Sydney Stewart v. Sacramento Sheriff Office, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02310
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SYDNEY STEWART, Case No. 2:25-cv-02310-TLN-CSK PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 14 SACRAMENTO SHERIFF OFFICE, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Sydney Stewart is proceeding without counsel in this action and seeks 18 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) 19 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP request makes the required financial showing. 20 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP request. 21 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 23 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 24 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 25 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 26 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 2 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 3 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 4 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490 5 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 6 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 7 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 8 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 9 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 10 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 11 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 12 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 14 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 15 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 16 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 17 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 19 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 20 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 21 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 24 The Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required 25 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims and the 26 grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 27 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 28 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals it 1 consists of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of the causes of action and fails to 2 state a claim for relief under Section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 4 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 5 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks 6 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a 7 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 8 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable 9 § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the Constitution 10 and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a 11 person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Florer v. 12 Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An individual 13 defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's 14 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between 15 the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen 16 v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th 17 Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable 18 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 19 Plaintiff brings a cause of action against Defendants Sheriff Deputy Brandon 20 Ritchie, Sheriff Deputy “Masterson,” and the Sacramento Sheriff’s Office for Section 21 1983 relief for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for unlawful 22 search and seizure of property. Compl. at 1, 2, 6-7 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also makes one 23 reference in the Complaint that Defendants Ritchie and Masterson committed “race 24 discrimination.” Compl. at 7. Construing the Complaint liberally, the Court interprets this 25 as an attempt to bring a claim for discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 26 Court will address Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful search and seizure of property under the 27 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and race discrimination under the Fourteenth 28 1 Amendment against all Defendants.2 2 1. Defendants Ritchie and Masterson: Unlawful Search and Seizure 3 Construing the Complaint liberally, it appears Plaintiff intends to bring a Fourth 4 and Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged unlawful 5 search and seizure of Plaintiff’s vehicle. See Compl. at 6-7. The Fourth Amendment 6 claim against Defendants Ritchie and Masterson should be dismissed for failure to 7 sufficiently state a claim for an unreasonable search or seizure. The Fourth Amendment 8 protects the “right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 9 seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee is applied to the states through the 10 Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). An automobile stop by 11 a police officer is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. 12 Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all search 13 and seizure. “[I]f the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable 14 cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the 15 seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject 16 to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Carroll v. United States, 17 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 18 The Complaint’s allegations are somewhat unclear. The Complaint alleges that on 19 June 16, 2025 at approximately 12:48 a.m., Plaintiff was driving after leaving their 20 house, and noticed police officers driving behind them. See Compl. at 6. Plaintiff slowed 21 down and continued driving, making turns on different streets. Plaintiff was stopped at 22 the gate to the apartments on Lawston Way. See id. The officers asked Plaintiff a lot of 23 questions. See id. Plaintiff asked the officers if Plaintiff ran a stop sign, and if Plaintiff did, 24 why did the officers follow Plaintiff for over a mile before stopping Plaintiff. See id. one of 25 the officers asked if he could search Plaintiff’s car and Plaintiff said no. Id. Based on 26

27 2 It appears Plaintiff names one other individual in the Complaint (Compl. at 5), however, the name is difficult to decipher and there are no allegations against this 28 individual. 1 Plaintiff’s allegations, it is unclear what alleged unlawful actions each individual 2 Defendant took during the alleged traffic stop. See Compl. Plaintiff groups both 3 Defendants together in the description of the events and does not specify what actions 4 were taken by Defendant Ritchie and Defendant Masterson. See Compl. 5 Plaintiff fails to state a Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim. The 6 Complaint does not allege how long Plaintiff was stopped and whether any search 7 actually occurred after Plaintiff told the officers they could not search Plaintiff’s vehicle. 8 See Compl. It is also unclear whether any items were seized. In the relief section of the 9 form Complaint, Plaintiff refers to Plaintiff’s cell phone, receipt, and car title, which 10 suggests those items were seized. See Compl. at 7. Accordingly, this claim against 11 Defendants Ritchie and Masterson is dismissed. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 12 to amend the Complaint, if Plaintiff can, to allege specific facts regarding the alleged 13 violations and Defendants Ritchie and/or Masterson’s connection to or involvement in 14 the alleged violations. 