Swan View Coalition v. Chip Weber

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 7, 2019
Docket19-35004
StatusUnpublished

This text of Swan View Coalition v. Chip Weber (Swan View Coalition v. Chip Weber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swan View Coalition v. Chip Weber, (9th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 7 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SWAN VIEW COALITION; FRIENDS OF No. 19-35004 THE WILD SWAN, INC.; NATIVE ECOSYSTEMS COUNCIL; ALLIANCE D.C. No. 9:13-cv-00129-DWM FOR THE WILD ROCKIES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM*

v.

CHIP WEBER, Flathead National Forest Supervisor; FAYE KRUEGER, Regional Forester of Region One of the U.S. Forest Service; UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, an agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 10, 2019 Seattle, Washington

Before: BERZON and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,** District

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants (collectively, “Swan View”) appeal the district court’s

rulings rejecting various challenges to the U.S. Forest Service’s Glacier Loon

Project (the “project”). For the reasons below, we affirm in part but remand to the

district court for further proceedings concerning whether the Forest Service plans

to abide by certain restrictions imposed by the Swan Valley Grizzly Bear

Conservation Agreement (the “Swan Valley Agreement”) beyond 2020.

1. Biological assessment for wolverines:

Because wolverines are proposed to be listed under the Endangered Species

Act and are present in the project area, the Forest Service had to determine whether

the project is “likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of the wolverine; if so,

the Forest Service was required to “confer” with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4). The Forest Service also had to “conduct a

biological assessment for the purpose of identifying any endangered species or

threatened species which is likely to be affected by” the project. Id. § 1536(c)(1).

Assuming that the statute’s “biological assessment” requirement applies to

species that are proposed to be listed, the Forest Service satisfied that requirement

** The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

2 here.1 Pursuant to its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332, the Forest Service analyzed the effects of the project

on wolverines, including effects on natal denning security, prey base, and overall

habitat security, as well as cumulative effects. The Forest Service concluded that

the project would “not likely contribute to a trend towards Federal listing or loss of

viability to the population or species,” and “would not result in a jeopardy

determination for the wolverine.” The NEPA documentation thus fulfilled the

purpose of the Act’s “biological assessment” requirement with respect to the

wolverine, a “proposed” species: It helped the Forest Service determine whether

the project was “likely to jeopardize the [wolverine’s] continued existence,” and

thus whether the agency had to confer with the Fish and Wildlife Service. 16

U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4); see id. § 1536(c)(1) (permitting agencies to undertake a

biological assessment “as part of [their] compliance with [NEPA]”).

1 The parties disagree about whether the Fish and Wildlife Service’s regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.12, which sets forth procedures for conducting a biological assessment, applies here, given that the project is not a “major construction activit[y],” id. § 402.12(b)(1). It may well be that the “major construction activities” language is not a broad limitation on the applicability of the regulation but an explanation of how the regulation applies to such activities in particular. If so, then the regulation does not relieve agencies of the obligation to conduct a biological assessment for actions other than “major construction activities.” See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, No. Civ. 03-00621 JMS/BMK, 2006 WL 2927121, at *5 (D. Haw. Oct. 11, 2006). The issue was not extensively briefed, however, and, given our conclusion that the Forest Service complied with the regulation if it applies, we need not decide the question.

3 Swan View argues that the regulation required the Forest Service to obtain

the Fish and Wildlife Service’s concurrence in the findings of the biological

assessment. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(j), (k)(1). In addition to the NEPA

documentation discussed above, the Forest Service prepared a programmatic

biological assessment that discussed the effects on wolverines of “projects

routinely conducted on National Forest System lands,” such as “Timber Harvest.”

The programmatic assessment cited the Fish and Wildlife Service’s proposed rule

to list wolverines as threatened under the Endangered Species Act, which

identified three threats to the species: climate change, trapping, and small

population size. 78 Fed. Reg. 7864, 7886 (Feb. 4, 2013). The proposed rule

concluded that there was no “evidence to suggest that land management

activities”—such as “timber harvest”—“are a threat to the conservation of the

species.” Id. at 7879. Based in part on that conclusion, the Forest Service

determined, in its programmatic assessment, that routine Forest Service activities,

including timber harvest, “(individually and/or cumulatively) are not considered a

threat to [the wolverine population] and are not likely to jeopardize the continued

existence” of the species. The Fish and Wildlife Service concurred in that

determination.

The Fish and Wildlife Service’s concurrence in the programmatic biological

assessment was sufficient in these circumstances to satisfy any concurrence

4 requirement prescribed by the regulation, assuming there is such a requirement.

See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(j), (k)(1). Unlike a biological assessment for listed

species—which ultimately must indicate whether those species “are likely to be

adversely affected by the action,” in which case the Fish and Wildlife Service must

prepare a biological opinion, id. § 402.12(k)(1); see id. § 402.14(a), (b), (g)—a

biological assessment for proposed species results in a determination whether the

action is “likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of the species, id.

§ 402.12(k)(1). In light of that distinct purpose, it is enough here that the Fish and

Wildlife Service concurred in the Forest Service’s determination that the types of

activities that comprise the project do not, individually or cumulatively, threaten

the wolverine population, and are therefore not likely to jeopardize its existence.

2. Effects on grizzly bears:

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Related

Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
295 F.3d 1209 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Christopher Savage
897 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Swan View Coalition v. Weber
52 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (D. Montana, 2014)

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