ACCEPTED 06-12-00141-CR SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 3/4/2015 4:39:26 PM DEBBIE AUTREY CLERK
NO. 06 – 12 – 00141 – CR
FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 3/5/2015 12:18:00 PM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
SYLVESTER KELLY
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
On appeal from the 188TH District Court, Gregg County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 41,078-A
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
– ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED –
CARL DORROUGH District Attorney
Zan Colson Brown Texas Bar No. 03205900 Assistant District Attorney Gregg County, Texas 101 East Methvin St., Suite 333 Longview, Texas 75601 Telephone: (903) 236–8440 Facsimile: (903) 236–3701 TABLE OF CONTENTS INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................................................................8 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................9
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ...........................................................................30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................31 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................31
1 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 88 S. Ct. 1229, 20 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1968).....29 Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972) ..........................................................18 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ....................................................................................................................10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) .................................................................................................................. 15, 16, 30 State Cases Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ...................................17 Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ..............................10 Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), ..................................29 Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) .....................................16 Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ..........................................26 Fernandez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.) ........................................................................................................................20 Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ...............................17 Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ..................................16 Johnson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) .....................................................................................................17 King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ....................................10 Lafleur v. State, 79 S.W.3d 129, 136-37 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) ......16 Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................................11 McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds, Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ............17 Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 885 (1992) ....................................................................................................................16 Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ...............................16 Moore v. State, 849 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) .......................................29 State v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ...............................................16 Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814-815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) .....................17 State Rules Appellate Procedure, Rule 9 (2012).........................................................................32
2 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Sylvester Kelly was charged by indictment on November 30,
2011, with the criminal offenses of aggravated robbery; the date of the offense was
alleged as October 30, 2011. CR 3.
He pleaded not guilty to a jury, but the jury convicted him; he went to the
judge for punishment. CR 48. The following is a summary of the testimony:
Ryan Gibson and Steven Bryand, Longview Police patrolmen, were
approached by the robbery victim, Michael Boyd, who said he had just been shot
at and robbed and that the suspect, wearing a yellow hoodie had walked across the
street, Estes Parkway, and entered in a tan Lincoln Town Car. 3 RR 30, 33; 4 RR
15. Gibson walked across to the Town Car, where he found Sylvester Kelly, alone
in the rear seat, passenger side. 3 RR 31, 65. Kelly told Gibson he did not know
the owner of the Town Car. 3 RR 65. After identifying himself, Gibson saw Kelly
reach down toward the front passenger seat “as if reaching for something or
stuffing something.” 3 RR 31. The man Gibson arrested was the defendant,
Sylvester Grey, also known as Sylvester Kelly and Gibson identified him in Court.
3 RR 32-33. Under the front passenger seat, Gibson found a Glock .40 caliber
semiautomatic pistol, serial number APK986, which he identified in court as
State’s Exhibit 1A. 3 RR 33, 39. Gibson located the yellow hoodie described by
the victim in the rear passenger seat next to where Kelly had been sitting and
3 Gibson identified it as State’s Exhibit 3 A. 3 RR 33-34, 36. Gibson found the
victim’s wallet next to a fence, less than twenty feet from the Town Car. 3 RR 34-
35. The victim’s Texas ID card was inside, but the wallet contained no money. 3
RR 35. Gibson found the cash missing from the wallet in Kelly’s right front
pocket. 3 RR 36. After videoing the wallet, and after he and the victim completed
and signed the property release form, Gibson returned the wallet and cash to the
victim. SX 7, 3 RR 44-45.
Gibson collected a .40 caliber shell casing from near the victim’s car and
identified it in court as State’s Exhibit 2A. 3 RR 41.
Gibson identified in court the complete video recording he made of the
scene was introduced as SX 8 (the suspect’s vehicle and the area surrounding it)
and SX 9 (the victim’s vehicle, and area surrounding it). 3 RR 49-50. Gibson also
identified SX 10-19 a number of still photographs showing the shell casing lying in
the grass near the victim’s, the yellow hoodie, the victim’s wallet, the victim’s id
card found in the wallet, the damaged driver’s side window of the victim’s car, the
bullet hole in the window of same car. 3 RR 56-59.
