RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0192P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0192p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ARGUED: Clark Shanahan, SHANAHAN & HOY, FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Owosso, Michigan, for Appellants. Jack O. Kalmink, _________________ CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Clark Shanahan, SHANAHAN & HOY, RANDY SWIX , PAMELA SWIX , X Owosso, Michigan, for Appellants. Jack O. Kalmink, Paul Co-Conservators of the Estate - C. Smith, CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for - Appellee. of Aaron Ray Swix, - No. 02-2154 Plaintiffs-Appellants, - _________________ > , OPINION v. - _________________ - DAISY MANUFACTURING CO ., - RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Your mother INC., - refused to buy you a BB gun, warning that “you’ll shoot your Defendant-Appellee. - eye out.” Apparently she was right to be concerned. Based - on the facts of this case and a review of other cases on the N topic, it seems that BBs are attracted to children’s eyes as Appeal from the United States District Court politicians are attracted to television cameras. After losing for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. the use of one eye, Aaron Swix together with his parents No. 02-70152—George E. Woods, District Judge. brought this products liability action against Daisy, the manufacturer of the air rifle which was used to shoot him, Argued: March 11, 2004 alleging that the air rifle was defectively designed. The district court dismissed Swix’s complaint. This appeal Decided and Filed: June 23, 2004 followed.
Before: MARTIN, CLAY, and CUDAHY,* Circuit Judges. I In May of 1999, Albert Carl Porrit purchased a Daisy Powerline 856 air rifle for his minor grandson, Nicholas Porritt. The air rifle was kept in a locked gun cabinet. On April 20, 2000, Nicholas, then age eleven, removed the loaded air rifle from the gun cabinet without permission. According to his affidavit, Nicholas took the safety lock off * The Honorab le Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge of the United the gun and checked to see if the air rifle was empty. App. at States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 3 4 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
45. He then shook the rifle with the barrel facing down principle [sic] consumers) was/were children and young toward the floor. He pulled the bolt back and tilted the gun adults” and that “[t]he model was particularly dangerous and towards himself to see if there was a BB inside the rifle. He defective when placed in the hands of minor children.” App. believed at this point that the rifle was empty. He at 111, 113. The magistrate stated that “Defendant’s motion subsequently pumped the rifle about five times and shot it at to dismiss will apply to the amended complaint.” App. at the floor. Only air came out. He then took the air rifle to the 113. basement, pumping the rifle as he walked. When he got to the basement, he began to watch a movie and held the air rifle When the district court granted the defendant’s motion to in his lap. Halfway through the movie, he picked up the air dismiss one week later, on August 22, 2002, however, it gave rifle, pointed it at his ten-year old friend Aaron Swix and “the no indication that it was aware of the recent amendment to the air rifle went off.” Id. According to the plaintiffs, the result complaint. App. at 14-23. In oral argument, the parties was painful and permanent injury to Aaron Swix and virtually agreed that Judge Woods may have been unaware of the complete loss of sight in his left eye. amendment at the time he granted the motion to dismiss. In the same order, Judge Woods denied plaintiff’s motion for On January 14, 2002, Aaron Swix and his parents filed a partial summary judgment as moot. This appeal followed. products liability suit against Daisy Manufacturing Company, in the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking one million II dollars and alleging claims of defective design and failure to warn of a known danger. In their amended complaint, the The parties do not dispute that Michigan state law applies plaintiffs argued that “[t]he BB storage magazine in the model in this diversity suit brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The was dangerously and defectively designed [in that] . . . it task of this Court, sitting in diversity, is to apply the same law allowed a BB to become lodged in the forward portion, as would be applied by Michigan state courts. See Erie R.R. between the barrel and interior of the outer barrel assembly v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Where a state’s highest . . . thus misleading the operator to believe . . . the air rifle, to court has spoken to an issue, we are bound by that decision be completely empty of BBs, [even after pumping and firing], unless we are convinced that the high court would overrule it when, in fact, a BB would still be present in the magazine.” if confronted with facts similar to those before us. See App. at. 8. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Where a state appellate court has resolved an issue to which On March 14, 2002, Daisy filed a motion to dismiss the the high court has not spoken, “we will normally treat [such] complaint arguing that a gun is a “simple tool” under decisions . . . as authoritative absent a strong showing that the Michigan law and the dangers of pointing it at another person state’s highest court would decide the issue differently.” In are “open and obvious.” On April 18, 2002, plaintiffs filed a re Akron-Cleveland Auto Rental, Inc., 921 F.2d 659, 662 (6th motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Daisy’s Cir. 1990). liability but apparently they failed to file a timely memorandum in support. On August 14, 2002, the parties The district court dismissed Swix’s complaint in this case appeared at a telephonic hearing before Magistrate Judge finding that he had failed to establish that Daisy owed Swix Steven Pepe. At that hearing, Magistrate Judge Pepe granted a duty of care. App. at 23. Under Michigan law, both a the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to include the failure to warn claim and a defective design claim require a allegation that “[d]efendant’s primary marketing target (and plaintiff to establish that the defendant owed him a duty of No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 5 6 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
care. See Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. obviousness of the risks that inhere in some simple tools or 2000); Kirk v. Hanes Corp. of North Carolina, 16 F.3d 705 products is a factor contributing to the conclusion that such (6th Cir. 1994). There is also a defense under Michigan law products are not unreasonably dangerous. The test, however, to the duty requirement in a failure to warn and in a defective is not whether the risks are obvious, but whether the risks design claim known as the “simple tool rule.” See Fisher v. were unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries”); Johnson Milk Co., Inc., 383 Mich. 158, 174 N.W.2d 752 Cacevic v. Simplimatic Eng’g Co., 241 Mich. App. 717, 725, (Mich. 1970); Kirk, 16 F.3d at 705. 617 N.W.2d 386, 390-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), vacated in part on other grounds, 463 Mich. 997, 625 N.W.2d 784 In Fisher, a failure to warn case, a milkman sold a patent (Mich. 2001) (“[A] manufacturer in a case alleging design attorney a wire carrier made to carry four half-gallon bottles defects is not absolved of liability simply because the danger of milk. Id. at 159. On arriving home from the market with associated with the product (simple or nonsimple) is open and his carrier containing four milk bottles, the attorney slipped obvious.”); Boumelhem v. BIC Corp., 211 Mich. App. 175, on some ice in such a manner that the bottom of the carrier 181, 535 N.W.2d 574, 577-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding struck the sidewalk, causing the bottles to break. Id. at 160. the same relying, inter alia, on Owens and Glittenberg v. He extended a hand in order to break his fall and his palm Doughboy Recreational Indus., 441 Mich. 379, 491 N.W.2d landed on a piece of broken bottle, severely injuring his hand. 208 (Mich. 1992)); Adams v. Perry Furniture Co., 198 Mich. The attorney brought suit against the manufacturer of the wire App. 1, 14, 497 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) carrier. The court in Fisher found that “a manufacturer owes (“The test in design defect cases concerning simple tools is no duty to warn of an open and obvious danger associated whether the risks are unreasonable in light of the foreseeable with the use of a simple [tool].” Davis, 226 F.3d at 511 injuries.”), overruled on other grounds by Allied Elec. Supply (discussing Fisher). The parties do not dispute that this is a Co., Inc. v. Tenaglia, 461 Mich. 285, 602 N.W.2d 572 (Mich. correct statement of law with respect to a failure to a warn 1999); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 (1998) claim. (noting that “[a] strong majority of courts [including Michigan in Owens] have rejected the ‘open and obvious’ . . . A. Is the “simple tool” rule an absolute defense to a rule as an absolute defense . . .[and] [a]cademic commentators defective design claim? have been almost unanimous in their criticism of the . . . rule.”). The Supreme Court of Michigan has explained why The parties do seem to disagree, however, whether the fact obvious dangers should be treated differently in the design that a product is deemed a “simple tool” and the danger is defect context than in the failure to warn context. See “open and obvious” is an absolute defense to a defective Glittenberg, 441 Mich. at 394, 491 N.W.2d at 215. In design claim or whether the obviousness of a danger is merely Glittenberg, the Court explained: one factor in the analysis of whether the risks are unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries. We agree In the design defect context, obvious risk may with virtually every Michigan court which has opined on the unreasonably breach the duty to adopt a design that matter, all of which have suggested that the obviousness of a safely and feasibly guards against foreseeable misuse. danger is merely one factor in the analysis of whether the Because the manufacturer’s liability for choice of design risks are unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries. is not determined solely by looking at the obvious nature See, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, of the alleged defect, obviousness of the danger does not 425, 326 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Mich. 1982) (“As in Fisher, the preclude the possibility that an alternative design could No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 7 8 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
