Syed Jamal v. RTX Corporation

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: September 30, 2025
• Docket: 5:24-cv-02272
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No. 5:24-cv-02272-SRM-SPx 11 SYED JAMAL,

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

14 RTX CORPORATION, et al., MOTION TO REMAND [9], [27]

15 Defendants.

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Syed Jamal moves the Court to remand this case to Riverside County 20 Superior Court. Dkt. 9, Mot.; see also Dkt. 27. Defendants ARINC Incorporated doing 21 business as Collins Aerospace, Zachary Schloss, Raytheon Technologies Incorporated, 22 RTX Corporation, and Goodrich Corporation oppose the motion. Dkt. 14, Opp’n. The 23 Court has read and considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion. For the 24 reasons discussed below, the Motion to Remand is DENIED. 25 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 26 Syed Jamal began working as an engineer for Collins Aerospace in 2013. During 27 the COVID-19 pandemic, Jamal had to work from home due to the mandatory 28 stay-at-home orders. He claims that, during this time, he began suffering severe back pain 1 from working long hours at a stationary desk. Jamal notified Collins Aerospace about his 2 back condition, but it did not engage in the interactive process and refused to offer him 3 reasonable accommodations. Soon after, Jamal claims that his supervisor began 4 micromanaging his work, scrutinizing his work product, and giving him poor work 5 performance reviews. Jamal’s back pain worsened over time, and, in June 2021, his 6 treating physician placed him on disability leave. When he returned to work, Jamal 7 alleges that a new supervisor continued to subject him to various adverse employment 8 actions, and that another supervisor refused to provide him with reasonable 9 accommodations for his back condition. He lodged a formal complaint with Collins 10 Aerospace to resolve these issues. Collins Aerospace terminated his employment. 11 On September 18, 2024, Jamal commenced this action in Riverside County 12 Superior Court against Collins Aerospace, Zachary Schloss, Raytheon Technologies 13 Incorporated, RTX Corporation, and Goodrich Corporation. He alleges, in conclusory 14 fashion, these defendants were joint employers and are all responsible for his injuries. 15 See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 11. Jamal asserts six claims for relief under the Fair Employment and 16 Housing Act against Collins and Does 1 through 20, see id. ¶¶ 34–100, a whistleblower 17 retaliation claim under California Labor Code § 1102.5 against Collins and Does 1 18 through 20, see id. ¶¶ 101–11, and claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 19 emotional distress against all the defendants, see id. ¶¶ 112–124. 20 On October 24, 2024, Defendants timely removed the case to this Court claiming 21 diversity jurisdiction. According to Defendants, Jamal is a California citizen, and Collins 22 Aerospace, Schloss, RTX Corporation, and Goodrich Corporation are all non-California 23 citizens. Defendants acknowledge that Raytheon Technologies Incorporated (“RTI”) is a 24 California corporation, but they contend that its California citizenship should be 25 disregarded because it was a fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1, 26 Notice of Removal ¶¶ 28–40. 27 28 1 Jamal now moves to remand this case to Riverside County Superior Court, arguing 2 there is incomplete diversity between him and RTI.1 Defendants ARINC Incorporated 3 doing business as Collins Aerospace, Zachary Schloss, RTI, RTX Corporation, and 4 Goodrich Corporation oppose the motion to remand. 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 7 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 8 (1994)). A state civil action may be removed to federal court only if the federal court 9 would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There 10 are two types of subject matter jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and diversity 11 jurisdiction. Id. §§ 1331, 1332. Diversity jurisdiction requires that each plaintiff have 12 different citizenship than each defendant. See id. § 1332(a). 13 A. Fraudulent Joinder 14 The “one exception to the requirement of complete diversity is where a 15 non-diverse defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.’” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 16 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). “A defendant is fraudulently joined if the defendant 17 cannot be liable to the plaintiff on any theory alleged in the complaint.” Harwood v. 18 Option Care Enters., Inc., No. CV 19-1239, 2019 WL 1952692, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 19 2019). 20 The term fraudulent joinder is a bit of a misnomer. Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. 21 Spencer, 831 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016). While it is a “term of art,” McCabe v. Gen. 22 Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987), fraudulent joinder is not intended to 23 1 Jamal objects to the declarations Defendants offered in support of the Notice of 24 Removal. (See Dkt. 10–12.) He also requests that the Court take judicial notice of the 25 remand order issued in McBee v. Raytheon Technologies Incorporated, No. 23-cv-07271 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2024). (See Dkt. 13.) The Court need not address these issues because 26 remand is warranted for reasons that do not depend on the resolution of the objections 27 and request. Accordingly, the objections are OVERRULED, and the request for judicial 28 notice is DENIED. 