Michael Boyd, the victim of aggravated robbery, testified a man in a yellow
hoodie first tapped on his driver’s side window and then shot through the window,
causing Boyd to jump “like between the seats” and “lay still, thinking maybe if he
thought I was dead, he wouldn’t shoot anymore.” 3 RR 91. The robber reached
4 through the shattered window and took Boyd’s wallet from Boyd’s back pocket. 3
RR 91. Boyd had his Texas ID and $490 in his wallet when it was taken. 3 RR 91-
92. State’s exhibit 12 was a picture of Boyd’s wallet, and State’s Exhibit 14 was a
picture of Boyd’s identification card. 3 RR 92. Boyd’s face was cut by the
shattering window glass. 3 RR 94. Boyd said State’s Exhibit 21 is a picture of
Boyd’s bloody face after the shot shattered the window. Boyd did not see the
shooter’s face, as it was shadowed by the big hoodie. 3 RR 95. Boyd had on
sunglasses. 3 RR 101. Boyd looked right at the pistol. 3 RR 104. He could not
identify Kelly’s face as the shooter. 3 RR 105. However, he recognized Kelly as
he walked away by stature, “the way he walks.” 3 RR 95. Kelly (Gray) and Boyd
had gone to elementary school together. 3 RR 96. Boyd did not tell the police
that he recognized Kelly’s walk. 3 RR 99. He did not feel the need to do so
because the police had caught Kelly “red-handed.” 3 RR 107.
Chris Taylor, a member of the crime scene unit at Longview PD, testified
he tried, but failed, to lift any usable prints from the gun. 3 RR 108, 110.
Aubrey Morrow testified he had been with Boyd in the car at the time of
the shooting and robbery; they were drinking, smoking marijuana, and listening to
music. 3 RR 121-122. After the shot, he jumped out of the car, ducked down a
minute, and started walking toward the building. 3 RR 123. He thinks he heard
Boyd say “he took my wallet.” 3 RR 125. He observed somebody walk across the
5 street and enter a “yellowish” car on the passenger side. 3 RR 123-124. Although
an officer told Morrow that he needed to talk with him, Morrow took off and
walked away, because he was “wanted.” 3 RR 124. He could not describe the
shooter or describe what he was wearing. 3 RR 125-126.
John Beene, firearms expert from the Department of Public Safety in Tyler,
testified the shell casing (SX 2) was fired from the Glock pistol (SX1). 3 RR 140.
Steven Bryand, the other LPD patrol officer at the scene that night, testified
he took the report from the victim, Gary Boyd, who said he had been robbed and
the actor was in a brown car across the street. 4 RR 15. Bryand observed the
victim’s car, with its shattered window and a bullet hole where the bullet had
exited the front windshield. 4 RR 15. He testified to the abrasions on Boyd’s face.
4 RR 16. He testified that the firearm was capable of causing serious bodily injury
or death. 4 RR 16. Bryand did not test Kelly’s hands for gunshot residue. 4 RR 22.
Defense counsel asked Kelly on the record if he wanted to testify and Kelly
declined. 4 RR 28.
Both sides rested, and after the Court read the charge to the jury, closing
arguments began, with Mr. Botto speaking first for the State. In thanking the jury,
he stated, “Without you justice is not served today. Without finding Mr. Kelly
guilty today justice will not be done.” 4 RR 31. In urging them to carefully inspect
6 the evidence of the firearm and casing, he stated, “And at the end of that inspection
and examination, you find Mr. Kelly guilty because he is guilty.” 4 RR 33.
The attorney appointed as his appellate counsel filed an Anders brief,
specifying that no non-frivolous issues could be raised, and that raising the
following issues would be frivolous: the Batson objection during voir dire, the
sufficiency of the evidence during guilt innocence, and the punishment phase. This
Court agreed.
Kelly filed a pro-se PDR, claiming he could not properly prepare a brief in
response to an Anders brief without a complete record. The Court of Criminal
Appeals agreed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, who arranged for
Kelly to have a record, from which he prepared the current Appellant’s brief.
Kelly is incarcerated at the Clements Unit, 9601 Spur 591, Amarillo, TX
79107, as number 1802362.
7 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find all the elements
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, including the element that Kelly was the
shooter and thief.
Kelly has not proved that his trial counsel, Rick Hagan was ineffective. His
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were all fruitless or frivolous. Mr.
Hagan could not be expected to make up a defense when there was none.
Kelly has not proved that either his trial counsel or his appellate counsel was
ineffective. Solomon’s performance was not deficient and Kelly was not
prejudiced by Solomon’s alleged errors. The State did not knowingly use false or
perjured testimony. No pretrial identification as unduly suggestive. There was no
reason to raise the issue of a the lack of a photo lineup. The failure to test for
gunshot residue was not exculpatory and would not be grounds for reversal. The
owner of the car in which Kelly was found had no information relevant to this
case. The prosecutors’ argument was not improper.
