Swedlow v. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 5, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-00011·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SCOTT PATRICK SWEDLOW, Case No. 1:22-cv-00011-JLT-SKO Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF FIRST v. AMENDED COMPLAINT DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY and (Doc. 9) TWENTY-ONE DAY DEADLINE Defendants.

Scott Patrick Swedlow (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action against the Department of Treasury and Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) on January 3, 2022. (Doc. 1.) On March 7, 2022, the undersigned screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to state any cognizable claims. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff was granted thirty days to file an amended complaint to cure the identified deficiencies. (See id.) On March 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. (Doc. 9.) The first amended complaint is now before this Court for screening. Having considered the first amended complaint, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following screening order and findings and recommendations recommending that the first amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend, for lack of jurisdiction, and that this action be dismissed. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Plaintiff alleges that he filed for a stimulus payment but has not received the payment to which he is entitled. (Doc. 9 at 2.) He requests that the Court order the IRS to remit his stimulus payment in the amount of $3,208.60 in the form of a check, as opposed to a “debit card,” which he alleges “CDCR and many other correctional institutions are unable to process on behalf of incarcerated individuals. (Id.) A. CARES Act The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), codified in part at Section 6428 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6428, establishes a mechanism for the IRS to issue economic impact payments (“EIPs”) to eligible individuals in the form of a tax credit. Scholl v. Mnuchin (Scholl I), 489 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-16915, 2020 WL 9073361 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020). Under § 6428(a), eligible individuals may receive a tax credit in the amount of $1,200 ($2,400 if filing a joint return), plus $500 multiplied by the number of qualifying children. Scholl I, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 1020 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6424(a)). This amount is credited against the individual’s federal income tax for the year 2020. Id. For purposes of the CARES Act, an eligible individual is defined as “any individual” other than (1) a nonresident alien individual, (2) an individual who is allowed as a dependent deduction on another taxpayer’s return, or (3) an estate or trust. Id. at 1021 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6424(d)). Incarcerated persons are “eligible individuals” to receive EIPs under the CARES Act. Scholl v. Mnuchin (Scholl II), 494 F. Supp. 3d 661, 689 (N.D. Cal. 2020) The CARES Act provides that “each individual who was an eligible individual for such individual’s first taxable year beginning in 2019 shall be treated as having made a payment against the tax imposed by chapter 1 for such taxable year in an amount equal to the advance refund amount for such taxable year.” Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6428(f)(1)). Therefore, the Act provides that “if an eligible individual filed a tax return in 2018 or 2019 or filed one of the enumerated Social Security forms, then the Act directs the IRS to treat those taxpayers as eligible for an advance refund of the tax credit.” Id. Congress provided that “[n]o refund or credit shall be made or allowed under this subsection after December 31, 2020.” 26 U.S.C. § 6428(f)(3)(A). The CARES Act also has a reconciliation provision between the advance refund and the tax credit such that if a taxpayer receives an advance refund of the tax credit, then the amount of CARES Act delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to “prescribe such regulations or other guidance as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, including any such measures as are deemed appropriate to avoid allowing multiple credits or rebates to a taxpayer.” 26 U.S.C. § 6428(h). B. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the United States consents to be sued in the district court for refund of taxes. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). However, the United States consents to be sued for a tax refund only where the taxpayer has followed the conditions set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), which states: “No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or ill

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Swedlow v. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

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