reduce the risk of harm at a cost and in a manner that concluded that Prentis was actually consistent with Fisher maintains the product[’s] utility. and that both cases found that the obviousness of the danger was simply one factor in the reasonableness analysis. Id. at In the failure to warn context, the obvious nature of the 708 (“Even though Fisher was decided prior to Prentis, it also simple product’s potential danger serves the core purpose applied a ‘pure negligence’ standard . . . . While the risks that of the claim, i.e., it functions as an inherent warning that glass bottles will break or that broken glass might injure the risk is present. Stated otherwise, if the risk is someone are inarguably foreseeable, the court [in Fisher] obvious from the characteristics of the product, the determined that such risks, as a matter of law, were not product itself telegraphs the precise warning that unreasonable given the obvious nature of the danger and the plaintiffs complain is lacking. simple nature of the product.”) (emphasis in original). Kirk then applied the same reasonableness test of Prentis and Id. (citations omitted). In other words, there is no need to Fisher to a Bic lighter to conclude that no jury— “in light of warn of a danger where the danger is obvious, but in a design the fact that the danger of lighters is obvious to their intended defect case, the court must also consider whether a users—could find that these lighters pose an unreasonable manufacturer should have created the danger in the first place. risk of harm.” Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). Therefore, For instance, the danger associated with a rag-doll with steak Kirk suggests that the test is not simply whether the danger is knives for arms (“Steak Knife Sally”) may be quite obvious, “open and obvious,” but instead whether the risks were but it is equally clear that the risks associated with such a unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries. Id. at 709 design choice far outweigh the utility. (“Were we to reject Fisher and Adams, as Kirk argues, we would have to hold that the determination of whether a Our opinion in Kirk is in accord. See 16 F.3d 705. In Kirk, particular design presents an unreasonable risk of foreseeable we were not asked to decide whether the fact that a danger is injury may never be resolved by the court on summary “open and obvious” is an absolute defense to a defective judgment.”); see also id. at n.5.1 design claim or whether the obviousness of a danger is merely one factor in the analysis of whether the risks are Daisy argues that the “open and obvious” nature of a unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries. Instead, the danger is dispositive based on Mallard v. Hoffinger Industries question presented to this Court was whether the “simple tool Inc., 222 Mich. App. 137, 564 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. rule” applies in design defect cases at all. Id. Nonetheless, in deciding whether the simple tool rule 1 W e note that there is a great deal of confusion in the language of applies to design defect cases, our discussion provided insight many opinions, including Kirk, which have bearing on the question into the question whether the open and obvious nature of a whether the simple tool rule is dispo sitive or whether a reaso nableness danger is merely one factor to be considered or is dispositive. analysis applies. We believe that this confusion has be en created, in part, Id. Specifically, our opinion addressed whether Fisher, which because courts have conflated this question with the separate and was argued to have established the rule that the obviousness potentially independent question of whether such cases can be decided as a matter o f law. If each question is considered separately, however, it of a danger is dispositive, was overruled by Prentis v. Yale appears that there is no t much disagreement. As will be discussed, it is Manufacturing Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. clear that a reasonablene ss analysis applies but that the nature of this 1984), which was argued to have replaced the dispositive rule analysis will not prevent a design defect claim from being decide d as a with a multi-factor “reasonableness” analysis. Id. We matter of law where reasonable minds could not disagree as to the outco me. No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 9 10 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
1997).2 We find the reasoning of Mallard, however, to be the relevant discussion in Owens and Glittenberg as dicta. unpersuasive. In Mallard, the Court discounted the guidance Mallard, 222 Mich. App. at 141-43, 564 N.W.2d at 77-78. of the Michigan Supreme Court, noting that “[w]hile we agree As we have held, dicta can be of value in determining state with plaintiffs that the Supreme Court’s language in law. See Kirk, 16 F.3d at 709. This is especially true here, Glittenberg appears to suggest that the open and obvious where we have strong dicta from a variety of Michigan courts, nature of the danger will not preclude any design defect including the state’s highest court, all making the same point. claims, we conclude that the Court was discussing general Finally, we note that Mallard was decided prior to Cacevic principles of design defect claims and not their applicability and without any apparent consideration of Boumelhelm. to simple products.” See Mallard, 222 Mich. App. at 142, 564 N.W.2d at 77. We are at a loss to see how the court in Therefore, for the reasons discussed supra, we find that the Mallard could find that the Supreme Court was excluding fact that a product may be a “simple tool” is not dispositive in