8 ARGUMENT
Appellant has no meritorious ground which can be effectively raised on
direct appeal. The evidence was sufficient; the record does not support a finding of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel or appellate counsel.
Appellant, writing pro se, has filed a brief raising the following issues:
I. There was insufficient evidence of guilt, as the victim and an eye witness failed to identify the accused.
II. Trial Counsel Rick Hagan was ineffective for a number of reasons.
III, IV, V, and VI. Appellate Counsel Vernard Solomon was ineffective for filing an Anders brief. Appellant believes he could have raised several issues.
1) The evidence was sufficient to identify Kelly as the shooter and to prove all the essential elements.
a) Standard of review: Could a reasonable jury find all the elements of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt?
Appellate courts cannot reverse a defendant’s conviction on grounds of
insufficient evidence unless no rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61
L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). This question is examined in a light most favorable to the verdict.
Id. Viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the verdict" means that the
reviewing court is required to defer to the fact finder’s credibility and weight
determinations because the fact finder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and
the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Tex. Crim.
9 App. 2010). Appellate courts should avoid disturbing a jury’s verdict unless necessary as
a matter of law. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The State
requests this Court share in that deferential spirit by affirming Appellant’s conviction
based on the evidence presented.
b) Under a hypothetically-correct jury charge, the evidence was sufficient.
Evidence sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge, which means a charge which “accurately sets out the
law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the state’s burden of
proof or restrict the state’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular
offense for which the defendant was tried.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997).
Using the hypothetically correct jury charge based on the indictment in the present
case, the State had to prove the aggravated robbery by proving that (1) Appellant (2) on
or about October 30, 2011, (3) in Gregg County, Texas, (4) during the course of a theft
(5) with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property (6) intentionally or
knowingly (7) threaten or place M Boyd in fear of imminent bodily injury or death (8)
used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a handgun. By all accounts, the only element in
question is number one. Who was it that shot out Boyd’s window and took his wallet?
10 Just to touch all the bases, here are citations to the record for each of the other
elements:
(2) and (3) Officer Gibson testified that the offense occurred on October 30, 2011,
in Gregg County, Texas. 3 RR 29-30.
(4) Boyd testified that the person who shot out his window reached in and
removed a wallet full of cash 3 RR 91.
(5) This shooter’s intent to obtain or maintain control of said property can be
inferred from the testimony that the shooter reached in and took the wallet, that the wallet
was discarded, and the $490 was found in Kelly’s pocket.
(6) The shooter’s state of mind must be inferred from the fact that he actually
pulled the trigger and immediately took the wallet and walked away. The damage to the
car and to Boyd’s face evidenced that a gun had been shot at the car near Boyd’s face. SX
11-19, 3 RR 58. The fact that the shooter covered his face with a large yellow hoodie
before approaching Boyd’s car shows premeditation—and intent. The jury could have
inferred that from Kelly’s behavior that he intended for Boyd to be placed in fear (acted
intentionally) or knew that his acts would place Boyd in fear (acted knowingly) No
evidence pointed to an accidental discharge of the gun, disregarding potential results,
(acted recklessly). But even if the trigger had been pulled accidentally, “recklessly” could
still be inferred.
(7) Boyd testified he was frightened that he would be killed. 3 RR 97. When he
was explaining how the wallet was removed from his pocket, he described lying across
11 and between the seats, pretending to be shot, so that perhaps the shooter would not shoot
again. 3 RR 91.
(8) The State produced the gun, found at Kelly’s feet, which was proved to have
shot the shell casing left by Boyd’s car. SX 1B, 3 RR 39; SX 2A, 3 RR 41. An expert
testified that the shell casing matched one that he had test fired using the gun found at
Kelly’s feet. SX 22. 3 RR 141.
All the essential elements except the identity of the shooter were uncontested.
That leaves a discussion of the evidence that Kelly was the shooter/thief. All
evidence is considered, but it is considered in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Could a reasonable jury have found this element beyond a reasonable doubt?
What evidence points to his guilt and what evidence points to his innocence?
He was found with money in an amount described by Boyd.
The wallet described by Boyd containing Boyd’s identification was found just a
few feet away from the Lincoln.
He was found with the gun and the yellow hoodie described by Boyd.