1 impugn the integrity of a plaintiff or its counsel, and it is not concerned with a subjective 2 intent to deceive, Black v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. CV 03-8730, 2004 WL 5392660, at *1 3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2004). Fraudulent joinder instead refers to the principle that the 4 citizenship of a nondiverse defendant should be disregarded for diversity-removal 5 jurisdiction purposes. See Simpson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 6 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 7 A removing defendant bears the burden of showing that plaintiff cannot “‘establish 8 a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.’” Hunter v. Philip Morris 9 USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 10 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004)). In other words, a defendant must show that a 11 non-diverse defendant, here, RTI., cannot be liable under any theory of liability in state 12 court. Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). If there is any 13 possibility that state law might impose liability under the alleged cause of action, a court 14 cannot find that joinder of the non-diverse defendant fraudulent. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 15 1044; see also Harwood, 2019 WL 1952692, at *6 (“Even when a pleading contains 16 insufficient allegations to state a claim for relief against a non-diverse defendant, a 17 remand is proper ‘where defendant fail[s] to show that plaintiff would not be granted 18 leave to amend his complaint to cure the asserted deficiency by amendment.’”) (quoting 19 Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. CV 14-06708, 2014 WL 6475128, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 20 Nov. 19, 2024). 21 The defendant bears a “‘heavy burden’ since there is a ‘general presumption 22 against finding fraudulent joinder.’” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hunter, 582 23 F.3d at 1046). As such, a defendant “is entitled to present the facts showing the joinder to 24 be fraudulent.” McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339. “Courts should resolve doubts as to 25 removability in favor of remanding the case to state court.” Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 26 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court 27 lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 28 Moreover, the removing party is entitled to present additional facts to demonstrate that a 1 defendant has been fraudulently joined. Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 549 2 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)). 3 A court “may look to affidavits and other evidence to determine whether the joinder is 4 a sham but must resolve all disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the 5 controlling state law in favor of Plaintiff.” Harris v. Elevance Health, Inc., No. CV 6 24-03968, 2024 WL 3815418, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024); see also Judge Karen L. 7 Stevenson & James E. Fitzgerald, Rutter Grp. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial, 8 ¶ 2:2295 (Apr. 2025) (“The district court may also consider affidavits or other evidence 9 (presented by either party) on the issue of whether a particular defendant’s joinder is 10 ‘sham’ or ‘fraudulent.’”) (citing W. Am. Corp. v. Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Co., Inc., 11 765 F.2d 932, 936 n.6 (9th Cir. 1985)). 12 Defendants argue RTI’s California citizenship should be disregarded because it 13 was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity citizenship. They contend that RTI was not 14 Jamal’s direct employer, and that it cannot be considered his joint employer as a matter of 15 law. Because only employers can be held liable under FEHA, Defendants argue Jamal 16 cannot establish any FEHA claim against RTI. Jamal contends that he properly alleges 17 that RTI and the other defendants operated as joint employers and are jointly liable under 18 FEHA and the emotional distress claims. 19 A totality-of-the-circumstances test is used to determine whether a person is a joint 20 employer. Vernon v. California, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Factors 21 to consider when assessing the relationship between two alleged employers includes 22 “payment of salary or other employment benefits and Social Security taxes, the 23 ownership of the equipment necessary to performance of the job, the location where the 24 work is performed, the obligation of the defendant to train the employee, the authority of 25 the defendant to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge the employee, the 26 authority to establish work schedules and assignments, the defendant's discretion to 27 determine the amount of compensation earned by the employee, the skill required of the 28 work performed and the extent to which it is done under the direction of a supervisor, 1 whether the work is part of the defendant's regular business operations, the skill required 2 in the particular occupation, the duration of the relationship of the parties, and the 3 duration of the plaintiff's employment.” Id. at 130. These factors are not “applied 4 mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined, and their weight depends often on 5 particular combinations.” Id. The most important factor is “the extent of the defendant’s 6 right to control the means and manner” of the employee’s performance. Id. (quotation 7 marks omitted). “In all cases, an employer must be an individual or entity who extends a 8 certain degree of control over the plaintiff.