T. H. Glennon Co., Inc. v. Monday

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: April 17, 2026
• Docket: 23-1883
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1883

T.H. GLENNON CO., INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DEBRA MONDAY, individually and as Manager of TMG Green LLC; TMG GREEN, LLC; ULDERIC BOISVERT, individually and as Manager of Greenwood Farms, LLC and as President of H.U.R.B Landscaping, Inc.; GREENWOOD FARMS, LLC; H.U.R.B. LANDSCAPING, INC.; Pat Does 1-5,

Defendants, Appellees,

SHONN MONDAY, individually and as Manager of TMG Green LLC,

Defendant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Dunlap, Circuit Judges.

Michael C. Walsh, with whom Walsh & Walsh LLP was on brief, for appellant.

Ronaldo Rauseo-Ricupero, with whom Nixon Peabody LLP was on brief, for appellees H.U.R.B. Landscaping and Boisvert. April 17, 2026 THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Writing only for the

parties -- who well know the facts, the case history, and the

arguments -- we see no reason to beat around the bush: we reverse

the dismissal of the claims against Debra Monday but affirm the

dismissal of the claims against the other defendants.1

Here's just a bit of context before we get there, though.

After plaintiff/appellant T.H. Glennon Co., Inc. ("Glennon") fired

salesman Shonn Monday (a Massachusetts resident), Glennon's

leadership team learned that Shonn had breached his non-disclosure

agreement.2 His purported offenses? In short, stealing Glennon's

confidential corporate info and starting a competitor company in

the apparently cut-throat world of mulch coloring and landscaping

equipment.

So (trimming down the procedural history quite a bit)

Glennon sued Shonn as well as today's appellees: his wife Debra

(also a Massachusetts resident), their new company TMG Green, and

their suspected collaborators, the New York-based H.U.R.B.

Landscaping and its officer Ulderic Boisvert. The Massachusetts

federal district court dismissed several claims and then

bifurcated the proceedings, pausing the case for all the defendants

1 All these dismissals were without prejudice. 2 We call Shonn Monday "Shonn" and Debra Monday "Debra" to avoid confusion, but we mean no disrespect in using their first names.

- 3 - except Shonn. It then held a bench trial just for the claims

against him, and, in a fifty-six-page written decision, found him

liable to Glennon for several claims. After some more briefing,

the court (in a text order) dismissed without prejudice the

remaining claims against all the other defendants for a lack of

personal jurisdiction.3

In a twenty-four-page appellate brief containing just

eleven pages of argument, Glennon appeals those dismissals. It

makes one good point -- the claims against Debra shouldn't have

been dismissed based on a lack of personal jurisdiction -- but the

remainder of its arguments lack merit, are waived, or both; none

require extended discussion.4

I. DEBRA MONDAY

For starters, we agree with Glennon's uncontested

argument that the district court wrongly dismissed Debra on the

3 The order in full: Treating the opposition to reopening the case as a renewed motion to dismiss, the motion is allowed without prejudice to allow the plaintiff to either re-file in a district where personal jurisdiction is clear or to re-file in Massachusetts with detailed averments supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction and affidavits and other evidentiary materials making out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. 4 And because none of these arguments break new ground, we also choose not to publish the opinion.

- 4 - same personal jurisdiction grounds as the out-of-staters.5 The

Massachusetts federal district court of course has personal

jurisdiction over this Massachusetts resident who was served at

her Massachusetts abode. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) ("For an individual, the

paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the

individual's domicile . . . ."). So we reverse the district

court's personal-jurisdiction-based dismissal of Glennon's claims

against Debra.6 On remand, the district court remains free to

consider the other arguments Debra raised below.

II. H.U.R.B. & BOISVERT

We now turn to Glennon's bouquet of arguments for why

the district court erred in dismissing H.U.R.B. and Boisvert for

want of personal jurisdiction.7 None uproot the decision below.

1. Glennon first proclaims that its civil RICO claim

conferred personal jurisdiction over H.U.R.B. via a nationwide

jurisdiction provision. But before trial, the district court

dismissed that claim on the pleadings because there was "only one

5 By "uncontested," we mean Debra didn't file a brief or show up to argument. 6 Glennon's briefs don't mention TMG Green (Shonn and Debra's shared company), so we don't revive the claims against it even though the company was lumped in exactly like Debra. 7 We'll just refer to H.U.R.B. throughout this section, but the analysis applies equally to Boisvert.

