Swoope v Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 166790
• Status: Published

Opinion

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong

SWOOPE v CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST

Docket No. 166790. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 8, 2025. Decided March 10, 2026.

Carlonda N. Swoope brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., after she was injured in an automobile collision while driving a car she had borrowed from a friend without having obtained permission. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had neither a valid driver’s license nor automobile insurance. Plaintiff applied for PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, which assigned plaintiff’s claim to defendant. Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred by MCL 500.3113(a) because she had taken the vehicle unlawfully without a reasonable belief that she had permission to use it. The trial court, Dana M. Hathaway, J., denied the motion and also denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration. Defendant appealed by leave granted, and the Court of Appeals, LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and CAMERON, JJ., reversed, holding that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits because, given her lack of a driver’s license, she was unlawfully operating the car at the time of the accident. 350 Mich App 104 (2024). Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 12 (2025).

In a unanimous opinion by Justice BOLDEN, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:

The Court of Appeals misinterpreted MCL 500.3113(a) when it held that plaintiff was barred from recovering PIP benefits on the ground that there was no genuine question of fact that she was unlawfully operating the motor vehicle. When PIP benefit eligibility is challenged under MCL 500.3113(a), the relevant question is whether the motor vehicle or motorcycle had been taken unlawfully, which is a distinct inquiry from whether the vehicle had been operated unlawfully. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether plaintiff’s actions constituted an unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. 1. MCL 500.3113 bars recovery of PIP benefits under certain conditions. Under MCL 500.3113(a), a person is not entitled to be paid PIP benefits for accidental bodily injury if, at the time of the accident, the person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully. Because the parties did not dispute whether plaintiff was willingly operating or willingly using the vehicle, this case turned on whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully” at the time of the accident and whether plaintiff knew or should have known that it was “taken unlawfully.”

2. In Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503 (2012), and Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 495 Mich 316 (2014), the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “taken unlawfully” in a previous version of MCL 500.3113(a) that barred relief if, at the time of the accident, “[t]he person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” Taken together, Spectrum Health and Rambin both require consideration of the circumstances at the time the vehicle was taken to determine whether the taking itself was unlawful. If the driver took the vehicle contrary to the express prohibition of the vehicle’s owner, MCL 500.3113(a) bars relief. If the driver was operating a vehicle that had been unlawfully taken—but not over the owner’s express prohibition—further inquiry into the driver’s intentions at the time the vehicle was taken is required.

3. The Legislature amended the language of MCL 500.3113(a) when it enacted 2014 PA 489. Although the amendment changed the statutory language in two ways, recovery of PIP benefits continues to depend on whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully,” a phrase that remained unchanged. Accordingly, it remains incumbent on a court that is considering whether MCL 500.3113(a) bars recovery of PIP benefits to determine whether, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was “taken unlawfully” in the sense in which that phrase has been judicially interpreted—in other words, whether possession of the vehicle was gained contrary to Michigan law, as decided in Spectrum Health. In Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1 (2021), the Court of Appeals correctly held that the disqualification from PIP benefits in the amended version of MCL 500.3113(a) “applies to any person (1) willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle that (2) was unlawfully taken by someone, and (3) the person seeking benefits knew or should have known that the motor vehicle was taken unlawfully,” with the focus of the analysis on whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully. And under Spectrum Health and Rambin, the phrase “unlawfully taken” is associated with how possession of the vehicle that was involved in the accident was gained. Whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully is a distinct inquiry from whether it was used or operated unlawfully. Had the Legislature wanted to bar recovery under MCL 500.3113(a) for a person who had unlawfully taken, operated, or used a vehicle, it would have done so. Because the Legislature did not do so and the language of the statute is plain, the Court declined to read such language into the statute.

4. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that because there was no genuine question of fact that plaintiff was unlawfully operating the car, plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). The panel found dispositive plaintiff’s lack of a valid driver’s license, noting that Ahmed had remarked, in dicta, that “[a]ny violation of the criminal law that leads to a taking of a motor vehicle will constitute an ‘unlawful taking’ for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a).” The panel reasoned that because the Michigan Vehicle Code prohibits an individual from driving a motor vehicle on a state highway without a valid driver’s license, and because MCL 257.901 attaches criminal penalties to violations of the statute, plaintiff’s operation was unlawful under MCL 500.3113(a). The panel also reasoned that because plaintiff knew that she lacked a valid license, she should have understood that driving the vehicle without a valid license was unlawful. However, the correct inquiry requires a court to focus on whether the taking of the vehicle was unlawful, not whether the operation of the vehicle was unlawful. Plaintiff’s status as an unlicensed driver provided no insight as to whether she had unlawfully gained possession of the vehicle, and how a driver operates the vehicle has no bearing on whether MCL 500.3113(a) bars recovery of PIP benefits. To the extent that Ahmed concluded otherwise, it was wrongly decided.

Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood

FILED March 10, 2026

STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

CARLONDA NAISHE SWOOPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 166790

CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST,

Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

BOLDEN, J. In this case, we must determine whether, at the time of the motor vehicle accident

in which she was injured, plaintiff “was willingly operating or willingly using a motor

vehicle or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and [she] knew or should have known

that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully.” MCL 500.3113(a). If so, then

she is barred from recovering personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-

fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The Court of Appeals misinterpreted MCL 500.3113(a) when it held that plaintiff

was barred from recovering PIP benefits on the ground that there was no genuine question

of fact that she was unlawfully operating the motor vehicle. Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of

the Midwest, 350 Mich App 104, 107-108; 29 NW3d 695 (2024). It reached this

conclusion, in part, by erroneously extending dicta from Ahmed v Tokio Marine America

Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1; 972 NW2d 860 (2021). Having considered the text of MCL

500.3113(a) and our previous opinions interpreting its controlling language, we hold that

when PIP benefit eligibility is challenged under MCL 500.3113(a), the relevant question

is whether the motor vehicle or motorcycle had been taken unlawfully—a distinct inquiry

from whether the vehicle had been operated unlawfully. See MCL 500.3113(a); Spectrum

Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503; 821 NW2d 117 (2012);

Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 495 Mich 316; 852 NW2d 34 (2014).

Because the Court of Appeals analyzed MCL 500.3113(a) by conducting the wrong

inquiry, we reverse. However, because the Court of Appeals inadequately considered

defendant’s alternative ground for summary disposition under MCL 500.3113(a)—that

plaintiff’s actions constituted an unlawful taking of the motor vehicle—we remand to the

Court of Appeals to address this question.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Carlonda Naishe Swoope, was injured in an automobile accident in Detroit

on October 27, 2020. The next day, plaintiff’s friend, Kandice Valentine, drove to

plaintiff’s home to bring plaintiff to her house to spend the night, while plaintiff’s mother

and children stayed at plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff testified that, the next morning, “[m]y

2 mother called me and told me that her chest was hurting, and the ambulance wasn’t coming

fast enough. So I tried to get there as soon as possible.” Without first obtaining Valentine’s

consent or permission, plaintiff took Valentine’s car keys and vehicle and drove toward

her mother’s home, but along the way, she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. She

had never driven Valentine’s car before. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had neither

a valid driver’s license nor automobile insurance.

On November 11, 2020, plaintiff applied for PIP benefits through the Michigan

Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). 1 MACP assigned plaintiff’s claim to defendant, Citizens

Insurance Company of the Midwest, which denied coverage. Plaintiff sued defendant,

seeking recovery of PIP benefits for the injuries that she sustained in the accident.

Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR

2.116(C)(10). 2 Defendant argued that plaintiff’s claim was barred by MCL 500.3113(a)

because plaintiff took the vehicle unlawfully without a reasonable belief that she had

1 A person may file a claim seeking PIP benefits through the MACP if they sustained “accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” under certain enumerated circumstances, including, as plaintiff alleged, that there is no insurance policy that would cover the incident. MCL 500.3172(1)(a). 2 MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and may be granted only when, based on the pleadings, the alleged claims are “ ‘so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.’ ” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999), quoting Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 163; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).

MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint,” and a moving party is entitled to summary disposition under this subsection when, after considering “affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties” in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the plaintiff has failed to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Maiden, 461 Mich at 120.

3 permission to use the vehicle. 3 The trial court denied the motion. Defendant moved for

reconsideration, which the trial court also denied.

Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Swoope, 350 Mich App at

107. 4 Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in this Court. We directed the Clerk to schedule oral

argument on the application and ordered the parties to address

whether the plaintiff is barred from recovering personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., because, at the time of the accident, she “was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle . . . that was taken unlawfully, and [she] knew or should have known that the motor vehicle . . . was taken unlawfully.” MCL 500.3113(a). [Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 12 (2025) (alterations in original).]