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). When looking 9 at the employer’s means to control an employee, a court considers “the level of control an 10 organization asserts over an individual’s access to employment opportunities.” Id. An 11 employer’s control over an employee must be significant, and there must be sufficient 12 indicia of an interrelationship to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee 13 that the alleged joint employer is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate 14 employer. Id. at 130–31. 15 As an initial matter, Jamal does not assert any claims under FEHA or the 16 California Labor Code against RTI. See Compl. ¶¶ 34–111. He only asserts emotional 17 distress claims against it which arose in the workplace environment. See id. ¶¶ 119–124. 18 Although the employer-employee relationship is not a dispositive issue when it pertains 19 to an emotional distress claim, Jamal does not allege any facts to suggest that RTI either 20 intentionally or negligently caused him emotional distress outside the workplace 21 environment. In fact, RTI is mentioned only three times throughout the Complaint: once 22 in paragraph five where Jamal identifies RTI as a defendant, id. at ¶ 5, and two more 23 times in paragraphs 8 and 11 where Jamal claims, in conclusory fashion, that he was 24 RTI’s employee, id. ¶¶ 8, 11. Notably, when describing the incident, Jamal focuses only 25 on Schloss, the Doe defendants, and Collins’ alleged wrongful conduct. In his motion, he 26 asserts that “all other named entity Defendants operated as joint employers of Plaintiff,” 27 Mot. at 7, and that the declarations submitted by Defendant “provide nothing more than 28 1 mere inconsistent hearsay statements that do not adequately reflect the controlling parties 2 of Plaintiff’s employment,” id. at 9. 3 Contrary to Jamal’s assertions, the evidence offered by defendants show by clear 4 and convincing evidence that RTI was neither Jamal’s direct employer or a joint 5 employer with Collins and Schloss. For example, David Levine2—RTI’s Assistance 6 Secretary-Tax—attests that the references to RTI in Jamal’s personnel records refer to 7 RTX Corporation, the national entity, not RTI. Dkt. 14-6, Decl. of David Levine ¶ 3. He 8 further states that RTI has ever employed anyone in California. Id. According to Levin, 9 RTI is a dormant holding company: it does not own any physical property, run payroll, or 10 had any income generating sales since 2019. Id. Most importantly, Levine declares that 11 RTI “does not exercise any control over the operations, policies or personnel of any other 12 entity, including Goodrich Corporation or RTX Corporation.” Id. 13 The declaration from Jennifer M. Boivin3 lends further support that RTI was not a 14 joint employer. See generally Dkt. 14-8, Decl. of Jennifer M. Boivin. Boivin is the 15 Associate Director, Entity Management, Legal, Contracts and Compliance for Collins. Id. 16 ¶ 1. In her position, she has access to RTX Corporation’s corporate formation records. 17 Id. ¶ 3. She attests that in February 2000, RTI was repurposed to serve as a holding 18 company for intellectual property assets for RTX Corporation’s subsidiary. Id. ¶ 4. 19 According to Boivin, “RTI has no subsidiaries, no active operations and no employees. 20 RTI has been dormant for more than ten years.” Id. 21 In considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendants have sufficiently 22 established that RTI serves as a holding company of Raytheon Company’s intellectual 23 property assets and has no subsidiaries, active operations or employees. Thus, RTI could 24 not control the means and manner of Jamal’s employment, nor those of the other 25 26 2 Jamal raises numerous objections to Devine’s declaration. See Dkt. 11. These objections are OVERRULED. 27 3 Jamal likewise raises numerous objections to Boivin’s declaration. See Dkt. 10. These 28 objections are OVERRULED. 1 || defendants. Jamal has not alleged any facts in support of his theory that RTI jointly 2 ||employed him. Jamal only alleges that Schloss’s job title lists RTI as a common 3 ||/employer, but in light of Defendant’s evidence, this fact is unavailing. 4 Based on the reasons set forth above, all the claims against RTI depend on the 5 || existence of a type of employer-employee relationship or that RTI was a joint employer 6 || with the other defendants. Amendment would be futile because Defendants offered facts 7 ||to demonstrate why RTI could not be liable on any theory, and Jamal = did not refute 8 || those facts. Therefore, the Court determines that Defendants established that there is no 9 || possibility that Plaintiff can state a claim against RTI. 10 Considering that Jamal and RTI are nondiverse parties, the Court will disregard the 11 ||latter’s citizenship and finds that complete diversity exists between Jamal and the 12 ||remaining defendants. Because this case is not being remanded, Jamal is not entitled to 13 || attorneys’ fees incurred as a result of the removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 14 CONCLUSION 15 For the above reasons, the Motion to Remand is DENIED. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. "7 □□ □□ 18 || Dated: September 30, 2025 19 HON. SERENA R. MURILLO 50 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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