Sylvester v. Maag

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Sylvester v. Maag

26 A. 392, 155 Pa. 225, 1893 Pa. LEXIS 1228

CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedApril 17, 1893

DocketAppeal, No. 285

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 26 A. 392 (Sylvester v. Maag) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sylvester v. Maag, 26 A. 392, 155 Pa. 225, 1893 Pa. LEXIS 1228 (Pa. 1893).

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Opinion

Per Curiam,

The only assignment of error in this case is the refusal of the court to charge that, “ under all the evidence the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant.”

It is unnecessary to refer to the testimony further than to say that, among other things, it clearly tended to prove; (1) That plaintiff was lawfully on defendant’s premises when [227]*227he was bitten by the dog; and (2) that the dog, by which he was thus bitten, was a ferocious and dangerous animal, and the defendant then knew that such was its nature and character.

In submitting the case to the jury, the learned president of the court below, in a very fair and impartial charge, instructed them, inter alia, that, in order to recover, the plaintiff must prove, substantially, the above stated facts. Their verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, therefore, conclusively established both of said facts. The testimony not only warranted but required the submission of the case to the jury. It would have been plain error to have withdrawn it from their consideration by affirming defendant’s point.

In view of the evidence, as to the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injury, the damages awarded by the jury were quite moderate. Those who indulge in the luxury, or enjoy the convenience, of keeping, within the city limits, dogs which they know are ferocious and dangerous, must see that they are so secured that persons lawfully going upon their premises or along the highways may not be bitten, or they must expect to suffer the consequences of their neglect to do so.

Judgment affirmed.

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Per Curiam,

The only assignment of error in this case is the refusal of the court to charge that, “ under all the evidence the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant.”

It is unnecessary to refer to the testimony further than to say that, among other things, it clearly tended to prove; (1) That plaintiff was lawfully on defendant’s premises when [227]*227he was bitten by the dog; and (2) that the dog, by which he was thus bitten, was a ferocious and dangerous animal, and the defendant then knew that such was its nature and character.

In submitting the case to the jury, the learned president of the court below, in a very fair and impartial charge, instructed them, inter alia, that, in order to recover, the plaintiff must prove, substantially, the above stated facts. Their verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, therefore, conclusively established both of said facts. The testimony not only warranted but required the submission of the case to the jury. It would have been plain error to have withdrawn it from their consideration by affirming defendant’s point.

In view of the evidence, as to the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injury, the damages awarded by the jury were quite moderate. Those who indulge in the luxury, or enjoy the convenience, of keeping, within the city limits, dogs which they know are ferocious and dangerous, must see that they are so secured that persons lawfully going upon their premises or along the highways may not be bitten, or they must expect to suffer the consequences of their neglect to do so.

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

26 A. 392, 155 Pa. 225, 1893 Pa. LEXIS 1228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sylvester-v-maag-pa-1893.

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