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this case, we consider whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion

for summary disposition. On appeal, we review grants and denials of summary disposition

de novo. Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52, 61-62; 903 NW2d 366 (2017).

To determine whether the trial court erred by denying the motion, we must interpret

MCL 500.3113(a), which presents a legal issue that we review de novo. American Civil

Liberties Union of Mich v Calhoun Co Sheriff’s Office, 509 Mich 1, 8; 983 NW2d 300

(2022). “ ‘The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent

that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language.’ ” Id., quoting Krohn v Home-

3 Defendant also argued that plaintiff made misrepresentations and false statements on her MACP application that should disqualify her from receiving PIP benefits. That argument is not part of the appeal in this Court and is not addressed in this opinion. 4 The opinion was approved for publication after it was issued.

4 Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 156; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). The first step in determining

legislative intent is to examine the statutory language itself, which provides the most

reliable evidence of the statute’s intended meaning. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 515,

citing Krohn, 490 Mich at 155-157. If the statutory language is unambiguous, no further

judicial construction is required or permitted. American Civil Liberties Union, 509 Mich

at 8.

B. MCL 500.3113(a)

MCL 500.3113 bars recovery of PIP benefits under certain conditions. MCL

500.3113(a) is relevant here. In pertinent part, its current version explains:

A person is not entitled to be paid [PIP] benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident . . . :

(a) The person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully. [MCL 500.3113. 5]

The parties do not dispute whether plaintiff was willingly operating or willingly using the

vehicle. Therefore, this case turns on whether Valentine’s vehicle was “taken unlawfully”

at the time of the accident and whether plaintiff knew or should have known that it was

“taken unlawfully.”

5 MCL 500.3113(a) was amended effective January 13, 2015, by 2014 PA 489. Although MCL 500.3113 has been amended since, the language of Subsection (a) has remained unchanged. See Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 9 n 3; see also 2024 PA 224.

5 C. SPECTRUM HEALTH AND RAMBIN

This Court has twice interpreted a prior version of this statute. That earlier version

barred relief if, at the time of the accident, “[t]he person was using a motor vehicle or

motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed

that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” MCL 500.3113(a), as amended by

1986 PA 93; see also Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 516; Rambin, 495 Mich at 326.

In Spectrum Health, we determined that under this previous language, the key

question when determining PIP benefit eligibility was whether the vehicle had been taken

unlawfully at the time of the accident. The specific question presented was whether a

person who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle that had been

taken contrary to the express prohibition of its owner was barred from recovering PIP

benefits. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 508.

Spectrum Health involved two consolidated cases. In one, Craig Smith, Jr., was

injured in a single-car accident that occurred while he was driving a vehicle owned by his

father, Craig Smith, Sr., who had insured the vehicle with Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance

Company of Michigan and Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan. Id. at

511. At the time of the accident, Craig Sr. had forbidden Craig Jr. from operating the

vehicle because Craig Jr. lacked a valid driver’s license, but Craig Sr. had permitted Craig

Jr.’s girlfriend to use the vehicle. Id. at 512. On the night of the accident, Craig Jr. began

drinking, obtained the keys to the car from his girlfriend, and crashed the vehicle into a

tree. Id.

In the other consolidated case, Ryan DeYoung’s driver’s license had been revoked

on account of three drunk-driving convictions. Id. at 513. His wife, Nicole DeYoung,

6 owned and insured four vehicles with Progressive Marathon Insurance Company. Id.

Nicole had expressly prohibited Ryan from driving these vehicles and had listed Ryan as a

named excluded driver on the insurance policy. Id. Nevertheless, one night Ryan came

home intoxicated, took the keys to one of the vehicles from Nicole’s purse, drove the

vehicle away from their home despite Nicole’s express prohibition, and injured himself in

a single-vehicle accident. Id.

To determine the drivers’ respective eligibility for PIP benefits, we examined the

text of MCL 500.3113 to hold that “the plain meaning of the phrase ‘taken unlawfully’

readily embraces a situation in which an individual gains possession of a vehicle contrary

to Michigan law.” Id. at 517. In other words, a person need not steal a vehicle to be

considered to have taken it unlawfully and therefore to be excluded from recovering

benefits by MCL 500.3113(a). Further, we reasoned that “[b]ecause a taking does not have

to be larcenous to be unlawful, the phrase ‘taken unlawfully’ in MCL 500.3113(a) applies

to anyone who takes a vehicle without the authority of the owner, regardless of whether

that person intended to steal it.” Id. at 518. Accordingly, we concluded that “any person

who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code—including MCL

750.413 and MCL 750.414, informally known as the ‘joyriding’ statutes—has taken the

vehicle unlawfully within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a)” and is barred from recovery

of PIP benefits regardless of the driver’s intent to steal the vehicle. Id. at 537. We also

held that MCL 500.3113(a) examines the lawfulness of the taking from the driver’s

perspective. Id. at 522.

