matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte by the court at any stage of the
proceeding.”). After reviewing the relevant law, we conclude that the General Division
of the Court of Common Pleas did not have jurisdiction.
1. Tabbosha’s complaint primarily sought an annulment
{¶15} First, we consider the nature of Tabbosha’s complaint. He attempts to
frame his declaratory-judgment action as simply a request for a declaration that he is
not married to Abdelrehim. But “[a]t its core,” what he seeks is a request for an
annulment. Herring v. Coleman, 2023-Ohio-3245, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).
{¶16} Tabbosha’s complaint requested five declarations. Three of the requests
asked for a declaration that a legal marriage between Abdelrehim and Tabbosha had
not been established, or, alternatively, that the marriage was void as a matter of law.
{¶17} Annulments differ from divorces—whereas a divorce terminates an
existing legal marriage, an annulment establishes that the parties were never in fact
married. Nixon v. Day, 2019-Ohio-3335, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). Moreover, bigamous
marriages are void ab initio and accordingly never legally existed. Carnes v. Carnes,
2015-Ohio-2925, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.); Bubsey v. Oleyar, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2255, *4
(8th Dist. May 25, 2000); see White ex rel. White v. Conrad, 2005-Ohio-17, ¶ 9 (9th
Dist.) (“an annulment decree renders a marriage invalid from its inception. . .
Accordingly, the annulled marriage is treated as though it never existed.”). Domestic-
relations courts are equity courts and have the power to declare a marriage void ab
initio if they determine that a purported marriage is invalid. Trunk v. Coleman, 2024-
Ohio-470, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.).
{¶18} Annulment actions have been used to achieve relief similar to that
sought by Tabbosha in this case. In Trunk, Coleman filed an ex parte petition in
California to establish a marriage between Coleman and Trunk. Id. at ¶ 2. Despite
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Coleman’s failure to serve Trunk, the California court granted the petition. Id. Trunk
brought an annulment action in an Ohio domestic-relations court, asking the court to
declare the purported marriage a nullity. Id. at ¶ 3. Because the plaintiff did not
consent to the purported marriage, the court held that the marriage was void ab initio
and that the trial court properly granted an annulment. Id. at ¶ 55.
{¶19} Tabbosha challenges the Egyptian court’s determination that he is
married to Abdelrehim based on his not consenting to the marriage and because he
was already married. Had the trial court proceeded to the merits of Tabbosha’s claim
for a declaratory judgment, the trial court would have been required to apply Ohio’s
statutes governing the validity of marriages and annulments to determine if Tabbosha
and Abdelrehim were married. Therefore, Tabbosha’s requested relief through his
declaratory-judgment action was an annulment.
2. Subject-matter jurisdiction
{¶20} A court has subject-matter jurisdiction where it has “the constitutional
or statutory power to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” Ostanek v. Ostanek,
2021-Ohio-2319, ¶ 36.
{¶21} The Ohio Constitution and the Ohio Revised Code define a domestic-
relations court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the Ohio Constitution provides,
“The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction
over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative
officers and agencies as may be provided by law.” Ohio Constitution, art. IV, § 4(B).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “provided by law” means that common pleas
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction “is defined entirely by statute.” State v. Wilson, 73
Ohio St.3d 40, 42 (1995).
{¶22} R.C. 3105.011, which governs courts’ jurisdiction over “domestic
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
relations matters,” provides, “[t]he court of common pleas including divisions of
courts of domestic relations, has full equitable powers and jurisdiction appropriate to
the determination of all domestic relations matters.” R.C. 3105.011(A). Included in
“domestic relations matters” are any proceedings under R.C. Ch. 3105. R.C.
3105.011(B)(2). And, as annulments are governed by R.C. Ch. 3105, they are “domestic
relations matters.” Id.; R.C. 3105.31 to 3105.34.