The ballistics expert reported that the gun found in the car with Kelly matched the
casing found by Boyd’s car.
Kelly told police he did not know who owned the Lincoln and that he had entered
it because he was cold.
He told police he had been dropped off and had never entered the club.
The Lincoln and Boyd’s car were within plain view of each other.
12 Boyd and Morrow saw Kelly walk across the street and enter the Lincoln. Neither
testified they saw anyone else enter the Lincoln.
The police were there immediately because they had been dispatched there on a
different matter—a call that someone inside the club had a gun.
Kelly was still in the Lincoln, and Boyd was able to immediately tell the police
that the shooter was in the Lincoln.
Officer Bryand stayed with Boyd and took the description of the yellow hoodie
and the black Glock and the stolen property as Officer Gibson walked across the street
and observed Kelly attempt to hid the Glock. He apprehended Kelly and found the
Glock, the hoodie and the money all within Kelly’s reach, and found the wallet discarded
just a few steps away from the Lincoln
Boyd could say why he had that much money on him—to pay a bill for his
mother. He could not recall at trial where he was going to pay that bill on a Sunday.
Boyd told police and the court that he did not get a look at the shooter’s face.
Morrow told the jury that he did not get a look at the shooter’s face.
Both saw Kelly leave and get in the Lincoln.
Morrow did not stay to talk with police because he knew he would be arrested.
Only one of the officers recalled anyone else standing around.
Morrow testified, however, that he and Boyd were sitting in the car, listening to
music, smoking marijuana and drinking. He said a man came to Boyd’s car, tapped on the
window with a gun, said something like “Give it up,” shot through the window. Morrow
ducked for cover, then heard Boyd say something like “He took my wallet.” When a
13 police officer told Morrow he wanted to talk to him, Morrow walked away to avoid
arrest.
The damage to his car and his face support Boyd’s story. The amount of money
he described, the hoodie he described, and the gun he described all were found near
Kelly. Even the wallet containing Boyd’s picture identification card was found just steps
away from Kelly. These facts support Boyd’s story.
The large amount of money found on Kelly’s person, the hoodie found on the seat
beside him, and the Glock found at his feet point to Kelly’s guilt.
The police officers at this scene did not test Kelly’s hands for gunshot residue, but
they explained that they were neither equipped nor trained to run such tests.
Boyd testified in court that he recognized Kelly’s stature and gait as he walked
away (having known him since childhood) but did not tell the police he could recognize
him because he did not think it necessary. It appeared to him that the police had caught
Kelly “red-handed.”
Kelly, after being Mirandized, gave a voluntary statement and told Gibson he had
not been wearing the hoodie, did not know anything about the gun, was there to try to
“hook up” with a girl named Sidney, had just met her, could not give her phone number,
did not know who owned the Lincoln in which he was found, had entered the Lincoln to
get warm, and had not even gone inside the club. As to the money, he said he had been
unemployed for three months, but the money in his pocket was left from his last
paycheck. SX 20. He said he made three or four hundred dollars a week when he was
working. SX 20.
14 A jury is free to believe or disbelieve any witness’ testimony, or believe part of it
and disbelieve part of it. This jury convicted Kelly because they believed more of Boyd’s
testimony than Kelly’s recorded statement. They were present and they saw the
demeanor of the witnesses. It was their job to discern who was telling the truth. They
chose to believe Boyd’s testimony because the physical evidence found and the location
where it was found all went to support Boyd’s version of the facts. Any reasonable jury
could have found every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.
2) Kelly has not proved that his trial counsel was ineffective.
a) Standard of review: Did trial counsel’s performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and would the outcome of the trial be different but for the allegedly deficient performance?
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be evaluated under the standard
of review enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984); see also, Hernandez v. State, State v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999) (adopted the Strickland test). The standard of review has two prongs. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Under the first prong, Appellant must show that his
counsel’s performance was deficient, or that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. ; LaFleur v. State, 79 S.W.3d 129, 136 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). A claimant must prove that counsel’s representation so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
15 The second prong requires Appellant to prove that his counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. To demonstrate
prejudice, Appellant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. ; LaFleur, 79
S.W.3d at 137. The failure to satisfy one prong negates a court’s need to consider the
other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Appellant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance by a preponderance of
the evidence. Ex parte Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)–
88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985). Trial counsel’s performance is not to be judged with the benefit of hindsight.
Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)(Tex. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 885 (1992).