- 5 - predicate act that's alleged and that's not enough." (It thus

didn't consider whether the civil RICO claim establishes personal

jurisdiction over H.U.R.B.) On appeal, Glennon seems to say that

the district court was wrong to dismiss the claim, because an

"ongoing scheme" took place -- a "years long campaign of

industrial espionage," in fact, composed of multiple predicate

acts like Shonn deleting files, stealing research, and feeding bad

information to Glennon. And (says Glennon) H.U.R.B. was in on it,

so personal jurisdiction attached to it because a properly pled

civil RICO claim confers nationwide jurisdiction.

Though the district court's dismissal of the civil RICO

claim poses a legal question we review de novo, see Lerner v.

Colman, 26 F.4th 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2022), Glennon does not

adequately explain on appeal why the district court erred in

dismissing it. Glennon's appellate brief just summarizes the

complaint and (at the end of that summary) states that several

predicate acts ("wire fraud, mail fraud, industrial espionage and

computer fraud and abuse") occurred, without telling us more.

Notably, the brief doesn't specify how Glennon's pleadings

adequately alleged at least two "predicate acts" under RICO (aside

from the trade secrets violation that the complaint and the

district court seemed to key in on). See id. at 77. Nor does it

explain how those purported predicate acts comport with the

"heightened particularity requirements" for alleged predicate acts

- 6 - of wire and mail fraud. See Douglas v. Hirshon, 63 F.4th 49, 55

n.7 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that, for RICO claims "based on alleged

predicate acts of mail and wire fraud," the complaint "must state

the time, place, and content of the alleged mail and wire

communications perpetrating that fraud" (cleaned up)). Glennon

actually doesn't cite a single RICO case, and that's a big problem

in and of itself. See Rodríguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 48,

49 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding an argument waived for inadequate

development when "incredibly, [the party] cites no caselaw at

all").

In contrast, H.U.R.B.'s opposition brief "reviews in

[some] detail the case law and concepts that would need to be

addressed to develop" a winning civil RICO claim and explains why

Glennon's isn't one. Doherty v. Merck & Co., 892 F.3d 493, 501

(1st Cir. 2018). Meanwhile, Glennon's reply "offers no response"

to those RICO arguments, posing waiver issues. Id.

And even assuming Glennon provided a good argument for

why it adequately pled a civil RICO claim, it doesn't even try to

explain which subsection of the civil RICO statute confers

nationwide personal jurisdiction over H.U.R.B.8 See 18 U.S.C.

8In its brief, Glennon doesn't even cite the general statute that could confer nationwide personal jurisdiction. And its complaint below, which just says that "[t]he Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, especially under the RICO law," provides no greater insight.

- 7 - § 1965. As far as we can tell, that's an important question not

settled in our circuit and subject to disagreement across our

sister circuits and even our district courts.9 "Such a skimpy

effort to advance an issue . . . waives the issue." Doherty, 892

F.3d at 501.10

2. But that isn't the only theory of personal

jurisdiction that Glennon offers. Distinct from any RICO

arguments, Glennon next says it satisfied the prima facie standard

for specific personal jurisdiction.11 Yet Glennon's specific

9 See, e.g., Naicom Corp. v. DISH Network Corp., No. 3:21-CV-01405-JAW, 2024 WL 1363755, at *19 (D.P.R. Mar. 29, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-1416 (1st Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) ("Courts disagree on which subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 1965 authorizes nationwide service of process, and therefore allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants lacking sufficient minimum contacts to the forum."); Dispensa v. Nat'l Conf. of Cath. Bishops, No. 19-CV-556-LM, 2020 WL 2573013, at *10 (D.N.H. May 21, 2020) ("There are, in addition, differences among the circuits as to when 'the ends of justice require' the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants lacking traditional minimum contacts with the forum." (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b))); see also Licht v. Binance Holdings Ltd., No. CV 24-10447-NMG, 2025 WL 625303, at *24-25 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 24-10447-NMG, 2025 WL 624025 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2025); Mun. of Bayamón v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. CV 22-1550 (SCC), 2025 WL 2630671, at *5-6 (D.P.R. Sept. 11, 2025). 10At argument, Glennon's counsel said that we "would probably be justified in assuming" the civil RICO "argument waived." When asked by one of us whether that means he waived it, Glennon's counsel backtracked a bit and said, "Not unless the Court tells me that I have, no." Consider this us telling him that he has. 11 "Under the prima facie standard . . . we accept the plaintiff's (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true, and [we] construe those facts in the light most congenial to the

- 8 - personal jurisdiction argument faces the same fate as its civil

RICO argument -- appellate waiver -- for several reasons.

