T. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJuly 3, 2025
Docket21-1213V
StatusUnpublished

This text of T. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (T. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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T. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2025).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 21-1213V

************************* * B.T., * Chief Special Master Corcoran * Petitioner, * Filed: June 2, 2025 * v. * * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * *************************

Jessica Wallace, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Aventura, FL, for Petitioner.

Benjamin P. Warder, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION GRANTING FINAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1

On April 15, 2021, B.T. filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”). 2 Petitioner alleged that he developed an ulnar neuropathy in his right upper extremity from receipt of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to him on September 19, 2018. Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1, 3. I dismissed the claim after briefing, and that determination was not appealed. Decision, dated Nov. 8, 2024 (ECF No. 46). Petitioner has now filed a motion for a final award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion, dated Apr. 23, 2025 (ECF No. 54). This is Petitioner’s sole fees and costs requests. Petitioner requests attorney’s fees and costs relating to the work performed by present counsel (Jessica Wallace of Siri & Glimstad, LLP (“Siri”)) since her appearance in the matter, as well as attorney’s fees and costs relating to the work performed by previous counsel (Diana Stadelnikas of mctlaw).

1 Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public in its present form. Id. 2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix). Petitioner requests a total of $107,074.37—reflecting $67,207.84 for Siri ($39,749.70 in attorney’s fees, plus $27,458.14 in costs), and $39,866.53 for mctlaw ($38,844.00 in attorney’s fees, plus $1,022.53 in costs). Motion for Siri, dated Apr. 23, 2025 (ECF No. 54) (“Mot. Siri”); Motion for mctlaw, dated Apr. 22, 2025 (ECF No. 52) (“Mot. mctlaw”).

Respondent reacted to the interim fees request on May 5, 2025. See Response, dated May 5, 2025 (ECF No. 57) (“Resp.”). Respondent is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs are met in this case, but defers the calculation of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Id. at 2, 4. Petitioner filed a reply maintaining his position and requested that he be awarded the requested fees and costs as indicated. Reply, dated May 5, 2025 (ECF No. 58).

For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and costs in the total amount of $107,074.37.

ANALYSIS

I. Petitioner’s Claim had Reasonable Basis

Although the Vaccine Act only guarantees a fees award to successful petitioners, a special master may also award fees and costs in an unsuccessful case if: (1) the “petition was brought in good faith”; and (2) “there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Section 15(e)(1). I have in prior decisions set forth at length the criteria to be applied when determining if a claim possessed “reasonable basis” sufficient for a fees award. See, e.g., Sterling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-551V, 2020 WL 549443, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 3, 2020). Importantly, establishing reasonable basis does not automatically entitle an unsuccessful claimant to fees, but is instead a threshold obligation; fees can still thereafter be limited, if unreasonable, or even denied entirely.

A claim’s reasonable basis 3 must be demonstrated through some objective evidentiary showing. Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). This objective inquiry is focused on the claim—counsel’s conduct is irrelevant (although it may bulwark good faith). Simmons, 875 F.3d at 635. In addition, reasonable basis inquiries are not static—they evaluate not only what was known at the time the petition was filed, but also take into account what is learned about the evidentiary support for the claim as the matter progresses. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding the finding that a reasonable basis for petitioners’ claims ceased to exist once they had reviewed their

3 Because this claim’s good faith is not in dispute, I do not include a discussion of the standards applicable to that fees prong.

2 expert's opinion, which consisted entirely of unsupported speculation). As a result, a claim can “lose” reasonable basis over time.

The standard for finding the existence of reasonable basis is lesser (and thus inherently easier to satisfy) than the preponderant standard applied when assessing entitlement, as cases that fail can still have sufficient objective grounding for a fees award. Braun v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 144 Fed. Cl. 72, 77 (2019). The Court of Federal Claims has affirmed that “[r]easonable basis is a standard that petitioners, at least generally, meet by submitting evidence.” Chuisano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 287 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (internal quotations omitted) (affirming special master). The factual basis and medical support for the claim is among the evidence that should be considered. Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 132 Fed. Cl. 372, 378 (Fed. Cl. 2017). Under the Vaccine Act, special masters have “maximum discretion” in applying the reasonable basis standard. See, e.g., Silva v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 108 Fed. Cl. 401, 401–02 (Fed. Cl. 2012). 4

Although Petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful, I find there was sufficient objective basis to entitle him to a fees and costs award. Petitioner’s injury was not disputed. And although he was ultimately unable to demonstrate that his receipt of the flu vaccine “did cause” his ulnar neuropathy, or that it occurred within a medically acceptable timeframe, it was a reasonably-disputed claim, the disposition of which was not self-evident from the start. 5 Thus (and because I find no other reason to deny fees despite the claim’s disposition), a final award of fees and costs in this matter is appropriate.

II. Calculation of Fees

Determining the appropriate amount of the fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of the lodestar method—“multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)).

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