In reviewing Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
considers the totality of the evidence before the jury or court. McFarland v. State, 845
S.W.2d 824, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled by Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The review of counsel’s performance should be highly
deferential. McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 824. There is a presumption that the attorney
rendered effective representation; Appellant has the burden of rebutting that presumption.
Id. The record must affirmatively support Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Johnson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
On direct appeal, the record has usually not been sufficiently developed to enable
an appellate court to adequately determine whether the appellant was provided ineffective
16 assistance of counsel. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814-815 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). A claim of ineffective assistance is better pursued by way of habeas corpus, with
which there is a better opportunity for the record to have been developed regarding trial
counsel's reasons for his or her actions. See Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
b) Appellant’s claims of trial counsel’s ineffective performance are not supported by the record.
i) There were no other occupants of the car in which Kelly was arrested at the time he was arrested. Any attempt to interview them would have been fruitless.
Appellant claims that his trial counsel failed to find and interview the driver and
passenger of the car in which he was arrested. Officer Gibson testified that Kelly
claimed that night that he didn’t know who the car belonged to, and that he had
entered it because he was cold. 3 RR 64-65. Kelly was alone in the car when
apprehended. 3 RR 65. Although counsel got an affirmative answer from
Patrolman Gibson when he asked if he was approached by a man who said, “Hey,
that’s my car,” the officer did not ever identify the man. 3 RR 66-67. Counsel
asked if his name was Bertrand Snoddy, but the officer did not know. The record
supports that Counsel may have known the owner’s name, but does not support
Kelly’s assertion that counsel did not find and interview him before trial. The
record does not support that there was a passenger. The record does not support
17 that counsel’s failure to find and interview them caused the outcome of the trial to
be any different. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the “potential
witnesses” observed anything about the offense. This is a frivolous claim.
Later, at page 8 of his brief, the appellant adds a citation to a case regarding an
attorney was found ineffective for failure to “pursue appellant’s request to
investigate a named alibi witness.” Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972).
There is nothing in this record to indicate that the owner of the vehicle in which
Kelly was found even knew Kelly, much less that he would provide an alibi.
Nothing in the record shows what the trial counsel knew or what trial strategy he
was following. Sound trial strategy is presumed, and the appellant has failed to
rebut the presumption.
ii) Hagan was unaware of the chain of custody regarding the currency.
The brief record excerpt cited by the appellant does not show that the
counselor was unaware of the chain of custody. 3 RR 48, ll. 4-14. It shows only
that the property release form which documented the return of the wallet and
currency to Michael Boyd was introduced as State’s Exhibit 7A, and that Mr.
Hagan did not object. There was nothing objectionable to the evidence and an
attorney is not obligated to make frivolous objections.
18 iii) The record does not show that Hagan failed to conduct pretrial discovery.
The record does not show that Hagan failed to conduct pretrial discovery.
The Michael Morton Act went into effect on January 1, 2014, well after Kelly’s
trial, but before those major changes, Gregg County District Courts established
standing orders to cover pre-trial disclosure, pre-trial and trial discovery, expert
witnesses, pre-trial motions and settings, trial disclosures, and standing in-limine
orders. These orders were adopted as a local rule by the 124 th and 188th District
Court Judges, Alfonso Charles and David Brabham on February 25, 2011, and is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Nothing in the record of this case shows that the
defense counsel and prosecutors failed to comply with the standing orders.
iv) Hagan did not need to file a motion in limine related to the testimony of Aubrey Morrow.
Appellant claims at page 8 of his brief that the record does not show that
Morrow was actually an eye witness. He relies on Officer Bryand’s testimony that
although he was aware of one other gentleman standing around, he did not talk to
any other witnesses besides Michael Boyd. 4 RR 17. Morrow’s testimony
explains that seeming contradiction when he said he heard an officer ask him to
stay and answer some questions, but Morrow, being “wanted,” walked away. 3 RR
124. Morrow did testify that he had been in the car when the shot occurred. 3 RR
19 124. Appellant has not cited to any statute or case which would prohibit the
testimony of Aubrey Morrow. The case he did cite was
Fernandez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
pet.). In Fernandez, the attorney was found ineffective (1) for calling the
defendant’s wife as a witness, thus subjecting her to cross-examination by the
State, when the State could not have called her to testify because of the spousal
immunity, and (2) for failing to object to particularly damaging hearsay testimony.
This case is not applicable to the facts at hand because Morrow was not married to
Kelly, and because Morrow’s testimony was not hearsay.
