Sweet v. Hadco

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 18, 1996
• Docket: CV-95-576-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Sweet v . Hadco CV-95-576-M 01/18/96 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Debora Sweet, Plaintiff, v. Civil N o . 95-576-M Hadco Corporation, and Robert Breton, Defendant.

O R D E R

Alleging sexual harassment, plaintiff, Debora Sweet, brings

this action against defendants, Hadco Corporation ("Hadco") and

Robert Breton, under Title V I I , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Sweet

also brings supplemental state law causes of action. Hadco moves

to dismiss Sweet's state law causes of action, arguing that they

are barred by New Hampshire's workers' compensation law. For the

reasons discussed below, Hadco's motion to dismiss is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Sweet's federal and state law causes of action arise out of alleged sexual harassment on the part of Hadco and its employee, Robert Breton. Counts I , I I , and III of Sweet's complaint are founded on Title VII and are not the subject of Hadco's motion to dismiss. Count IV of Sweet's complaint alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress on the part of defendants.

Count V alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress by

defendants. Count VI seeks enhanced compensatory damages for the

actions complained of in Counts IV and V .

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is one of

limited inquiry, focusing not on "whether a plaintiff will

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v . Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974). In considering a motion to dismiss, "the

material facts alleged in the complaint are to be construed in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff and taken as admitted,

with dismissal to be ordered only if the plaintiff is not

entitled to relief under any set of facts he could prove."

Chasan v . Village District of Eastman, 572 F. Supp. 5 7 8 , 579

(D.N.H. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 745 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1984)

(citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION A. Count IV - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

2 Count IV alleges that, through a series of actions that

culminated in Sweet's constructive discharge, Hadco committed the

common-law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Hadco contends that New Hampshire's workers' compensation law,

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8, bars an employee from bringing

common-law actions for injuries arising out of the employment

relationship.

New Hampshire law contains an "exclusivity provision" which

reads: An employee of an employer . . . shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of this chapter and . . . to have waived all rights of action whether at common law or by statute or provided under the laws of any state or otherwise: (a) Against the employer . . . .

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8(I) (Supp. 1994). This exclusivity provision unquestionably bars employees from maintaining common-

law causes of action against their employers for personal

injuries arising out of the employment relationship. O'Keefe v .

Associated Grocers, 120 N.H. 8 3 4 , 835, 424 A.2d 199, 201 (1980);

Censullo v . Brenka Video, Inc., 989 F.2d 4 0 , 43 (1st Cir. 1993)

(interpreting New Hampshire's workers' compensation l a w ) ; Miller

v . CBC Companies, N o . CV-95-24-SD, slip o p . (D.N.H. Nov. 2 9 ,

3 1995); Frechette v . Wal-Mart Stores, N o . CV-94-430-JD, slip o p .

(D.N.H. Sept. 2 6 , 1995).

This court has interpreted the workers' compensation statute

to prohibit suits against an employer for both intentional and

non-intentional torts. Miller, supra; Bartholomew v . Delhaye,

N o . CV-95-20-B, slip o p . (D.N.H. Nov. 8 , 1995). More

specifically, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8 has consistently

been held to bar causes of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress brought by employees against employers.

Censullo, 989 F.2d at 4 3 ; Miller, supra; Bartholomew, supra;

Frechette; supra; Singleterry v . Nashua Cartridge Prod. Inc., N o .

CV-94-345-SD, slip o p . (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 1995); Kopf v . Chloride

Power Electronics, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1183, 1191 (D.N.H. 1995).

Therefore, New Hampshire's workers' compensation law bars Sweet's

claim against Hadco for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Accordingly, Count IV of Sweet's complaint is

dismissed as to Hadco.

B. Count V - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In her objection to Hadco's motion to dismiss, Sweet

concedes that, for the reasons discussed above in relation to

Count IV, her common-law claim against Hadco for negligent

4 infliction of emotional distress is barred by New Hampshire's

workers' compensation law. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8.

Accordingly, Count V of Sweet's complaint is also dismissed as to

Hadco.

C. Count VI - Enhanced Compensatory Damages

In Count VI of her complaint, Sweet claims she is entitled

to enhanced compensatory damages for injuries she suffered as a

result of the actions complained of in Counts IV and V . Under

New Hampshire law, a claim for enhanced compensatory damages is

not a cause of action; it is request for a particular remedy. A

plaintiff can recover enhanced compensatory damages when the

defendant's actions constitute a state law tort and are "wanton,

malicious, or oppressive." Munson v . Raudonis, 118 N.H. 4 7 4 ,

479, 387 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1978) (quoting Vratsenes v . N.H. Auto,

Inc., 112 N.H. 7 1 , 7 3 , 289 A.2d 6 6 , 68 (1972)).

Here, New Hampshire's workers' compensation law bars both of

Sweet's state law causes of action. Because she can bring no

underlying state law tort claim, Sweet may not seek enhanced

compensatory damages under New Hampshire law. Accordingly, Count

VI of Sweet's complaint is also dismissed as to Hadco.

5 IV. CONCLUSION

Because New Hampshire's workers' compensation law, N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8, bars Sweet's state law causes of action

against her employer, Hadco, for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the employment relationship, Counts IV and V of

Sweet's complaint are dismissed as to Hadco. Because Sweet's

state law causes of action fail, she may not seek enhanced

compensatory damages under New Hampshire law. Therefore, Count

Accordingly, Hadco's motion to dismiss Counts IV, V , and VI

(document n o . 8 ) is granted.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

January 1 8 , 1996

cc: James W . Craig, Esq. William H . Barry, I I I , Esq. Patricia Randall, Esq.