Sylvia Hudson v. Dave Shorter, Jr.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJune 3, 1998
Docket02A01-9709-CV-00232
StatusPublished

This text of Sylvia Hudson v. Dave Shorter, Jr. (Sylvia Hudson v. Dave Shorter, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sylvia Hudson v. Dave Shorter, Jr., (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON ______________________________________________

SYLVIA HUDSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee, FILED Shelby Circuit No. 78879 T.D. Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9709-CV-00232 June 9, 1998 DAVE SHORTER, JR., Cecil Crowson, Jr. Defendant-Appellant. Appellate C ourt Clerk ____________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY THE HONORABLE JAMES E. SWEARENGEN, JUDGE

Jerry Stokes of Memphis For Plaintiff-Appellee

C. J. Barnett, McNabb, Holley & Waldrop PLLC of Memphis For Defendant-Appellant

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

Opinion filed:

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

This is an automobile personal injury case. The defendant, David Shorter, Jr., appeals

from the judgment of the trial court in a bench trial awarding plaintiff, Sylvia Hudson, $9,000.00

damages. Shorter’s responsibility for the accident was stipulated, and the trial concerned only

the issue of damages. Although the collision caused relatively minor damage to the parties’ vehicles,1 Hudson

was taken to the emergency room of Methodist Hospital in Memphis immediately after the

accident. She was examined and released without being referred to any health care professional.

Hudson admitted that shortly thereafter she retained an attorney and was referred to Bellevue

Clinic for treatment of alleged lower back and neck pain. Hudson visited the clinic on fourteen

occasions, and her treatment included the application of hot and cold packs and the

administration of ultrasound to her lower back and neck. Bellevue Clinic’s bill totaled $2,655.00

for these visits.2 Subsequently, Bellevue Clinic referred Hudson to Dr. Paul Williams, an

orthopedist. Dr. Williams administered similar conservative treatment to Hudson during the

course of nine visits and charged her a total of $528.00.

Hudson sued Shorter for damages in general sessions court, and Shorter appealed to

circuit court for a trial de novo. The case was tried in the circuit court by a judge without a jury,

and the bills for medical expenses were introduced into evidence by stipulation. Hudson also

presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Williams concerning his care and treatment and also

as proof that the major medical bill from Bellevue Clinic was reasonable and necessary. The

trial court considered the deposition testimony in reaching its decision to award plaintiff

$9,000.00 as damages. Shorter has appealed and presents in his brief these issues for review:

Under the surrounding circumstances, were the appellee’s physician’s opinions too speculative, and not within a sufficient degree of certainty to be admitted into evidence at trial:

a. With respect to his treatment of the appellee? And/Or

b. With respect to the treatment and bill allegedly incurred by the appellee with another physician?

In his deposition, Dr. Williams testified about Hudson’s initial visit with him as follows:

Q. What were your findings after this physical examination?

A. My opinion was that she sustained a strain and sprain of a generalized nature of her lumbar spine.

Q. Was that consistent, Doctor, with an automobile accident that she gave a history of?

A. It could and might be caused by an automobile accident.

1 Photographs reveal that the rear of Hudson’s car was only slightly damaged, whereas the front of Shorter’s pick-up truck was not damaged at all. 2 There was a dispute at trial concerning whether the clinic triple-charged Hudson for certain treatments.

2 When asked whether his treatment rendered to Hudson during the course of her visits was

“necessary,” Dr. Williams stated:

She might have lived without the treatment, but I feel that the treatment was advised based on her medical complaints. And it was my thought that this treatment was what I would like to have done to me if I had the same complaint.

Dr. Williams, after reviewing Hudson’s other related medical bills that itemized the treatments

by Bellevue Clinic, testified:

Q. Do you have an opinion whether the treatment that Ms. Hudson received was necessary?

A. Again, these were treatments to relieve her complaints. She could live without the treatments but these would shorten the course of her -- the treatments rendered here would shorten the course of her complaints and make her more comfortable while she was getting better.

Q. Would those treatments be necessary to relieve those complaints?
A. These treatments would be helpful in relieving the complaints.
Q. Did you see the bills that were charged as a result of those treatments?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you think they’re fair and reasonable and in keeping with what other physicians who treat soft tissue injuries would charge in this community?

A. They appear to be fair and reasonable and within normal limits for similar groups that render this type of physical therapy treatment.

At the conclusion of his deposition, Dr. Williams was asked:

Q. Doctor, all that you’ve testified to you’ve testified to within a reasonable degree of medical certainty?

Q. And the treatment you rendered Ms. Hudson, was that consistent with the complaints that she gave in her history stemming from a motor vehicle accident?

Shorter asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Williams’s medical opinions

since they are not within the requisite degree of certainty. In addition to responding that Dr.

Williams’s opinions were within a sufficient degree of certainty, Hudson counters that Shorter

failed to make a timely objection at trial.

3 The trial court is afforded wide discretion in the admission or rejection of evidence, and

the trial court's action will be reversed on appeal only when there is a showing of an abuse of

discretion. Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1992); Davis

v. Hall, 920 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn. App. 1995).

W e f i r s t a d d r e s s H u d s o n ’ s a r g u m e n t t h a t S h o r t e r i s b a r r e d f r o m a s s e r ti n g t h i s i s s u e s i n c e h e f a i l e d t o o b j e c t

a t tr ia l . H u d s o n c i te s T e n n . R . C i v . P . 3 2 .0 2 , w h i c h s t a te s :

S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s io n s o f R u l e 2 8 .0 2 a n d R u l e 3 2 . 0 4 ( 3 ) , o b j e c ti o n m a y b e m a d e a t th e tr ia l o r h e a rin g to r e c e iv in g in e v id e n c e a n y d e p o sitio n o r p a rt th e re o f f o r a n y r e a s o n w h i c h w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e e v i d e n c e i f t h e w i tn e s s w e r e th e n p re s e n t a n d te s tif y in g .

H u d s o n a r g u e s t h a t S h o r te r d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f D r . W i l l i a m s ’ s d e p o s i t io n b e f o r e h e r p r o o f w a s c l o s e d .

T e c h n i c a ll y , S h o r te r d i d n o t r e g i s te r a n o b j e c ti o n b e f o r e t h e d e p o s i t i o n w a s p r e s e n t e d , b u t a f t e r t h e c o u r t r e a d th e

d e p o s i t i o n , S h o r te r s ta t e d :

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Related

Davis v. Hall
920 S.W.2d 213 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1995)
Otis v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
850 S.W.2d 439 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)

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