Such a motion in limine would have been frivolous. Just because a piece of
evidence or a witness’ testimony is harmful does not mean it is inadmissible.
v) Hagan failed to prevent testimony from an eye witness; failed to request an instruction to disregard the testimony or request a mistrial based on the testimony.
Again, the appellant has failed to show that Morrow’s testimony was
objectionable. A defense attorney cannot prevent testimony if the testimony is not
objectionable. Only a judge can rule it inadmissible. If the testimony is not
objectionable, there is no need for an objection, a request for instruction to
disregard, or a request for a mistrial. This alleged failure does not prove deficient
performance or prejudice.
20 vi) Hagan’s failure to raise a viable defense was based on the fact that there was no viable defense.
Appellant asserts that if an attorney fails to assert a viable defense, the
appellant does not have to prove it would be successful. See Appellant’s Brief, at
8. He must, at the very least, however, assert on appeal that some defense existed.
Mr. Kelly was caught red handed immediately after the robbery across the street
from the robbery, with a gun that was tied to the robbery by matching the casing;
he was caught with a large amount of money; he was caught with a hoodie that had
been described by the victim; he had thrown the wallet containing the victim’s
identification not far from where he was found, and he was found in a car, on the
left side, when the victim had pointed to the car and said he entered the left side.
What possible defense is there? Were these all simple coincidences? Mr. Hagan
was left in the unenviable position of having to rely on his cross-examination skills
alone. There was no alibi; there was no other person who confessed; there was no
other person whom to accuse. He attempted to raise reasonable doubt with his
questions, but the facts were stacked against this defendant.
Appellant has not proved his counsel’s performance fell below an
objectively reasonable standard or that the allegedly substandard performance
caused his conviction. He has failed to prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
21 3) (In response to Appellant’s Points III, IV, V, and VI) Kelly has not proved that his appellate counsel was ineffective.
a) Standard of review: Did trial counsel’s performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and would the outcome of the trial be different but for the allegedly deficient performance?
The same standard of review applies to claims of ineffective appellate
counsel that applies to claims of ineffective trial counsel.
b) Appellate Counsel Vernard Solomon was not ineffective for filing an Anders brief.
The appointed appellate counsel Vernard Solomon filed an Anders brief in
which he took one point from each phase of the trial and explained why that point
would have been frivolous to argue. His arguments persuaded the Sixth Court of
Appeals that there was no non-frivolous argument to make in an attempt to get a
reversal. Appellant now lists, in his points III, IV, V, and VI, a number of
complaints that should have been raised on direct appeal. These complaints about
Solomon’s failings are all meritless, but will be discussed individually.
i) The State did not knowingly use false or perjured testimony.
Appellant’s allegation that the State knowingly used false and perjured
testimony from Aubrey Morrow and failed to correct it is unfounded. Morrow
stated he was a witness to the robbery. Neither Gibson nor Bryand interviewed
him. Neither Gibson nor Bryand was present at the time of the robbery. They
22 came up soon thereafter. Morrow said that an officer indicated he wanted to talk to
him, but Morrow, being “wanted,” did not want to be interviewed, because he
knew that he would be arrested. He therefore walked away before the officers
could talk to him. This explains why the officers were not able to put him in their
report. Bryand did recall another gentleman standing around, but did not interview
him. 4 RR 17. Bryand’s testimony and Morrow’s are not directly in conflict. This
record does not show that the State knowingly elicited false testimony.
ii) (Appellant’s Issue IV) No pretrial identification was unduly suggestive.
Appellant’s claim that he was subjected to unduly suggestive pretrial
identification is unfounded. This is not a case of finding a suspect at another
location and bringing him back for identification. This man never left the sight of
the victim. Boyd watched him cross the street and enter the car. Then he told
police which car he was in, on which side of the car, and what he was wearing.
Office Gibson found him where the victim said he was, sitting beside the yellow
hoodie. A claim of unduly suggestive pretrial identification would have been
frivolous.
iii) (Appellant’s Issue V) Record does not support Kelly’s claim that the investigation was “contrived” or that the witnesses were obligated to agree with police.
Appellant’s allegations that the robbery investigation was “contrived” and
that witnesses Boyd and Morrow were obligated to agree with the police are
23 without foundation in the record. The robbery investigation was not contrived. It
was just easy. Boyd admitted he never saw the face of the shooter, but he did see
him walk away. He thought he recognized the man in the yellow hoodie as his
childhood schoolmate because of his stature and the way he walked. He
maintained visual contact with the car he saw Kelly enter until he could point it out
to police and the police found Kelly there with the gun and the hoodie, Boyd’s
cash, and Boyd’s wallet tossed not very far away.
iv) Appellate counsel had no reason to object to the lack of a photo lineup.
