Sweeney v. Riverbay Corp.

76 A.D.2d 847, 907 N.Y.S.2d 214

This text of 76 A.D.2d 847 (Sweeney v. Riverbay Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sweeney v. Riverbay Corp., 76 A.D.2d 847, 907 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Howard R. Silver, J.), entered on or about August 13, 2008, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied, and the complaint reinstated.

Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries she sustained after tripping and falling over a garden hose that had been placed across the sidewalk in front of a building managed by defendant. Even assuming that the deposition testimony and photographs suggesting the hose was clearly visible from all directions compels the conclusion as a matter of law that the hazard was open and obvious (see Tagle v Jakob, 97 NY2d 165, 169 [2001]), the question remains whether defendant breached its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Westbrook v WR Activities-Cabrera Mkts., 5 AD3d 69, 72-73 [2004]).

We find that the hose stretching across the sidewalk constituted a tripping hazard (see e.g. Harris v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 24 AD3d 164 [2005] [overlapping sections of [848]*848carpet]; Westbrook at 75 [‘Tone 10-to-12-inch-high box in a supermarket aisle”]). Eric Harvey, who witnessed the accident, testified that the hose was stretched across the sidewalk at 8:30 a.m. when he came downstairs from his apartment. Plaintiffs verified bill of particulars and defendant’s complaint report fix the time of the accident at 9:10 a.m. and 9:12 a.m. respectively. Therefore, there is a basis for Harvey’s estimate that the hose had been on the sidewalk for approximately 30 minutes before the accident. Here, there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether the hose had been on the sidewalk for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident so as to permit its discovery and removal by defendant. Gordon v American Museum of Natural History (67 NY2d 836 [1986]), which the dissent cites, is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that anyone observed the dangerous condition prior to the accident (see e.g. Villaurel v City of New York, 59 AD3d 709, 711-712 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 704 [2009]). Defendant presented no evidence as to whether it had inspected or watered the area since the day before the accident, when its maintenance person was on duty. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Moskowitz, DeGrasse and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.

Catterson, J., dissents in a memorandum as follows: I must respectfully dissent because, in my opinion, 30 minutes is not sufficient time for the defendant to have had constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition of a garden hose stretched across a walkway on a 300-acre property. Therefore, I would affirm the order granting the defendant summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.

The following facts are undisputed: On or about August 3, 2005, at approximately 10:00 a.m., 74-year-old plaintiff Margaret Sweeney tripped and fell over a green garden hose that stretched across a cement sidewalk in Co-Op City in the Bronx. The residential community comprises 35 high-rise buildings, and seven townhouse clusters, located on 300 acres. The defendant, Riverbay Corporation, is the owner and manager of Co-Op City, and is responsible for the maintenance of the community..

At deposition, Sweeney testified that she noticed rotating sprinklers, to which the hose was attached. She also testified that although it was a dry and clear day, the sidewalk was wet from the spray of the sprinklers. At the time that Sweeney fell she was wearing flat shoes and carrying a purse. There was no one walking on the sidewalk. Sweeney asserts that she had an unobstructed view of the path in front of her and that she had no trouble with her vision, but claims that she did not see the hose before she tripped over it. She stated that it was only when she looked back, she saw that the hose was “spirally.”

[849]*849Eric Harvey, also a resident of Co-Op City, testified at deposition that he witnessed the accident from approximately 30 to 40 feet away. Harvey, an off-duty police officer, first swore in an affidavit prepared by the plaintiffs counsel that he saw the hose lying across the sidewalk about a half hour before the accident, but he did not inform any Riverbay worker about the presence of the hose. He also stated that the hose was the type which he has seen used by Riverbay. However, at his deposition, he testified that he was unfamiliar with the type of hose used by Riverbay and that he was not sure he saw the hose a full 30 minutes before the accident. Rather, he testified only that the hose may have been there a “little while.”

Osborne Pearson, the grounds maintenance supervisor for Riverbay, testified at deposition that neither the hose nor the sprinkler was owned by Riverbay. Mr. Pearson also testified that no Riverbay employee was assigned to any watering duties on the morning of the accident. He stated that Riverbay uses only straight stretch hoses, not coil and that Riverbay has a policy of ensuring that at least one maintenance person is present when a hose is running across the sidewalk. He further testified that while watering, the maintenance crew generally uses a caution sign or a cone. Mr. Pearson did not know how long the hose had been lying on the sidewalk prior to the accident.

Upon completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The court below granted the motion and dismissed the complaint finding that the hose stretched across the sidewalk was “easily observable” and thus “open and apparent.” As such, the court found it did not constitute a “dangerous hazard.” I would affirm, but for different reasons.

A court may conclude that a risk was open and obvious, as a matter of law, if the established facts compel such a conclusion on the basis of clear and undisputed evidence. (Tagle v Jakob, 97 NY2d 165, 169 [2001].) A danger is considered open and obvious if it would be seen by any passerby reasonably using his or her senses. {Tagle, 97 NY2d at 170.) The photographs of the hose taken on the day of the accident depict its open and obvious nature. The plaintiff had an unobstructed view of the sidewalk. Also, the hose could be seen from 25 feet away and was raised and coiled, rather than flat on the ground. The presence of the sprinklers and the fact that the sidewalk was-sodden on a sunny day are further evidence that any person reasonably using his or her senses would have been aware of the hose.

However, this does, not end the inquiry since it is well settled that an open and obvious condition only relieves the property owner of the duty to warn. The property owner still has a duty [850]*850to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, (See Westbrook v WR Activities-Cabrera Mkts., 5 AD3d 69, 71-73 [1st Dept 2004]; Meola v Metro Demolition Contr. Corp., 309 AD2d 653, 654 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]; MacDonald v City of Schenectady, 308 AD2d 125, 127 [3d Dept 2003].)

I would agree with the motion court that the garden hose was not inherently dangerous. The circumstances of this case are more analogous, in my opinion, to those found in Rivera v City of New York (57 AD3d 281 [1st Dept 2008]) than in Westbrook on which the majority relies. In Rivera, this Court found no dangerous condition when plaintiff fell over a plainly visible and illuminated speed bump spanning the width of the walkway. In Westbrook, the plaintiff tripped over a box while rounding a corner in a grocery store, and this Court found the plaintiff could have overlooked the hazard.

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Related

Tagle v. Jakob
763 N.E.2d 107 (New York Court of Appeals, 2001)
Lewis v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority
474 N.E.2d 612 (New York Court of Appeals, 1984)
Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History
492 N.E.2d 774 (New York Court of Appeals, 1986)
Westbrook v. WR Activities-Cabrera Markets
5 A.D.3d 69 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2004)
Harris v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
24 A.D.3d 164 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Mitchell v. City of New York
29 A.D.3d 372 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2006)
Mayer v. New York City Transit Authority
39 A.D.3d 349 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2007)
Rivera v. City of New York
57 A.D.3d 281 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
Villaurel v. City of New York
59 A.D.3d 709 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2009)
Lewis v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority
99 A.D.2d 246 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)
Cuddy v. Waldbaum, Inc.
230 A.D.2d 703 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)
MacDonald v. City of Schenectady
308 A.D.2d 125 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2003)
Meola v. Metro Demolition Contracting Corp.
309 A.D.2d 653 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
76 A.D.2d 847, 907 N.Y.S.2d 214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sweeney-v-riverbay-corp-nyappdiv-2010.