Two years later, we were faced with a new question about the prior version of MCL

500.3113(a). See Rambin, 495 Mich 316. In Rambin, we considered whether the operator

7 of a motorcycle that was owned by another person was permitted to present evidence that

he did not knowingly lack authority to take the motorcycle. Id. at 337. In other words,

after Spectrum Health concluded that a violation of the misdemeanor joyriding statute,

MCL 750.414, barred recovery of PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), we had to decide

whether MCL 750.414 included a mens rea requirement—i.e., that the driver of the vehicle

must have intended to take the vehicle without authority to constitute a violation. Id. at

320.

Unlike the facts of both cases consolidated in Spectrum Health, Rambin did not

involve the taking of a vehicle over the express prohibition of the vehicle’s owner, but

rather involved someone who operated a motorcycle that he claimed had been loaned to

him. Id. at 323. The plaintiff, Lejuan Rambin, was injured while riding a motorcycle that

was owned by and registered to Scott Hertzog. Id. at 321. Hertzog’s motorcycle had been

stolen earlier that month. Id. at 322. The plaintiff asserted that he attended a motorcycle

club ride, and Andre Smith loaned him the motorcycle that he was operating when he

collided with an uninsured vehicle. Id. at 323. The plaintiff maintained that he did not

know the motorcycle had been stolen and that, therefore, he had not unlawfully taken the

motorcycle because he had a reasonable belief that Smith was the motorcycle’s rightful

and legal owner when he drove it with Smith’s permission. Id. at 324, 327.

We continued to apply the analysis from Spectrum Health that recovery under MCL

500.3113(a) is analyzed from the perspective of the driver of the vehicle who was in an

accident, and we used that framework to determine the lawfulness of the taking of the

motorcycle. Id. at 323 n 7. Because the facts did not involve the disregard of an owner’s

express prohibition, we analyzed the misdemeanor joyriding statute, MCL 750.414, to

8 determine whether the motorcycle had been, as a matter of law, unlawfully taken. This

Court held that MCL 750.414 included a mens rea element of knowingly taking the vehicle

without authority or knowingly using it without authority. Id. at 332. We reasoned that

the term “take” requires some voluntary action, so the plaintiff was entitled to present

evidence to support his belief that his taking was lawful and, therefore, that MCL

500.3113(a) did not bar his recovery of PIP benefits. Id. at 333-334. We held that to

determine whether that mens rea element is met, how the vehicle is used may be relevant,

even though unlawful use is not relevant to the initial question of whether the vehicle was

unlawfully taken under MCL 500.3113(a). Id. at 331-332.

Taken together, Spectrum Health and Rambin both require consideration of the

circumstances at the time the vehicle was taken to determine whether the taking itself was

unlawful. If the driver took the vehicle contrary to the express prohibition of the vehicle’s

owner, MCL 500.3113(a) bars relief. See Spectrum Health, 492 Mich 503. If the driver

was operating a vehicle that had been unlawfully taken—but not over the owner’s express

prohibition—further inquiry into the driver’s intentions at the time the vehicle was taken

is required. See Rambin, 495 Mich 316.

D. MONACO v HOME-OWNERS INS CO AND AHMED v TOKIO MARINE AMERICA INS CO

As already noted, after Rambin, the Legislature amended the language of MCL

500.3113(a) when it enacted 2014 PA 489. Although this is our first time interpreting the

amended language of MCL 500.3113(a) and how it relates to PIP benefit eligibility, the

Court of Appeals has discussed the amended language on a few occasions.