15 Further, it is not clear whether Plaintiff is trying to raise a separate cause of action 16 for violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment relating to the traffic stop. 17 “A procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a 18 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate 19 procedural protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 20 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff does not clearly allege a separate cause of action 21 and what procedural protection Plaintiff believes they were entitled to but denied. To the 22 extent Plaintiff is seeking to raise a separate cause of action for a due process violation 23 under the Fourteenth Amendment, this cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend. 24 Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend the Complaint, if Plaintiff can, alleging 25 what deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest occurred, what procedural 26 protection Plaintiff was denied, and facts demonstrating Defendants Ritchie and/or 27 Masterson’s connection to or involvement in the alleged violations. 28 / / / 1 2. Defendants Ritchie and Masterson: Race Discrimination 2 Construing the Complaint liberally, it appears Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants 3 Ritchie and Masterson committed race discrimination during the alleged traffic stop. See 4 Compl. at 7. In order to state a claim under § 1983 for “a violation of the Equal Protection 5 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted 6 with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in 7 a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 8 Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Intentional discrimination 9 means that a defendant “acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” 10 Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). 11 Here, the Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for race 12 discrimination under § 1983 against Defendants Ritchie and Masterson. Plaintiff makes 13 only one reference to “race discrimination” in the Complaint but does not allege any 14 other facts to support this claim against any defendant. The Complaint does not allege 15 Plaintiff is a member of a protected class or allege that any defendant acted with an 16 intent or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiff based upon membership in a protected 17 class. Therefore, the race discrimination claim against Defendants Ritchie and 18 Masterson is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to 19 amend the Complaint, if Plaintiff can, to allege a race discrimination claim and specific 20 facts demonstrating Defendants Ritchie and/or Masterson’s connection to or involvement 21 in the alleged violations. 22 3. Defendant Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office: All Claims 23 On the first page of the Complaint, the Sacramento Sheriff Office is named as a 24 Defendant, however Plaintiff does not list the Sacramento Sheriff’s Office as a Defendant 25 anywhere else in the Complaint. Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, it appears that 26 Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for municipal liability against Defendant Sacramento 27 Sheriff’s Office pursuant to Section 1983. “In order to establish municipal liability [under 28 Monell], a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro 1 v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell 2 v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose 3 liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was deprived of a 4 constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate 5 indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force 6 behind the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 7 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)). The complaint must 8 identify the particular policy that plaintiff alleges caused the constitutional injury. See Lee 9 v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. 10 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local governments are responsible 11 only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose liability on a local government, 12 plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their 13 injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must be the result of a decision of a 14 person employed by the entity who has final decision or policymaking authority. Monell, 15 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the 16 injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that his injury resulted from a 17 permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. 18 Here, the Complaint does not allege any facts that could support a Monell claim. 19 Plaintiff makes no allegations related to the Sacramento Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff has not 20 sufficiently supported the claim with facts as required under Rule 8. Therefore, the 21 claims against Defendant Sacramento Sheriff’s Office are dismissed with leave to 22 amend. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend the Complaint, if Plaintiff can, 23 to allege facts demonstrating Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations resulted from 24 Defendant Sacramento Sheriff’s Office policy or custom that is the result of a decision of 25 a person employed by the entity who has final decision or policymaking authority; a 26 direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury; and that Plaintiff’s injury 27 resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; 28 Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. 1 B. Leave to Amend 2 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se 3 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and 4 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In 5 light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff could 6 allege additional facts to state claims under Section 1983, the Court finds it appropriate 7 to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130- 8 31 (indicating that prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the 9 complaint and provide an opportunity to cure if it appears at all possible the defects can 10 be corrected). 11 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall allege facts 12 establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain 13 statement of Plaintiff's claim. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in 14 sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than 15 the one before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being 16 repeated anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of 17 circumstances” where possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help 18 plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk's 19 Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at 20 www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. The amended complaint shall be titled “First 21 Amended Complaint.” 22 The amended complaint must not require the Court and the defendants to guess 23 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 24 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally 25 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain 26 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the Court to spend its time 27 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id. 28 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the Court and defendants to prepare 1 || lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” /d. at 1179. 2 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in 3 | order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 4 || amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a 5 || general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the 6 || amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any 7 | function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). 8 | Ill. CONCLUSION 9 In accordance with the above, IT |S ORDERED that: 10 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 11 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend; and 12 3. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended 13 complaint that complies with the instructions provided above. If Plaintiff 14 fails to timely comply with this order, the undersigned may recommend that 15 this action be dismissed. 16 17 || Dated: November 19, 2025 C i s 18 CHI SOO KIM 49 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 || 5, stew.2310.25 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28