To start: among other things, this appeal poses

evidentiary questions about (1) whether the statements in

Glennon's "proffer" below were "properly documented," such that

the district court should have considered them under our prima

facie standard caselaw, and (2) how the trial record interacts

with Glennon's proffers. See Chen v. U.S. Sports Acad., Inc., 956

F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2020). Still, even if we were to put those

issues aside and accept what Glennon says is properly documented

evidence as true (and we're not sure we can), there is a more

fundamental problem with its appellate assertions.

On appeal, Glennon ignores (at least until its reply

brief) what the prima facie standard is in service of: the

three-part specific personal jurisdiction test of "relatedness,

purposeful availment, and reasonableness." Motus, LLC v. CarData

Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2022). And on this

essential three-part showing (that Glennon bears the burden on),

Glennon's opening brief "provides neither the necessary caselaw

nor reasoned analysis to show that [it] is right about any of

plaintiff's jurisdictional claim." Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).

- 9 - this."12 Rodríguez v. Mun. of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 176 (1st

Cir. 2011); see also Rodríguez-Machado, 700 F.3d at 49 (finding an

argument waived when "amazingly" the opening brief "spends no time

describing the legal contours" of the main issue). Its occasional

references to "sufficient contacts" are no more than sprinklings

of buzzwords that don't further its case. See Rodríguez, 659 F.3d

at 175.

And (again) H.U.R.B.'s response "reviews in detail the

case law and concepts that would need to be addressed to develop"

a successful personal jurisdiction argument here and why Glennon's

position doesn't pass muster. Doherty, 892 F.3d at 501.

Meanwhile, Glennon's retort in its reply brief -- three paragraphs

citing three cases for the whole analysis -- is both too little

and too late. See Rodríguez, 659 F.3d at 175-76 (too little);

United States v. Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th 844, 849 n.3 (1st Cir.

2024) (too late).

Throughout its appellate briefing, Glennon also omits

any discussion of the "reasonableness" inquiry, and that alone

soils any personal jurisdiction claim.13 After all, the "failure

12 Nor is the proffer organized using that three-part framework. 13 If Glennon thought its "foreseeability" sentence in its reply brief was a "reasonableness" argument, it is mistaken. "Foreseeability" is one of two necessary showings for purposeful availment. See Motus, 23 F.4th at 124. "Reasonableness" is a separate inquiry. Id. at 122.

- 10 - to make any one of" the three necessary specific personal

jurisdiction "showings dooms any effort to establish specific

personal jurisdiction." Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. The

Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

The subject matter's complexities make Glennon's sparse

briefing even more problematic. After all, "personal jurisdiction

is -- as Winston Churchill said of the Soviet Union -- 'a riddle

wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.'" Rosenthal v.

Bloomingdales.com, LLC, 101 F.4th 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2024) (Thompson,

J., concurring dubitante) (cleaned up); see also Donatelli v. Nat'l

Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 1990) (same). By

failing to work within the well-established personal jurisdiction

framework, aside from one page of discussion in its reply brief,

Glennon's briefs and proffer are "hardly a serious treatment of

complex issues and [are thus] not sufficient to preserve these

points for review." Rodríguez, 659 F.3d at 176 (cleaned up); see

also Ward v. AlphaCore Pharma, LLC, 89 F.4th 203, 211 (1st Cir.

2023) ("The appellant has made an argument that requires red meat

and strong drink -- but she has supported it only with the thinnest

of gruel."). That conclusion ends this line of inquiry.

3. Setting aside the first two personal jurisdiction

theories, Glennon offers up one more. It asks us to accept, for

- 11 - the first time, the "conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction."14

But Glennon itself hedges on that theory's viability, and several

of its own cited cases explain why we shouldn't adopt it today.

