Swanson v. Village of Shickley

Nebraska Supreme Court

Swanson v. Village of Shickley

251 N.W. 821, 125 Neb. 664, 1933 Neb. LEXIS 273

CourtNebraska Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 13, 1933

DocketNo. 28888

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 251 N.W. 821 (Swanson v. Village of Shickley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Swanson v. Village of Shickley, 251 N.W. 821, 125 Neb. 664, 1933 Neb. LEXIS 273 (Neb. 1933).

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Opinion

Day, J.

This is a compensation case which was argued at the same session as Duering v. Village of Upland, ante, p. 659. The notice in that case was not given within seven days from the order of the compensation commissioner. The defendant (employer) filed a special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the court, because the notice of intention to appeal had not been filed with the compensation commissioner within seven days as provided by subdivision g, sec. 48-157, Comp. St. 1929. The intention of the legislature as gleaned from the entire compensation act is that cases arising under it may be speedily determined. To accomplish this purpose, the legislature has the power to limit the time within which an appeal may be taken. 3 C. J. 1040. Since the power resides in the legislature, the language used is unequivocal and unambiguous: “Every order and award * * * shall be binding * * * unless notice of intention to appeal * * * has been filed with the compensation commissioner within seven days.”

Much is said in the brief about the required notice being posted within the seven days. Posting is not filing within the meaning of the statute. State v. Harsh, 120 [665]*665Neb. 287; State v. Marsh, 120 Neb. 296; Larson v. Wegner, 120 Neb. 449.

Other questions raised here are identical with those disposed of in Duering v. Village of Upland, supra, and, in conformity to that opinion, it follows that the trial court was right in, sustaining the special appearance.

Affirmed.

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Day, J.

This is a compensation case which was argued at the same session as Duering v. Village of Upland, ante, p. 659. The notice in that case was not given within seven days from the order of the compensation commissioner. The defendant (employer) filed a special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the court, because the notice of intention to appeal had not been filed with the compensation commissioner within seven days as provided by subdivision g, sec. 48-157, Comp. St. 1929. The intention of the legislature as gleaned from the entire compensation act is that cases arising under it may be speedily determined. To accomplish this purpose, the legislature has the power to limit the time within which an appeal may be taken. 3 C. J. 1040. Since the power resides in the legislature, the language used is unequivocal and unambiguous: “Every order and award * * * shall be binding * * * unless notice of intention to appeal * * * has been filed with the compensation commissioner within seven days.”

Much is said in the brief about the required notice being posted within the seven days. Posting is not filing within the meaning of the statute. State v. Harsh, 120 [665]*665Neb. 287; State v. Marsh, 120 Neb. 296; Larson v. Wegner, 120 Neb. 449.

Other questions raised here are identical with those disposed of in Duering v. Village of Upland, supra, and, in conformity to that opinion, it follows that the trial court was right in, sustaining the special appearance.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

251 N.W. 821, 125 Neb. 664, 1933 Neb. LEXIS 273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swanson-v-village-of-shickley-neb-1933.

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