T. H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings Co.

257 F. 564, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 807
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 10, 1919
DocketNo. 871
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 257 F. 564 (T. H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
T. H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings Co., 257 F. 564, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 807 (N.D. Ill. 1919).

Opinion

SANBORN, District Judge.

Injunction suit, filed April 28, 1917, on patents 684,552, issued October 15, 1901, and 751,943, issued February 9, 1904, on friction draft gear. Defendant corporation is licensee under the patents in suit and two others, but the license covers only one kind of gear, known as the “included” type. So far as the four patents cover other kinds, they are not transferred.

Defendant Miner has been engaged in making and selling draft gear since 1907. He furnishes to the Castings Company drawings of the parts of the gears, also working details, from which the latter furnishes to him some of the parts, and another part from stock furnished it by Miner. Other parts are bought by Miner from other manufacturers. The gears are assembled by Miner at the Grant Locomotive Works in the Castings Company’s plant, where a section is reserved for him by the Castings Company for the purpose, for which he pays rent, and where he has also space and machinery for testing the gears. Each pair of gears, suitable for one railroad car, is fully completed for installation by Miner when sold by him.

The questions raised are whether the Castings Company is estopped by the license in respect to the type of gears not covered by it, whether Miner’s relation to the corporation is such that he is bound by the estoppel, whether defendants are joint infringers, and whether there is any infringement, either on the assumption that 'both defendants are bound by the estoppel or the contrary one.

[1] The patents and structures in evidence relate to draft gears for passenger and freight cars, in which the impact is sustained partly by very heavy coiled springs and partly by the friction of steel [565]*565surfaces sliding on each other; some of the surfaces being inclined to the line of movement of the drawbar, and so arranged that the wedge elements expand and grip either the center bar or outside shell. The mechanism being confined in a box or cylinder, the force of the impact against a movable wedge riding on the surface of a shoe which is parallel to the inclined wedge surface, sets up forces at right angles to the general line of movement, and is so arranged as to grip either the central drawbar or the inside face of the cylinder or housing, thus creating sliding frictional resistance. Where the drawbar is gripped by the frictional elements, the device is known as belonging to the “included” type; and where the pressure is radial or outward, to the “nonincluded” or expansion type. The first patent in suit relates to the “included” type, and the second to the “excluded” one.

The license referred to is dated June 13, 1913, and recites that—

“Whereas, the National Malleable Castings Company, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Ohio, and having its principal place of business in the city of Cleveland, in said state, is desirous of acquiring the exclusive right under each and all of the letters patent aforesaid to manufacture, use, and sell draft rigging of the included friction type solely, that is to say, draft rigging having an internal friction member or plunger, with other members located exteriorly thereof and adapted to press or to be pressed inwardly to eoact with said central member, as contradistinguished from those in which the friction members move or press outwardly or expand radially and coact with the inner face or surface of a shell or casting, or the like.” Therefore there was granted to defendant corporation, “under each and all of the letters patent aforesaid, the exclusive right or license to make, use, and sell, for the full term of each and all of said letters patent aforesaid, draft rigging of the included friction type, as above specified.”

The corporation was also given the right to sue for infringements occurring after the license. The license raises no estoppel against the licensee in respect to the noninclusive type of gear. It does not convey any property right, but simply exempts the licensee from suit by the assignor so long as the former makes, uses, or sells only the “included” kind of gears. Analogies drawn from the law of real estate or leaseholds may serve to illustrate, but at the risk of false analogy. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 Fed. 883, 156 C. C. A. 395.

The patentee, for $1,500, paid, has agreed that he will not prevent the licensee from making the “included” gears, or bring suit, or in any way call it to account. He has made no agreement as to the “non-included” type. In respect to this he stands on his patent rights; the license being silent as to the “nonincluded” gearing, except that it recites that the licensee is desirous of acquiring the exclusive right “to manufacture, use, and sell draft rigging of the included friction type only.” This implies merely that it does not desire to make, use, or sell the other type, but falls short of an agreement that it will not do so. The granting clause throws no further light on the matter.

It is difficult to see how the licensee can he estopped in respect to the nonincluded type. It took nothing by the license as to this, no immunity from suit, and assumed no obligation respecting it. In Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Nichols & Shepard Co. (C. C.) 190 Fed. 579, [566]*566defendant was licensed under 55 patents to make a certain type of machine, and was sued for making another type. Judge Denison said:

“The estoppel must be mutual. The licensee may not deny the patentee’s title to the monopoly; the patentee may not deny the licensee’s right to act under that monopoly. It is difficult to see how, when the act involved is the manufacture of a certain machine, at a specified jplaee or in a specified way, and both complainant and defendant agree that there is no contract in existence permitting the act in controversy, either party can be estopped by a contract relating to something else.
“We may apply, further, by analogy, the rule of landlord and tenant, which is the basis of estoppel by a patent licensee. If the landlord claims title to lots 1, 2, and 3, and leases to the tenant lots 1 and 2, and the tenant then undertakes to occupy lot 3, the lease would not be a bar to ejectment by the landlord for lot 3, nor would the lessee be estopped to deny the landlord’s title to lot 3. It seems to me quite clear that the complaining patentee cannot, at the same time, maintain the position that the act of the defendant licensee, manufacturing what is said to be the patented article, is outside the conditions of the license, and therefore not authorized by the license, and also the position that his title to the monopoly is conceded by the license, and therefore cannot be disputed.” Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Stearns, 227 Fed. 74, 141 C. C. A. 622; Auto Spring Repair Co. v. Grinberg (C. C.) 196 Fed. 52; Tate v. B. & O. R. Co., 229 Fed. 141, 143 C. C. A. 417.

The licensee not being estopped, in this suit charging infringement by the making and sale of the “nonincluded” type of gearing, of course Miner cannot be. The prior art is therefore open to both defendants.

In regard to the question whether defendants would be jointly liable for infringement, see Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Goodrich (D. C.) 237 Fed. 893; Tatham v. Le Roy, Fed. Cas. No. 13,762.

Defense of Laches. Laches is also pleaded as a defense.

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Bluebook (online)
257 F. 564, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 807, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/t-h-symington-co-v-national-malleable-castings-co-ilnd-1919.