Sylvestre v. Board of Aldermen

111 A. 881, 43 R.I. 492, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 75
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedDecember 31, 1920
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 111 A. 881 (Sylvestre v. Board of Aldermen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sylvestre v. Board of Aldermen, 111 A. 881, 43 R.I. 492, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1920).

Opinion

Rathbun, J.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari brought by Adrien H. Sylvestre against the Board of Aider-men of the city of Woonsocket. The essential allegations *495 of the petition are that the petitioner is a taxpayer and property voter in the fifth ward of said city; that at the-election held in said fifth ward in said city, on November 2, 1920, he was the Republican candidate for the. office of alderman and received a plurality of all the legal votes cast for said office; that said Board of Aldermen in counting said ballots refused against the protest of the petitioner to count four ballots which were legally cast in his favor at said election; that said Board against his protest erroneously counted in favor of his opponent, Joseph Leclair, the Democrat candidate for said office thirteen “defective” ballots and declared said Joseph Leclair elected by a vote of 372 to 371 for the petitioner.

The petition alleges that said ballots were counted by said Board of Aldermen “sitting as a board .of canvassers.” The writ was issued and citation served on said Board of Aldermen in its capacity as a Board of Canvassers. It appearing that said Board in counting said ballots acted not in its capacity as a Board of Canvassers but in its capacity as a Board of Aldermen, the parties stipulated that the petition be amended by substituting the word “Aider-men” for the word “Canvassers” throughout the petition and agreed “that the cause be considered by the court as if a writ of certiorari to the Board of Aldermen of said city of Woonsocket had been duly issued and served and return made thereto upon the allegations of the amended petition.”

At the hearing before us each of said four ballots and said thirteen ballots were marked as exhibits. Counsel for said Joseph Leclair, the Democrat candidate for said office, was permitted to appear and to take part in the hearing, and certain ballots counted by said Board in favor of the petitioner against the protest of- said Leclair and certain ballots which said Board, against the protest of said Leclair refused to count in his favor, were also marked as exhibits.

*496 (1) *495 As this court said in Rice v. Town Council of Westerly, 35 R. I. at 121, “certiorari does not lie to review findings of fact and the constitutional provision, giving to this court *496 revisory and appellate jurisdiction to review the proceedings of inferior tribunals, by its terms only provides for a review of questions of law and equity. The matters now before us relate wholly to the manner in which the ballots in question were marked by the voters. Whether the marks placed upon his ballot by a voter conform to the statutory requirements for a legal ballot is a question of law rather than of fact, and is one proper to be reviewed in this proceeding.”

Chapter 11, Section 46, Gen. Laws, 1909, contains the following language: “No voter shall place any mark upon his ballot by which it may be afterwards identified as the one voted by him. One line crossing another at any angle within the circle or any voting-square, or at the right of any name, shall be deemed a valid voting-mark.”

*497 (2) *496 Rice v. Town Council of Westerly, supra, at 122 and 123, laid down certain general rules as follows, for passing upon the validity of voting-marks and ballots: “This court has frequently held that to make his ballot effective the voter must use the voting-mark prescribed by statute, i. e., one line crossing another at any angle. No vote should be counted unless the voter has conformed to that requirement. The statutory requirement is equally imperative that the voter shall place no mark upon his ballot by which it may be identified afterwards. If the voter places upon his ballot a mark, unconnected with the voting-mark, which additional mark appears to have been knowingly and intentionally placed, it will render his ballot defective, as bearing a distinguishing mark. So also if in connection with the voting-mark itself the voter makes an additional mark which appears to have been intentionally made and to be one which may be a means of identification, such additional mark should be held to'be a distinguishing mark and the ballot is defective; but in our opinion a different question is presented when, upon an inspection of the ballot it appears as most probable that the voter in making the cross required by statute, or in addition to said cross, clumsily or acci *497 dentally has made some other mark in connection with said cross; but a mark of such a nature as to raise grave doubt, of any improper intention on the voter’s part. From old age, defective eyesight, a clumsy or a trembling hand, lack of skill in the use of a pencil or from other cause some voters are much less expert than others in marking their ballots. Each case must be determined after an examination of the-particular mark objected to; but it may be stated, as a general rule, that if the additional mark or marks in question are not of a kind likely to be used for the purpose of identification, and appear to have been made accidentally, or to have been made by reason of unskillfulness in the use of a pencil or in the making of a cross, and their presence upon the ballot appears consistent with an honest intention in the voter, then a reasonable construction of the statute requires that the voter should not be disfranchised for this reason, that his ballot should be considered valid, and should be counted.”

(3) The petitioner objects to the action of said Board in refusing to count in his favor ballots one to four, inclusive. The voter in marking Exhibit 1 cancelled the name of the Republican candidate for mayor and placed a cross in the voting-square opposite the name of each of the other candidates in the Republican column, placed a cross in the voting-square opposite the name of the Democrat candidate for mayor, cancelled the names of all other candidates in the Democrat column and wrote, in the blank space at the right, the names of all candidates opposite whose names he had placed a cross. Writing on the ballot the names of candidates for whom he had already voted was a deliberate act which served no legitimate purpose and which resulted in placing upon the ballot marks by which it could be identified. In our opinion said Board did not err in refusing to count Exhibit 1.

(4) Each of the Exhibits 2 to 4 inclusive shows that the voter attempted to erase a cross. The voter either made a cross where he did not intend or changed his mind after making *498 the cross; in either event he should have returned the spoiled ballot and obtained another. Sec. 44, Chap. 11, Gen. Laws, 1909. Thorpe v. Fales, 33 R. I. at 397. Each of these ballots by reason of the attempted erasure bears a distinguishing mark.

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Bluebook (online)
111 A. 881, 43 R.I. 492, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sylvestre-v-board-of-aldermen-ri-1920.