{¶23} The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division was established by R.C. 2301.03(B)(2). That same subsection provides that
the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division “shall have
assigned to [it] all . . . annulment cases coming before the court.”
{¶24} That the statute assigns all annulment cases to the domestic-relations
court is significant because “[a] statutory assignment to one division of a court confers
on that division exclusive jurisdiction and deprives the court’s other divisions,
including the general division, of jurisdiction over the same matters.” McKenzie v.
Vickers-McKenzie, 2006-Ohio-7005, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing Keen v. Keen, 2004-Ohio-
2961, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); see Buckingham v. Buckingham, 2018-Ohio-2038, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.);
see also State ex rel. Heyside v. Calabrese, 2022-Ohio-1245, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).
3. Herring v. Coleman
{¶25} In Herring v. Coleman, 2023-Ohio-3245 (8th Dist.), the court held that
the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas lacked
jurisdiction over Herring’s request for a declaratory judgment that he was not married
to Coleman. Id. at ¶ 13. Herring alleged that Coleman had initiated a divorce action in
Nevada, which asserted that the two were married. Id. at ¶ 2. Herring brought a
declaratory-judgment action in Cuyahoga County’s general division, seeking to
establish that no marriage had ever existed between the parties. Id. The Herring court
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explained that R.C. 2301.03(L)(1), which established the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas’ domestic relations division, provides domestic-relations courts “with
jurisdiction over all marriage-related cases.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Pula v. Pula-Branch,
129 Ohio St.3d 196, 197 (2011).
{¶26} The Herring court concluded that “[a]t its core,” Herring’s complaint
sought a judgment determining whether a valid marriage existed between he and
Coleman. Herring at ¶ 13. The court determined that the general division lacked
jurisdiction over marriage-related matters, and therefore, the trial court correctly
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 13-14.
4. The trial court lacked jurisdiction
{¶27} The facts in Herring are nearly identical to those in this case. But the
statute establishing Hamilton County’s domestic-relations court is different from the
statute establishing Cuyahoga County’s domestic-relations court.
{¶28} R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) grants Cuyahoga County’s domestic-relations
division “all the powers related to” domestic-relations matters. But R.C. 2301.03(B)(2)
provides that the Hamilton County domestic-relations division “shall have assigned
to them all divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, and annulment cases
coming before the court.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶29} As discussed above, a “statutory assignment to one division of a court
confers on that division exclusive jurisdiction and deprives the court’s other divisions,
including the general division, of jurisdiction over the same matters.” (Emphasis
added.) McKenzie, 2006-Ohio-7005, at ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing Keen, 2004-Ohio-2961,
at ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); see Buckingham, 2018-Ohio-2038, at ¶ 6 (2d Dist.); see also
Heyside, 2022-Ohio-1245, at ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).
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{¶30} R.C. 2301.03(B)(2) unequivocally assigns to the Hamilton County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, “all . . . annulment cases coming
before the court.” Therefore, we hold that the domestic-relations division has exclusive
jurisdiction over annulments, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order
that effectively would have annulled Abdelrehim and Tabbosha’s purported marriage.
5. Declaratory judgment cannot bypass special statutory proceedings
{¶31} Tabbosha filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking an order stating
that his and Abdelrehim’s purported marriage had never been established and was
void. But declaratory-judgment actions cannot circumvent an area where a special
statutory proceeding has been established. See State ex rel. Albright, 60 Ohio St.3d
40, 42 (1991) (“[I]t is always inappropriate for courts to grant declaratory judgments
and injunctions that attempt to resolve matters committed to special statutory
proceedings . . . We find this tantamount to a holding that courts have no jurisdiction
to hear the actions in the first place, and now so hold.”); see also Jones v. Jones, 115
Ohio App. 358, 365 (8th Dist. 1962) (“The defendant should not be permitted to seek
affirmative relief (that is, a declaratory judgment as to the marital status of the parties)
as a matter of defense in an action pending against him in a case where there are
special statutes upon the authority on which the plaintiff’s petition must be based and
the trial of such issues had when lawfully presented are specifically provided for by
statute.”); Comer v. Bench, 2003-Ohio-2821, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.) (“R.C. 2721.02 provides
that ‘courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed.’ However, where a special statutory method
for determining a particular type of case is provided, it cannot be bypassed in favor of
a declaratory judgment action.”).