9 In Monaco v Home-Owners Ins Co, 317 Mich App 738; 896 NW2d 32 (2016), a 15-

year-old driver was injured in an automobile accident after she lost control of the vehicle,

which was owned by her mother, the plaintiff. Id. at 741. The daughter did not have a

driver’s license at the time; rather, she had a learner’s permit that enabled her lawful

operation of the vehicle when accompanied by a licensed parent, guardian, or driver who

was at least 21 years old. Id. at 741-742. No such person was with her at the time of the

accident, but the plaintiff testified at trial that her daughter nevertheless had permission to

drive the vehicle, explaining that she had initially told the insurance adjuster otherwise out

of fear she would be found criminally liable for allowing her unlicensed daughter to drive.

Id. at 743-744.

In Ahmed, the plaintiff was in a car accident while he was driving a motor vehicle

that his wife had rented. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 5. The rental agreement, which the

plaintiff’s wife signed, allowed certain authorized drivers to operate the vehicle, including

the customer’s spouse, but specified that any authorized driver must possess a valid driver’s

license. Id. The plaintiff was not a party to the rental agreement, nor had he read it before

he drove the vehicle. Id. at 5. The plaintiff lacked a valid driver’s license at the time of

the accident, but, according to his deposition testimony, he believed that his driver’s license

was merely restricted and that he was driving within the restrictions when the accident

occurred. Id.

In Monaco, the car accident occurred before the 2014 amendments of MCL

500.3113(a) became effective, so that opinion interpreted the prior version of the statute

when it affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motions for summary disposition

and a directed verdict on the ground that the daughter’s taking of her mother’s vehicle was

10 not unlawful. Monaco, 317 Mich App at 746-747, 750-751. However, the opinion also

noted that the newly amended language “still generally bars the recovery of PIP benefits

by a person who operated a vehicle that he or she had ‘taken unlawfully.’ ” Id. at 747. The

opinion established that the “first level of inquiry when applying MCL 500.3113(a) always

concerns whether the taking of a vehicle was unlawful . . . .” Monaco, 317 Mich App

at 747.

The accident at issue in Ahmed occurred after MCL 500.3113(a) was amended.

Similarly to Monaco, Ahmed analyzed that provision to conclude that while the

amendments had “broadened the provision governing disqualification from eligibility for

benefits,” the key statutory term, “taken unlawfully,” retained the same meaning as it had

under the version of MCL 500.3113(a) that we interpreted in Spectrum Health and Rambin.

Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 9-10. Ahmed explained that “ ‘[t]he provisions of any law or

statute which is re-enacted, amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of prior

laws, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments.’ ” Id.

at 10, quoting MCL 8.3u (brackets in Ahmed). Ahmed then applied the Spectrum Health

and Rambin analyses to the amended language of MCL 500.3113(a). The opinion noted

that “taken unlawfully” applies to anyone who takes a vehicle without the owner’s

authority and that the legality of the taking is examined from the perspective of the

vehicle’s driver at the time of the accident. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 11-12, citing

Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 518, 522, 537, and Rambin, 495 Mich at 323 n 7.

11 E. THE AMENDED LANGUAGE OF MCL 500.3113(a) STILL REQUIRES A COURT TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE VEHICLE WAS “TAKEN UNLAWFULLY”

We agree with Monaco and Ahmed that when the Legislature amended MCL

500.3113(a), the focus of the analysis was unchanged because a court must still determine

whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully.”

Before its 2014 amendment, the statute barred relief if “[t]he person was using a

motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person

reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” MCL

500.3113(a), as amended by 1986 PA 93 (emphasis added); see also Spectrum Health, 492

Mich at 516; Rambin, 495 Mich at 326. Under the present version, the statute bars relief

if “[t]he person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle

that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor

vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully.” MCL 500.3113(a). When the Legislature

modified MCL 500.3113(a), it continued to make benefit eligibility contingent on whether

the vehicle had been “taken unlawfully.” See MCL 8.3u (requiring that provisions of

amended statutes that remain the same as in prior versions “shall be construed as a

continuation of such laws and not new enactments”); see also Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co,

507 Mich 314, 322; 968 NW2d 390 (2021), quoting McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180,

192; 795 NW2d 517 (2010) (“When a word ‘has been subject to judicial interpretation, the

legislature is presumed to have used particular words in the sense in which they have been

interpreted’ ”) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, caselaw interpreting the previous version

of MCL 500.3113(a) remains instructive with regard to the proper meaning of the phrase

“taken unlawfully” in the current version.