simple products from its discussion of design defect claims, a design defect case—the obviousness of a danger is merely given that it held that “[i]n the design defect context, obvious one factor in the analysis of whether the risks are risk may unreasonably breach the duty to adopt a design that unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries. The fact that safely and feasibly guards against foreseeable misuse . . . a multi-factor analysis may be involved, however, will not [while][i]n the failure to warn context, the obvious nature of prevent a defective design claim involving a simple tool from the simple product’s potential danger serves the core purpose being decided as a matter of law where reasonable minds of the claim.” Glittenberg, 441 Mich. at 394, 491 N.W.2d at could not differ as to the outcome. See Kirk, 16 F.3d at 709 215 (quoted in full supra at ____).3 Mallard also discounts (noting the appropriateness of summary judgment “where the facts were clear and [there was] no genuine dispute as to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct”); Glittenberg, 2 Judge Kelly, in his concurrence in Ma llard, supported the view that 411 Mich. at 398-99, 491 N.W.2d at 217 (noting, in the a “reaso nableness” analysis should be ap plied in design defect cases context of a failure to warn claim, that a jury must consider involving simple tools. See Ma llard, 222 Mich. App. at 145, 564 N.W.2d the obviousness of the risk only “if reasonable minds could at 78 (Kelly, J., concurring). Judge Kelly stated, “I write separately differ” with respect to the outcome); Boumelhelm, 211 Mich. because I question the analysis in Fisher. Even where the product is a at 183, 535 N.W.2d at 578 (noting the propriety of the risk- simple one, a manufacturer should be held to a standard of reasonable care. The obviousness of the risk is only one factor that should be utility test but affirming grant of summary judgment under considered.” Id. the circumstances); Adams, 198 Mich. App. at 14, 497 N.W.2d at 520 (same); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. 3 Ma llard argues that the court in Glittenberg could not be endorsing Liab. § 2 (1998) (“A court may direct a verdict when it is a reasonableness analysis in design defect cases, despite its clear convinced that, given the obviousness of the danger, it is not language, because it expressly noted that its holding was not a departure reasonable to require the adopting of an alternative design.”). from Ow ens. Ma llard, 222 Mich. App. at 142, 564 N.W .2d at 77. The significance of this fact is baffling given that Ow ens found that the app licable test is “whether the risks were unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries.” Owens, 414 M ich. at 425, 326 N.W.2d at 377. Ma llard’s response to our criticism is that the court in Owens too could and in any case, as our discussion of Kirk dem onstrates, Fisher is not not be endorsing a reaso nableness analysis in design defect cases, d espite inconsistent with the reasonableness analysis discussed in Ow ens. See its arguably even clearer language, because it expressly ratified Fisher. supra at ____. Therefore, we find that the chain of tenuous inferences Mallard, 222 M ich. App. at 142 n.5, 564 N.W .2d at 77 n.5. However, Ma llard uses to d iscount the clea r langua ge of the Michigan Supreme Fisher involve d a failure to warn claim ra ther than a design defect claim Court is unpersuasive. No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 11 12 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
In sum, whether the danger associated with a simple tool is failed to demonstrate that an air rifle is anything but a “simple “open and obvious” will determine whether a manufacturer tool.” owes a duty to warn and is also an important factor in deciding a design defect claim. This inquiry requires us to C. Is the danger alleged here to be associated with a Daisy address two questions. First, is a Daisy air rifle a “simple air rifle “open and obvious”? tool” under Michigan law? Second, if so, is the danger alleged to be associated with a Daisy air rifle “open and The second question, whether the danger associated with a obvious”? Daisy air rifle is “open and obvious,” is more difficult. In answering this question, “[t]he focus is the typical user’s B. Is an air rifle a “simple tool”? perception and knowledge of whether the relevant condition or feature that creates the danger associated with use is fully Michigan caselaw does not provide a clear test for apparent, widely known, commonly recognized, and determining whether a product is a “simple tool.” However, anticipated by the ordinary user or consumer.” Glittenberg, the courts have categorized products as simple tools when one 411 Mich. at 391-92, 419 N.W.2d at 213 (emphasis added); or both of the following conditions exist: (1) the products are Adams, 198 Mich. App. at 12-13, 497 N.W.2d at 519 (same); not highly mechanized, thus allowing the users to maintain Kirk, 16 F.3d at 710 (finding that the danger of lighters is control over the products; (2) the intended use of the products obvious “to their intended users”); Prosser & Keeton, Torts, does not place the users in obviously dangerous positions. § 96, 686-87 (5th ed. 1984) (“[C]ourts have usually meant by Davis, 226 F.3d at 511-12. For example, courts have found ‘obvious danger’ a condition that would ordinarily be seen hammers, knives, gas stoves, axes, buzz saws, propeller and the danger of which would ordinarily be appreciated by driven airplanes, trampolines and backyard