Swinson v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 5, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-02694·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RANDY E. SWINSON, Plaintiff(s), -against- 20-CV-2694 (LLS) CITY OF NEW YORK; JANE DOE, NYCDOCCS MAILROOM OFFICER; JOHN ORDER TO AMEND DOE, NYCDOCCS MAILROOM OFFICER; JANE DOE, NYCDOCCS MAILROOM OFFICER, WARDEN, MDC, Defendant(s). LOUIS L. STANTON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently detained in the Manhattan Detention Complex, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.1 By order dated July 24, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

1 Plaintiff filed this action with an incomplete request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). By order dated April 1, 2020, Chief Judge McMahon directed Plaintiff to pay the filing fees or submit a completed and signed amended IFP application. Plaintiff filed an amended IFP application on May 4, and May 18, 2020. (ECF Nos. 5 and 6.) 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Randy E. Swinson alleges that “on or around Feb. 4th, 2020,” his “In-going and Out-going Regular & Legal Correspondence has not reach[ed] its destination.” (ECF No. 2 at 4.) He alleges that he is not able to contact his attorney, and that his attorney is not able to contact him. Plaintiff asked one Jane Doe mailroom person about his mail, and she told him, “you’ll get

it when you get out.” (Id.) He asserts that four employees assigned to the mailroom “directly participated in the wrong or knew about the wrong, failed to oversee or created a policy that allowed the wrong to occur.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he has “no access to the court or Family Court where I’m fighting a illegal judgement against me.” (Id.). Plaintiff also asserts that his family can’t contact him. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. DISCUSSION A. Mail Interference Claims A prisoner’s First Amendment rights encompass the right to “adequate, effective and meaningful” access to the courts and to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). “[C]ourts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail, as well as

greater protection to outgoing mail than to incoming mail.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)). Plaintiff’ s allegations concerning his mail implicates both an access-to-courts claim and a general mail tampering claim. Access-to-courts Claim Prisoners have “a constitutional right of access to the courts [that] gives rise to a number of derivative rights, including the right to access legal materials to prepare a case, and the right of indigent inmates to be provided with paper and pens to draft legal documents and stamps to mail them.” Collins v. Goord, 581 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Bounds, 420 U.S. at 824-28). Protecting these rights “require[] prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d

88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Bounds, 420 U.S. at 821, 828). But assistance from prison authorities is “only the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Access to the courts does not require prison authorities to furnish inmates with unlimited access to any and all resources that might support a prisoner in presenting his legal claim. Id. at 355.

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