12 In Monaco, the Court of Appeals applied the prior version of MCL 500.3113(a) to

reject the argument that unlawful operation—as opposed to the unlawful taking—of a

vehicle bars relief under the statute, stating that “the unlawful operation or use of a motor

vehicle is simply not a concern in the context of analyzing whether the vehicle was taken

unlawfully.” Monaco, 317 Mich App at 749. Although the plaintiff’s daughter in that case

had no lawful authority to operate the vehicle without a licensed adult, this had no bearing

on whether she unlawfully took the vehicle. Id., citing MCL 257.310e(4). “ ‘[T]aking’

and ‘use’ are simply not synonymous or interchangeable for the purposes of MCL

500.3113(a).” Monaco, 317 Mich App at 750. The panel concluded that because the driver

had not unlawfully taken the vehicle, recovery of PIP benefits was not barred by MCL

500.3113(a). Id.

Ahmed distinguished Monaco because, in Monaco, the driver had the owner’s

express permission to drive and, therefore, the vehicle could not have been unlawfully

taken. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 19. However, in Ahmed, the driver’s taking contravened

the express written terms of the rental agreement. Id. at 21. Thus, in Ahmed, the Court of

Appeals found it necessary to determine the meaning of the phrase “knew or should have

known,” which was part of the amended version of MCL 500.3113(a). Id.

“[C]ourts must pay particular attention to statutory amendments, because a change

in statutory language is presumed to reflect either a legislative change in the meaning of

the statute itself or a desire to clarify the correct interpretation of the original statute.” Bush

v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 167; 772 NW2d 272 (2009), citing Lawrence Baking Co v

Unemployment Compensation Comm, 308 Mich 198, 205; 13 NW2d 260 (1944). The

amendments here changed the statutory language in two ways. Prior to the 2014

13 amendment, recovery of PIP benefits would be barred if a person was (1) “using” a vehicle

that the person had (2) “taken unlawfully,” (3) “unless” the person “reasonably believed”

they were entitled to take and use the vehicle. MCL 500.3113(a), as amended by 1986 PA

93. Now, recovery of PIP benefits is barred if a person was (1) “willingly operating or

willingly using” a vehicle that was (2) “taken unlawfully,” (3) if the person “knew or should

have known” it was taken unlawfully. We agree with Ahmed that the amended language

replaced a safe harbor for ensuring that benefits remained for a person who had a

reasonable belief that their taking of a vehicle was lawful with a disqualification from

benefits for a person who knew or should have known the taking of the vehicle was

unlawful. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 23.

Although there were two modifications of the statutory language, recovery of PIP

benefits continues to depend on whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully.” In Spectrum

Health, we held that “ ‘taken unlawfully’ readily embraces a situation in which an

individual gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law.” Spectrum Health, 492

Mich at 517. The phrase “taken unlawfully” was not modified. “ ‘Where the language

used has been subject to judicial interpretation, the legislature is presumed to have used

particular words in the sense in which they have been interpreted.’ ” McCormick, 487

Mich at 192, quoting People v Powell, 280 Mich 699, 703; 274 NW 372 (1937). Thus, it

remains incumbent on a court that is considering whether MCL 500.3113(a) bars recovery

of PIP benefits to determine whether, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was “taken

unlawfully.” That is, the court must determine whether possession of the vehicle was

“gain[ed] . . . contrary to Michigan law.” Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 517; see also

Rambin, 495 Mich at 320.

14 F. WHETHER A VEHICLE WAS TAKEN UNLAWFULLY IS A SEPARATE QUESTION FROM WHETHER THE VEHICLE WAS OPERATED UNLAWFULLY

We agree with Ahmed that a plain reading of MCL 500.3113(a) means that “the

disqualification applies to any person (1) willingly operating or willingly using a motor

vehicle or motorcycle that (2) was unlawfully taken by someone, and (3) the person seeking

benefits knew or should have known that the motor vehicle was taken unlawfully.” Ahmed,

337 Mich App at 10 (quotation marks omitted). The focus of the analysis is on whether

the vehicle was taken unlawfully. Continuing to employ the definition from Spectrum

Health and Rambin, we also agree that “unlawfully taken” is associated with how

possession of the vehicle that was involved in the accident was gained. Spectrum Health,

492 Mich at 517. Whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully is a distinct inquiry from

whether it was used or operated unlawfully. “Operate,” for example, can be relevantly

defined as “[t]o direct, put into action, or maintain the function of, esp. by direct personal

effort; to engage, use, and control (a machine, computer, equipment, etc.).” Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed). Further, “use” can be relevantly defined as “[t]o employ for the

accomplishment of a purpose.” Id. Had the Legislature wanted to bar recovery under MCL