pools to be simple those who would be expected to use the product.”). tools. Id. We have also found guns to be simple tools. Id.; see also Treadway v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 950 F. Supp. In this case, Swix amended his complaint one week before 1326, 1335-36 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that a .38 caliber the district court granted Daisy’s motion to dismiss to allege revolver is a simple tool). As far as we are aware, no that “[d]efendant’s primary marketing target (and principle Michigan court has specifically considered whether an air [sic] consumers) was/were children and young adults.” App. rifle or BB gun, as opposed to a firearm, is a “simple tool.” at 111, 113. In essence, Swix has alleged that the typical or Fortunately, this is the easier of the two questions which we intended users of the Daisy air rifle are children.4 We believe must answer. Swix does not argue that an air rifle is more that the district court was unaware of this amendment at the “highly mechanized” than other guns. Similarly, the intended time it granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which may use of an air rifle does not appear to place the user in a explain its holding. significantly different position than users of firearms. In short, Swix’s complaint does not even attempt to distinguish This allegation is crucial in that it distinguishes this case an air rifle from a firearm in any way relevant to the from every Michigan case which holds that the dangers determination of whether it is a “simple tool.” Although Swix argues that an air rifle can mislead the operator into 4 believing it is empty when it is actually loaded, we have noted According to the affidavit of W illiam F. K itzes, Swix’s expert, a the same to be true of a firearm. See Davis, 226 F.3d at 512. September 1975 study commissioned by Daisy found that the median age of purchasers of Daisy Power Line guns was twelve years old. App. at Therefore, we agree with the district court that Swix has 91. No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 13 14 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
associated with guns or other products intended for adults Liab. § 2 (1998) (“In some contexts, products intended for were “open and obvious.” These cases all applied an special categories of users, such as children, may require “objective reasonable adult standard,” not because it was an more vivid and unambiguous warnings.”). “The test to adult who was using the product which caused injury, but determine whether a danger is obvious is an objective one, not because the product in question was intended for and typically dependent upon the actual knowledge of the user, or his actual used by adults. See Treadway, 950 F. Supp. at 1336 awareness of the danger. It is the knowledge and realization (applying an “objective and reasonable adult standard” in a of the danger that would be possessed by the ordinary products liability case involving a gun); Adams, 198 Mich. consumer who purchases or uses the product . . . . If the App. at 13, 497 N.W.2d at 519 (“Notwithstanding Bic’s product is one customarily used by children, the danger must acknowledgment that it was foreseeable . . . that lighters could be one which children would be likely to recognize and get into and were getting into the hands of children, the appreciate in order to prevent them from recovering for a typical user of a lighter is an adult.”); Kirk, 16 F.3d at 710 product related injury on the grounds that the danger was (noting that lighters are “manufactured for and sold to, adult open and obvious.” W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products users . . . . [In contrast,] [a] manufacturer who bypasses Liability § 196 (1979). adults, upon whom the law ordinarily places responsibility, and markets a simple, but dangerous, tool directly to children Therefore the question presented here is whether the may not avoid liability on the ground that the child ‘should reasonable child of whatever age the typical user of a Daisy have known better.’”). air rifle is determined to be would know that it would be dangerous to aim the rifle at another and click the trigger, If the typical user of a Daisy air rifle is a child, which we even after going through the process of emptying and testing must presume to be true on a motion to dismiss, an objective the rifle that Porritt allegedly went through in this case. reasonable child standard must apply. See Kirk, 16 F.3d at Given that this question has not yet been answered by any 710; Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 448-49, 254 N.W.2d Michigan court and given that reasonable minds could differ 759, 769 (Mich. 1977) (“One has no right to demand of a as to the answer, we believe this question is not particularly child, or of any other person known to be wanting in ordinary appropriate for determination as a matter of law.5 See, e.g., judgment or discretion, a prudence beyond his years or capacity.”); Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 285 Pa. Super. 320, 427 A.2d 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (applying a reasonable child 5 Daisy also makes the argument that it had no duty to warn in this standard to a products liability case involving a Daisy air case as a matter of law, based on Ma llard, in which the court mentioned rifle), vacated on other grounds, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 that “if a child is capable of understanding a warning, the dangerous (Pa. 1982); Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, condition would be obvious to the child, rendering the warning 119 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying Sherk); cf. Mallard v. Hoffinger unnecessary.” 210 Mich. App. at 285-86, 533 N.W.2d at 2; Opp. Br. at Indus., Inc., 210 Mich. App. 282, 286, 533 N.W.2d, 13 (Mich. 20-21. This argument is without merit. The court in Ma llard did not establish a general rule that there is no duty to warn children. The point Ct. App. 1995), vacated in part on other grounds, 451 Mich. Ma llard was making was context specific. In Ma llard, a young child 884, 549 N.W.2d 573 (Mich. 1996) (“Because the dived into a p ool and hit his head on the botto m. T he co urt app arently determination of the obvious nature of the danger is an believed that the danger was so open and obvious in that case that any objective one that focuses on the typical pool user . . . we are child old enough to understand the warning would necessarily be ca pab le unable to distinguish this case from Glittenberg on the basis of perceiving the danger on his o wn. In contrast, it is quite possible that a twelve year old might not understand that an “empty” B B gun could still of the victim’s age.”); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. discharge without an actual warning to such effect. In any case, given No. 02-2154 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. 15 16 Swix, et al. v. Daisy Mfg. Co. No. 02-2154
Glittenberg, 411 Mich. at 399, 491 N.W.2d at 217 (“If . . . the N.W.2d 477, 549-50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). In Farm Bureau, court determines that reasonable minds could differ, the the court noted that in negligence cases involving children, obviousness of the risk must be determined by the jury.”); the reasonable child standard would apply unless the child is Moning, 400 Mich. at 447, 254 N.W.2d at 769 (“The issue engaged in an adult activity. Id. at 477, 547. The defendant whether the defendants are subject to liability cannot properly argued that starting camp fires was an adult activity because be taken from the jury on the supposition that an 11 year old it generally requires adult supervision and the child involved boy knows how a slingshot operates and therefore appreciates was told that he had to be supervised. Id. at 479, 549-50. The the risk.”); Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 A. D. 114, 117, 243 court declined, however, to depart from the usual standard, N.Y.S. 496, 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930), aff’d by, 255 N.Y. noting that many activities should be done with adult 624, 175 N.E. 341 (1931) (“A product designed to be used by supervision, but this does not make them adult activities. Id. adults who may be expected to exercise care may not be at 479, 550. Similarly, while there is no question that an air dangerous, but when intended to be placed in the hands of rifle should be used with adult supervision, the complaint inexperienced children who may seek to enlarge their alleges that the typical user of a BB gun is a child, so that is knowledge by experimentation of various and sometimes the standard the district court must apply. unexpected character, it may be a source of peril.”) (quoted by Moning).6 Moreover, a manufacturer has a duty to protect against foreseeable misuses. Moning, 400 Mich. at 439; 254 N.W.2d Finally, though it might conceivably support a comparative at 765; Bordeax v. Celotex Corp., 203 Mich. App. 158, 167, negligence defense, the fact that Daisy intended that its air 511 N.W.2d 899, 905 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). It is certainly rifle be used under the direct supervision of an adult and that foreseeable that a twelve year old child will on occasion use Swix’s grandfather had the same rule does not alter the a BB gun which was purchased for his use, without direct “reasonable child standard” that applies in this case. See supervision, or that any supervision will be inadequate to Farm Bureau Ins. Group v. Phillips, 116 Mich. App. 544, 323 protect against a split-second decision by the minor to aim at another. See, e.g., Moning, 400 Mich. at 439, 254 N.W.2d at 765 (“A manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer of slingshots can be expected to foresee that they will be used to propel that the typical user of a pool is not a young child, the court in Ma llard applied a reasonable adult standard and therefore the case is not pellets and that a person within range may be struck.”). app licable here. Id. at 13. III 6 W e note that in Me nard v. Newh all, 135 Vt. 53, 55, 373 A.2d 505, 507 (Vt. 1977), the court stated: “A BB gun which is neither defectively Therefore, for the reasons discussed supra, we reverse the designed nor manufactured is not dangerous beyo nd that which would be district court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss and contemplated by the ordinary consumer with the ordinar y knowledge remand this case to the district court for further proceedings common to the community. A warning by the defendant Daisy that a BB not inconsistent with this opinion. gun, if fired at a person, could injure an eye, is nothing that even a seven- year-old child does not already know.” Id. However, in Menard, there was no allegation that the air rifle was defectively designed nor was it argued that the child who fired the gun was under any misapprehension about whether the gun would discharge. The plaintiff was simply arguing in that case that Daisy should have provided a warning that the gun was dangero us.