Applicant’s allegation that his counsel should have raised the issue that the police
arranged no photographic lineup is not supported by the record. Such an issue would
have been frivolous. No photographic lineup was required and would have been
pointless. Boyd said he did not see the face. A photograph would not have portrayed the
only identifying characteristics Boyd claimed to have been able to use to identify Kelly—
his stature and gait.
v) The failure to test for gunshot residue was not indicative of Kelly’s innocence, and would not be grounds for reversal.
Applicant alleges on page 13 that his counsel should have raised the police
officers’ failure to perform an “atomic absorbtion” test to find gunshot residue.
His trial counsel did bring up this failure at the trial. 4 RR 21-22. The answer
from Officer Bryand was that the ordinary patrol officer was not equipped or
trained to perform such a test in the field. 4 RR 22-24.
24 vi) There was no basis in the record for a belief that a statement from the car’s owner would have been relevant to this case.
Applicant’s allegation that the State didn’t try to get a statement from the car’s
owner or identification from the driver and passenger is an attempted “rabbit trail.” Kelly
told Officer Gibson, at their first encounter, that Kelly did not know the owner of the car;
he had just entered the car because he was cold. 3 RR 65. There is nothing in the record
that would have led officers to believe the owner had any knowledge of the robbery. The
existence of a passenger in the Town Car has no basis in the record. The fact that the
owner later approached the officer saying “That’s my car” does not connect the owner to
the robbery. That man may have been a guest at the club that night, but there is nothing in
the record to show any connection to the robbery. The gun was in a location in the Town
Car near where Officer Gibson saw Kelly make a furtive gesture. Even if there had been
other occupants, the gun was found at Kelly’s feet, so the affirmative link to Kelly would
have been strongest. There is no reason to bring up on appeal a connection that is not
supported by the record.
vii) The prosecutors engaged in no improper argument. To argue that they did would have been fruitless and frivolous.
Applicant alleges in his sixth issue that the prosecutor engaged in improper
argument when Mr. Botto said, “because he is guilty”; “without a guilty verdict, justice
will not be served”; “we apply our life experience to it, and then we know that Mr. Kelly
is guilty”; and when Ms. Garrett suggested Boyd didn’t identify Kelly because he was
scared to testify against Kelly.
Applicant correctly states that there are four permissible areas of final argument.
25 “[T]here are four permissible areas of jury argument: (1) summation of the
evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to
argument of opposing counsel; and (4) pleas for law enforcement.” Felder v.
State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (internal citations
omitted.)
But the Felder opinion continued: “An argument which exceeds these bounds is
error; however, it only becomes subject to reversal if, in light of the record as a whole,
the argument is extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statute or
injects new facts, harmful to the accused, into the trial.” Id.
Mr. Botto began by thanking the jury for their service, and added, “Without
you, justice is not served today. Without finding Mr. Kelly guilty today justice will
not be done.” 4 RR 31. This statement arguably is just thanking the jury and
emphasizing their importance, but also is a plea for law enforcement.
When Mr. Botto told the jury they could take the gun and the shell casing
and other evidence back to the jury room, he was encouraging them to pick up
each item and handle it. He said, “You get to inspect it and examine it. And at the
end of that inspection and examination, you find Mr. Kelly guilty because he is
guilty.” 4 RR 33. One can easily argue that Mr. Botto was proposing reasonable
deductions from the evidence when he said, “Your life experience goes back there
with you. Right? We don’t become some conspiracy theorists and try to make
26 things up back in that room. We take what we heard in this courtroom, we apply
our life experience to it, and then we know that Mr. Kelly is guilty.” It was not
extreme or manifestly improper, and it did not violate any statute or inject any
new, harmful facts. It was not a statement of Mr. Botto’s personal belief. It was
an appropriate closing statement. He did not say, “He’s guilty because I believe
him to be guilty.” Mr. Solomon, appellate defense counsel, found nothing to
argue about Mr. Botto’s closing statement because there was no improper
argument.
