Swartzman v. Socol Realty Co.

233 A.D. 374, 253 N.Y.S. 332, 1931 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11301
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedNovember 6, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 233 A.D. 374 (Swartzman v. Socol Realty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swartzman v. Socol Realty Co., 233 A.D. 374, 253 N.Y.S. 332, 1931 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11301 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1931).

Opinion

Martin, J.

This case presents for review the construction of a municipal ordinance (Code of Ordinances of City of New York, chap. 23, § 164). The infant plaintiff tripped and fell down a cellar stairway in front of premises known as No. 910 Intervale avenue, borough of Bronx, city of New York, while walking along the street with his mother.

The question now arises whether the defendant is hable for negligence because the municipal ordinance, under certain circumstances, required a chain or door to be placed at the entrance to the cellar steps to prevent the happening of accidents. The ordinance provides that when such steps are not covered, they shall be inclosed [375]*375with a railing on each side permanently constructed from three to three and one-half feet high, with a gate to open inwardly or with two iron chains across the front of the entranceway, one near the top and one in the center of the railing, to be closed during the night, unless there be a burning light over the steps.

The defendant contends that if a light is placed as directed by the ordinance, a door or chains are not required, and in a case where a door or chains are provided, the entranceway may be left open during the day time but must be closed at night. The plaintiffs contend that at all times a door or chains are required and the entranceway must be kept closed during the day time.

The trial court charged the jury as follows: If you find that the entrance to this stairway was not guarded or protected at the time the accident is alleged to have taken place, you may take that as an element to be considered by you upon the question of whether or not the defendant was guilty of any ngeligence.”

The court was then asked to charge the jury that the stairway shown in the exhibit complied with the ordinance. The court refused to so charge. Counsel for defendant then asked the court to charge that the fact that there was an absence of chains across the front of the stairway in the day time did not create a negligent condition under the ordinance. This the court also refused to charge. There were several other requests to charge which presented this subject to the court. The refusal to charge these - requests was error.

This ordinance was before the court in Greenberg v. Schlanger (229 N. Y. 120). The court there said: “ Under the evidence offered any negligence consisted either in the absence of chains or gates; in the height of the riser above the walk, or in the fact that the stairway projected into the street for five inches. The first question may be eliminated. It is true that although the city ordinance upon which the plaintiff relies was not offered in evidence, as the case was tried in New York we may take judicial notice of it. (L. 1917, chap. 382.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kowalchick v. Reshin
146 Misc. 770 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 1933)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
233 A.D. 374, 253 N.Y.S. 332, 1931 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swartzman-v-socol-realty-co-nyappdiv-1931.