{¶32} No common-law divorces, dissolution, or annulments are legal in Ohio.
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Nixon, 2019-Ohio-3335, at ¶ 20 (5th Dist.); see State ex rel. Papp v. James, 69 Ohio
St.3d 373, 379 (1994), quoting Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio St. 226, 231 (1951) (“‘There was
no common-law right of divorce.’”). Instead, divorces, annulments, and other related
domestic-relations matters are a product of statute in Ohio. See Papp at 379
(explaining that divorce has been described as a “special statutory proceeding.”). As
such, a “special statutory method” governs Ohio annulments. As Ohio’s annulment
statute established a special statutory proceeding, parties may not bypass it via a
declaratory-judgment action. In Hamilton County, the domestic-relations division has
exclusive jurisdiction over annulment actions.
{¶33} We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Tabbosha’s
declaratory-judgment action to the extent it sought a declaration amounting to an
annulment. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Tabbosha’s third,
fourth, and fifth requests for relief are dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(a).
{¶34} Our holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider whether
Tabbosha and Abdelrehim were validly married disposes of Tabbosha’s second
assignment of error, so we overrule the second assignment of error.
B. Tabbosha’s remaining claims
{¶35} The trial court granted Abdelrehim’s motion to dismiss in part because
it determined that Tabbosha’s claims were barred by res judicata. Tabbosha asserts in
his third assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing
the action based on res judicata without considering comity or public policy.
{¶36} Above, we determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over only
the portion of Tabbosha’s action that, at its core, sought an annulment. Accordingly,
we consider only the two remaining requests for relief: Tabbosha sought judgments
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declaring that his signature was forged on the Islamic Marriage Certificate. The trial
court determined that Tabbosha was attempting to relitigate the issues decided by the
Egyptian court and concluded that his claims were barred by collateral estoppel and
res judicata.
{¶37} But on these remaining requests for relief, the Egyptian court did
exactly what Tabbosha asked the trial court to do: it determined that Tabbosha’s
signature on the Islamic Marriage Certificate had been forged.
{¶38} “It is axiomatic that a reversal may only be rendered for errors that
caused prejudice to the complaining party.” Natl. Check Bur., Inc. v. Woodgeard,
2006-Ohio-140, ¶ 17. Tabbosha cannot show that he suffered any prejudice resulting
from the trial court’s dismissing the portion of the complaint seeking declarations that
his signature was forged. He has already been granted the exact relief he seeks.
{¶39} We overrule the third assignment of error.
C. The trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Tabbosha’s motion for leave to amend
{¶40} Tabbosha’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint. We review the
trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave to amend a complaint for an abuse of
discretion. Henderson v. Dewine, 2022-Ohio-1025, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). A trial court abuses
its discretion by “exercis[ing] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a
matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-
3304, ¶ 35. A trial court acts within its discretion by denying leave to amend a
complaint if the amendment would be futile. Hensley v. Durrani, 2013-Ohio-4711, ¶
14 (1st Dist.).
{¶41} Tabbosha sought to amend his complaint to include allegations that
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Abdelrehim had filed a subsequent action for spousal and child support in Egypt,
which he asserts demonstrates a justiciable controversy. But these allegations would
not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court. Therefore, Tabbosha’s
proposed amendment would be futile.
{¶42} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
and we overrule Tabbosha’s first assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶43} We overrule Tabbosha’s assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment as modified to reflect that Tabbosha’s third, fourth, and fifth requests for
relief are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm the remainder of
the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment accordingly.
KINSLEY, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.