When Appellant complains that the prosecutors alluded to the money that
was not entered into evidence, he seems to forget State’s Exhibit 7A, the property
receipt signed by both Michael Boyd and Officer Gibson. Although the wallet and
the cash were returned to Boyd that evening, there was a record made of their
existence and that record was introduced. Talking about the wallet and the cash
was not improper argument; it was merely a part of summary of the evidence.
When Ms. Garrett suggested that Mr. Boyd might have been afraid to
identify Kelly, she was explaining his reluctance to say he identified him by his
stature and gate, and she was further reminding the jury of his explanation for why
he did not tell the police—Boyd thought that since the police caught Kelly red
handed, Boyd would not have to identify him. 4 RR 50-51.
Ms. Garrett was responding to Mr. Hagan’s argument when she talked about
27 Boyd’s lies. Mr. Hagan first called Boyd a liar, reminding them that Boyd had lied
about why he was arrested a few years ago. Garrett had recalled Boyd to the stand
and asked him to tell the truth, admitting the lie. 3 RR 115. In closing argument,
Garrett had to talk about that lie and persuade the jurors to believe the rest of his
testimony. Her “bolstering” of his testimony added no new facts, her argument
was based on the evidence. She minimized the lie he told and she corrected, saying
that it was not really related to the issues at hand. She reminded the jurors of his
demeanor when he identified him by his stature and gait. And finally, she
reasoned that if he was intentionally lying just to get Kelly in trouble, he would
have lied and said, “I saw his face, and it was Kelly.” This is a plea for a
reasonable deduction from the evidence, not a statement of her personal opinion.
Appellant also complains that Mr. Botto called attention to the lack of
evidence that only the defense could have supplied. Only Kelly knew the name of
the woman who allegedly dropped him off at the club. The cases cited in
Appellant’s brief are Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 88 S. Ct. 1229, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 154 (1968); Moore v. State, 849 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); and
Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled by Castillo
v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In each of those cases, the
prosecutor commented on the defendant’s failure to testify, or his failure to show
28 remorse, thereby violating his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Kelly’s complaint is not that the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify, but
on Mr. Botto’s comment that Kelly had the authority to subpoena witnesses but
failed to call the woman who he claimed dropped him off at the club. This is not a
comment on his failure to testify.
Although Kelly did not testify, he did make a statement to police at the time
of his arrest. In the excerpt of Mr. Botto’s argument that Kelly references, Botto
mentioned that statement and told the jury to ask three questions during Mr.
Hagan’s closing statement: Where is the mystery girl? Where is the mystery
shooter? Why did Kelly have all that money? 4 RR 39-40.
In his statement to police, Kelly had said that he had been dropped off by a
female, and he had never entered the club. Mr. Botto suggested a reasonable
deduction from that statement would be that Kelly had been there the whole time,
must have seen the shooter, must have seen somebody put the hoodie and the gun
in the car with him. These questions were not a comment on Kelly’s failure to
testify; they were a comment on the holes in the story he told to police. Such
questions are proper in that they request the jury to look at the evidence and draw
reasonable conclusions.
The arguments that appellant complains of are not extreme or manifestly
improper. They do not violate a statute, and they do not inject new, harmful facts
29 into the trial. Mr. Solomon recognized this and elected not to raise the issue of
improper argument. He committed no error in so doing.
viii) Conclusion: Appellant’s claim of ineffective appellate counsel does not meet the Strickland standard.
Appellant has not met the burden of proving deficient performance or
prejudice on the part of his trial counsel or his appellate counsel. He has not
rebutted the strong presumption that every decision of his counsel was based on
sound legal strategy.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
All of Kelly’s claims are meritless. The evidence was more than sufficient.
Mr. Hagan’s representation was effective. Mr. Solomon’s Anders brief was
correct, and the Court of Appeals opinion was accurate. There were no non-
frivolous issues.
The State therefore prays that the trial court’s judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Zan Colson Brown Zan Colson Brown Texas Bar No. 03205900 Assistant District Attorney 101 East Methvin St., Suite 333 Longview, TX 75601 Telephone: (903) 236–8440 Facsimile: (903) 236–3701
30 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has been forwarded to the pro se appellant by first class mail.
Sylvester Kelly, # 1802362 Clements Unit 9601 Spur 591 Amarillo, Texas 79107
this 4th day of March, 2015.
/s/ Zan Colson Brown Zan Colson Brown Assistant District Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the foregoing document complies with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 9 (2012) regarding length of documents, in that exclusive of caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix, it consists of 7205 words.
/s/Zan Colson Brown Zan Colson Brown Assistant Criminal District Attorney