500.3113(a) for a person who had “unlawfully taken, operated, or used” a vehicle, it would

have done so. See Monaco, 317 Mich App at 750 (stating that “ ‘taking’ and ‘use’ are

simply not synonymous or interchangeable for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a)”); see also

Auditor General v McLaulin, 83 Mich 352, 354; 47 NW 233 (1890) (noting that “the

Legislature, if they had intended to include [a particular] charge, could readily have found

apt words in which to convey such intention”). Because the Legislature did not do so and

the language of the statute is plain, we decline to read such language into the statute.

15 Additionally, we find it compelling that in the first clause of MCL 500.3113(a), the

Legislature specified that PIP benefit recovery is barred only for a person who was

willingly operating or using the vehicle that was taken unlawfully. This requires a separate

inquiry into the willing use or operation of the vehicle.

G. APPLICATION

Defendant moved for summary disposition by raising several theories. Notably,

defendant argued that plaintiff was barred from entitlement to PIP benefits by MCL

500.3113(a) because her taking of Valentine’s vehicle without Valentine’s consent,

permission, or authorization was unlawful. Defendant further argued that plaintiff lacked

a valid driver’s license and therefore had no basis to believe she was permitted to legally

operate any vehicle on the date of the accident. The trial court denied defendant’s motion,

and defendant appealed that denial.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because “there was no genuine question

of fact that plaintiff was unlawfully operating the car,” plaintiff was not entitled to PIP

benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). Swoope, 350 Mich App at 107-108. The panel found

dispositive plaintiff’s lack of a valid driver’s license. Id. at 110-112. First, it quoted a

passage from Ahmed that had remarked, in dicta, that “ ‘[a]ny violation of the criminal law

that leads to a taking of a motor vehicle will constitute an “unlawful taking” for purposes

of MCL 500.3113(a).’ ” Id. at 110, quoting Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 11 n 5. The panel

reasoned that because MCL 257.301(1) explains that “an individual shall not drive a motor

vehicle on a highway in this state unless that individual has a valid operator’s or chauffeur’s

license,” and MCL 257.901 attaches criminal penalties to violations of the statute,

16 plaintiff’s operation was unlawful under MCL 500.3113(a). Swoope, 350 Mich App at

110-111. The panel also reasoned that plaintiff knew that she lacked a valid license, so she

should have understood that driving the vehicle without a valid license was unlawful. Id.

at 111, citing Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 26-27. The panel concluded that, because “there

was no genuine question of fact that plaintiff was unlawfully operating the car,” she was

“not entitled to PIP benefits under the no-fault act.” Swoope, 350 Mich App at 107-108

(emphasis added).

The panel erroneously applied Ahmed’s dictum and misread MCL 500.3113(a). The

correct inquiry requires a court to focus on whether the taking of the vehicle was unlawful,

not whether the operation of the vehicle was unlawful. Plaintiff’s status as an unlicensed

driver provides no insight as to whether she had unlawfully gained possession of the

vehicle. See Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 517. How the driver operated that vehicle has

no bearing on whether MCL 500.3113(a) bars recovery of PIP benefits. 6

By holding that plaintiff’s unlawful operation of the car barred her from recovering

PIP benefits, the Court of Appeals erred. We reverse. 7

6 To the extent that Ahmed concluded otherwise, it was wrongly decided. 7 Although the Court of Appeals noted in passing that plaintiff admitted she failed to take any steps to ensure that Valentine authorized the taking of the vehicle, the panel did not indicate that it was considering defendant’s alternative ground for summary disposition and never concluded that the vehicle had been unlawfully taken. On remand, the Court of Appeals shall consider whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Valentine’s vehicle was unlawfully taken by plaintiff at the time of the accident.

17 III. CONCLUSION

By holding that plaintiff’s unlawful operation of the motor vehicle barred her

recovery of PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the

statute. Whether a claimant is barred from recovery by MCL 500.3113(a) turns on whether

the vehicle was taken—rather than operated or used—unlawfully and whether the claimant

knew or should have known that it had been taken unlawfully. Thus, the Court of Appeals

erred, and we reverse. However, the Court of Appeals failed to address the alternative

ground for summary disposition raised by defendant regarding how plaintiff’s taking of the

vehicle was unlawful. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kyra H. Bolden Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood