Swift Instruments, Inc. v. United States

554 F. Supp. 1235, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 88, 4 C.I.T. 88, 1982 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 2005
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 23, 1982
DocketCourt 74-11-03087
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 554 F. Supp. 1235 (Swift Instruments, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swift Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1235, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 88, 4 C.I.T. 88, 1982 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 2005 (cit 1982).

Opinion

WATSON, Judge:

This action, tried before Judge Scovel Richardson, challenges the denial of a protest against the classification of certain merchandise as “unfinished compound optical microscopes” under TSUS items 708.71, 708.72 and 708.73 (TSUS items 708.71-73). 1 The merchandise can be roughly described as having the appearance of microscopes without lenses. In classifying the merchandise, defendant utilized General Interpretative Rule 10(h) of the General Headnotes to the Tariff Schedules, which provides that unless the context requires otherwise, a tariff description for an article covers such article, whether assembled or not assembled, and whether finished or not finished. Plaintiff contends that the imported merchandise is properly classified under TSUS item 708.80 providing for “frames and mountings, and parts” of compound optical microscopes. 2

In support of this proposition, plaintiff relies on the case of Olympus Corporation of America v. United States, 72 Cust.Ct. 177, C:D. 4538 (1974), which held that rule 10(h) was inapplicable to similar microscope components and that they were properly classified under TSUS item 708.80. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that even if TSUS items 708.71-73 do provide for unfinished microscopes, the imported microscope components are not unfinished under the *1237 criteria for determining whether merchandise is unfinished as set forth in Daisy Heddon, Div. Victor Comptometer Corp. v. United States, 66 CCPA 97, C.A.D. 1228, 600 F.2d 799 (1979).

Insofar as plaintiff’s argument presumes that TSUS items 708.71-73 do not provide for unfinished microscopes, it is unsupported by the legislative history of these provisions and case law.

Paragraph 228(b) 3 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the predecessor to TSUS items 708.-71-73, explicitly provided for unfinished microscopes. Although TSUS items 708.71-73 of the Tariff Classification Study, Proposed Revised TSUS, p. 544 (1960) enlarged and more comprehensively defined the types of optical instruments which could be classified as microscopes, the tariff treatment of what was classified as microscopes remained the same. Duty continued to be assessed at the rate of 45 percent ad valorem, and TSUS items 708.71-73 continued to provide for unfinished compound optical microscopes.

The latter conclusion follows naturally from the legislative scheme intended by Congress when it adopted the General Interpretative Rules and in particular rule 10(h), as part of the General Headnotes to the Tariff Schedules. Rule 10(h) has general applicability to the Tariff Schedules. It assures that tariff provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 providing for unfinished articles, and those that do not, which were in some form incorporated in the Tariff Schedules would be construed to encompass the unfinished article, unless the context required otherwise. J. Gerber & Co. v. United States, 62 CustCt. 368, 370, C.D. 3773, 298 F.Supp. 516, 518 (1971), aff’d, 58 CCPA 110, C.A.D. 1013, 436 F.2d 1390 (1971). When the historical antecedent of a tariff provision encompasses the unfinished article, and there is no manifestation of intent in the schedule, paragraph or subparagraph headnotes to the current tariff provision not to provide for the unfinished article, it is logical to conclude that rule 10(h) does apply to the provision.

Furthermore, Olympus Corporation of America v. United States, does not stand for the general proposition that rule 10(h) does not apply to TSUS items 708.71-73. In that case the Court was faced with an importation of microscope parts identical to those in issue here, except that the importation did not include specimen stages. Under the then prevailing rule of decision, the Court reasoned that “an imported article, lacking the vital components that characterize or comprise a compound optical microscope, is not classifiable as a compound optical microscope unfinished, in competition with a tariff provision classifying the individual entities of which the assembled article is comprised.” Olympus at 178, n. 5 [emphasis added]. This rule of decision is no longer valid in light of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decision in Daisy Heddon.

There it was argued that the rule stated in Authentic Furniture Products, Inc. v. United States, 68 Cust.Ct. 204, C.D. 4362, 343 F.Supp. 1372 (1972) aff’d. 61 CCPA 5, C.A.D. 1109, 486 F.2d 1062 (1973) that the “... absence of a substantial or essential part precludes classification as the unfinished article itself,” required reversal of the lower court decision. The lower court’s decision was affirmed. The “essential part” rule was explicitly overruled, and the proper basis for determining whether merchandise is to be classified under competing Tariff Schedule provisions as an unfinished article or as parts of the article was made clear.

If, as appellant argues, the omission of a part essential to the use of the eo nomine designated article would prevent classification as the article in an unfin *1238 ished condition, there would be, in practical effect, no such thing as an unfinished article, since the omission of virtually any part from an otherwise complete article would prevent its use in the manner intended. See Authentic Furniture Products, 61 CCPA at 8, 486 F.2d at 1064^65 (Miller, J., dissenting). Such is clearly not the intent of Congress, as evidenced by the very existence of General Interpretative Rule 10(h).
Further, the result in Authentic Furniture Products does not merely depend on the “essential” nature, be it functional or commercial, of the omitted side rails. It is abundantly clear from the opinion of the Customs Court, which was approved by this court, that the basis of the decision in that case was that “it is the determination of the court that the importations do not constitute a substantially complete article.” 68 Cust.Ct. at 215, 343 F.Supp. at 1380. Such a determination does not depend merely on the presence or absence of an “essential” part. Daisy Heddon at 802 [emphasis added].

Since rule 10(h) is applicable to TSUS items 708.71-73 and they do provide for unfinished microscopes, it is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether the imported components are substantially complete.

That determination is properly made by considering the circumstances surrounding each particular importation to determine the significance of what has been omitted, and the efforts necessary to place the completed article into the flow of commerce. Daisy Heddon suggests five factors that may be relevant to such a determination.

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554 F. Supp. 1235, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 88, 4 C.I.T. 88, 1982 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 2005, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swift-instruments-inc-v-united-states-cit-1982.