T Coal Company v. Daniel Cook

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 22, 2023
Docket21-1999
StatusUnpublished

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Bluebook
T Coal Company v. Daniel Cook, (4th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1999 Doc: 28 Filed: 06/22/2023 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-1999

T COAL COMPANY; SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD,

Petitioners,

v.

DANIEL L. COOK; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (20-0386-BLA)

Submitted: May 30, 2023 Decided: June 22, 2023

Before WYNN and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: James M. Poerio, POERIO & WALTER, INC., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Petitioners. Brad A. Austin, WOLFE WILLIAMS & REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia, for Respondents.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-1999 Doc: 28 Filed: 06/22/2023 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

T Coal Company and its carrier, Security Insurance Company of Hartford

(collectively “T Coal”), petition this Court for review of the Benefits Review Board’s

(“BRB”) decision and order affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision

and order granting Daniel L. Cook benefits under the Black Lung Benefit Acts, 30 U.S.C.

§§ 901-944 (the “Act”). T Coal argues that the ALJ did not adequately consider all relevant

evidence and that the ALJ’s decision to credit the opinion of Dr. J. Randolph Forehand

over the opinion of Dr. Gregory J. Fino was neither supported by substantial evidence nor

adequately explained. We deny the petition for review.

In evaluating an ALJ’s decision that has been affirmed by the BRB, “[w]e review

the BRB’s decision for errors of law and to ensure the BRB’s decision adhered to its

statutory standard of review.” Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard, 65 F.3d 1189, 1193 (4th Cir.

1995). Our review is limited to considering “whether substantial evidence supports the

factual findings of the ALJ and whether the legal conclusions of the [BRB] and ALJ are

rational and consistent with applicable law.” Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Stallard, 876 F.3d

663, 668 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the legal

conclusions of the BRB and the ALJ de novo. Edd Potter Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’

Comp. Programs, 39 F.4th 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2022).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sea “B” Mining

Co. v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244, 252 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To

determine whether this standard has been met, we consider whether all of the relevant

2 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1999 Doc: 28 Filed: 06/22/2023 Pg: 3 of 5

evidence has been analyzed and whether the ALJ has sufficiently explained his rationale

in crediting certain evidence.” Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling, 783 F.3d 498, 504 (4th Cir.

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To establish entitlement to living miner’s benefits under the Act, the miner must

prove: “(1) that he has pneumoconiosis, in either its clinical or legal form; (2) that the

pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; (3) that he is totally disabled by a

pulmonary or respiratory impairment; and (4) that his pneumoconiosis is a substantially

contributing cause of his total disability.” W. Va. CWP Fund v. Bender, 782 F.3d 129, 133

(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 CF.R. §§ 718.204(c)(1),

725.202(d)(2). Under the Act, “pneumoconiosis” is defined as “a chronic dust disease of

the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of

coal mine employment,” and includes both “clinical” and “legal” pneumoconiosis.

20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a). “‘Legal pneumoconiosis’ includes any chronic lung disease or

impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.201(a)(2). “Arising out of coal mine employment” means “significantly related to,

or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.201(b).

We must first consider whether the ALJ examined “all of the relevant evidence.”

Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). T

Coal asserts that the ALJ did not adequately consider all the evidence about Cook’s

smoking history and should have determined a precise smoking history. As the ALJ noted,

however, Cook was repeatedly inconsistent when discussing how long he smoked and how

3 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1999 Doc: 28 Filed: 06/22/2023 Pg: 4 of 5

much he smoked, and the treatment records are broadly consistent with the ALJ’s finding.

The ALJ’s conclusion that it was impossible to precisely determine Cook’s smoking

history, but that it was up to 45 pack years, was rational, adequately explained, and

supported by substantial evidence.

Next, T Coal argues that the ALJ erred in affording weight to Forehand’s opinion,

asserting that Forehand’s opinion is neither reasoned nor well-documented because it was

formed with a belief that Cook smoked half a pack of cigarettes a year for 37 years. We

conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reliance on Forehand’s opinion and

that the ALJ adequately explained why he credited Forehand, notwithstanding Cook’s

inconsistent reports of his smoking history. The ALJ discussed Forehand’s consideration

of Cook’s lengthy smoking history in conjunction with the extremely dusty conditions of

Cook’s coal mining employment when crediting Forehand’s opinion that both smoking and

coal mine dust substantially contributed to Cook’s totally disabling respiratory impairment.

Relatedly, T Coal asserts that Fino’s opinion is entitled to weight because he was

more accurately informed about Cook’s smoking history than was Forehand. Again, the

ALJ’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ permissibly

determined that, although Fino had a more accurate understanding of Cook’s smoking

history, he did not adequately explain why coal mine dust could not have played any role

in Cook’s respiratory impairment. Because the ALJ’s determinations were rational,

explained, and supported by substantial evidence, we decline T Coal’s invitation to

substitute our weighing of the conflicting opinions for that of the ALJ. See Westmoreland

Coal Co. v. Cochran, 718 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 2013).

4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1999 Doc: 28 Filed: 06/22/2023 Pg: 5 of 5

Accordingly, we deny T Coal’s petition for review. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

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