See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535

F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (D. Mass 1982); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales

Pracs. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 280, 294 (D. Mass. 2003). Van

Schaick explains that "those federal courts which have exercised

jurisdiction under the conspiracy rationale have done so on the

basis of the long-arm statutes applicable in the forum states,"

and that (as of 1982) "no Massachusetts decision has ever adopted

the theory."15 535 F. Supp. at 1132 (collecting cases). And In

re Lupron Marketing suggests that the conspiracy approach might

not comport with federal due process requirements, either. See

245 F. Supp. 2d at 294. Yet Glennon puzzlingly doesn't even try

14 This theory lets personal jurisdiction "be obtained over out-of-state defendants who have conspired with in-state defendants." Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir. 1980) (collecting cases). But in its usual formulation, it requires "something more than the presence of a co-conspirator within the forum state, such as substantial acts performed there in furtherance of the conspiracy and of which the out-of-state co-conspirator was or should have been aware." Id. 15A more recent case (courtesy of H.U.R.B.) makes clear that Massachusetts district courts still haven't really bought into this one (at least as of 2022). See In re TelexFree Sec. Litig., 626 F. Supp. 3d 253, 285 (D. Mass. 2022); but see Ward v. Auerbach, No. CV 16-12543-FDS, 2017 WL 2724938, at *12-13 & n.8 (D. Mass. June 23, 2017), aff'd sub nom., Ward v. AlphaCore Pharma, LLC, 89 F.4th 203 (1st Cir. 2023) (assuming that the theory applies, but holding that the plaintiffs failed to succeed under it anyway).

- 12 - to explain why the theory comports with either the Massachusetts

long-arm statute or federal due process -- complex threshold

problems that, again, its own cited cases flag but don't answer.

We see no reason to sort those things out ourselves unguided.16

Glennon cannot "leav[e] the court to do counsel's work, create the

ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones." United

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). So this one's

waived too.

4. "Wait! One last thing," says Glennon (we're

paraphrasing, of course). Even if it couldn't make out a winning

personal jurisdiction theory just yet, it insists it should get

the benefit of discovery to harvest more facts related to personal

jurisdiction. And so it contends the district court erred in

depriving it of such discovery.

True, "a diligent plaintiff who sues an out-of-state

corporation and who makes out a colorable case for the existence

of in personam jurisdiction may well be entitled to a modicum of

jurisdictional discovery if the corporation interposes a

jurisdictional defense." Sunview Condo. Ass'n v. Flexel Int'l,

Ltd., 116 F.3d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1997). But Glennon doesn't fit

the bill.

16To be clear: like the last time we addressed the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction (back in 1980), we aren't answering the question; we're just passing on it. See Glaros, 628 F.2d at 682 n.4.

- 13 - To start, the "standard for reversing a district court's

decision to disallow jurisdictional discovery is high." United

States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 626 (1st Cir. 2001).

We'll only overturn such a denial of discovery "upon a clear

showing of manifest injustice," meaning that the district court's

decision "was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice

to the aggrieved party." Id. (cleaned up). Glennon doesn't

acknowledge that heightened standard of review, let alone explain

why the district court's denial of jurisdictional discovery was an

abuse of discretion. And anyway, Glennon has (at least before us)

waived all its personal jurisdiction arguments, so it necessarily

hasn't "presented what amounts to a 'colorable' claim for personal

jurisdiction." Id. "As a result, we can hardly state that the

district court was 'plainly wrong' in denying discovery for lack

of a colorable claim." Id. We need say no more.17

Four up, four down. It turns out that Glennon's

arguments about personal jurisdiction over this out-of-state

landscaping company and its officer are actually "mulch ado about

nothing." Cf. William Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing act 2,

sc. 3, ll. 871-72 (Balthasar: "Note this before my notes; There's

not a note of mine that's worth the noting.").

17Well, we'll say one more thing on this one. We also don't buy Glennon's unsupported assertion that jurisdictional discovery was "mandatory" in these circumstances.

- 14 - III. WRAP UP

All told, we reverse the district court's dismissal of

Glennon's case against Debra but affirm the dismissal without

prejudice of the claims against the remaining defendants.18 Costs

to H.U.R.B. and Boisvert.

18 We remind the parties that affirming a dismissal without prejudice might possibly mean that Glennon can refile in the district court with clearer pleadings (or in another jurisdiction where personal jurisdiction over H.U.R.B. is clearer) to cure the deficiencies highlighted here and below.

- 15 -