Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.

130 F.2d 391, 54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3104
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 29, 1942
DocketNo. 8943
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 130 F.2d 391 (Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 130 F.2d 391, 54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3104 (6th Cir. 1942).

Opinion

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint charging that certain intake manifolds used on the internal combustion engines of the appellee in its Dodge, Plymouth and De Soto automobiles infringe Swan patents 1,636,721 and 1,536,044. Claims 5 and 7 of patent 1,636,721, and claims 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 22 and 23 of patent [392]*3921,536,044 are in suit. The District Court found that none of the claims are infringed.

Both of these patents have been before this and other courts in prior litigation.1 We do not deem it necessary to enter into a prolonged discussion of the prior art or the theory of the Swan invention, which was upheld in this court upon the ground that Swan had solved the problem of the proper distribution of gasoline to the cylinders of the internal combustion engine. With the increase in the demand for motor fuel, gasoline was produced which contained large amounts of low volatile hydrocarbons. As a result, particles of unvaporized or liquid fuel gathered upon the sides of the manifold and caused unequal distribution to the cylinders. By the configuration of his manifold Swan created at specified points a turbulence in the fuel mixture so that the heavy particles of gasoline became revolatilized and a satisfactory mixture and substantially equal distribution resulted. It is the claim of appellant here that the accused devices achieve exactly the same results by creating a similar turbulence and that the devices hence infringe. Appellee contends and the District Court in effect held that while appellee’s manifolds secure satisfactory distribution of the fuel mixture they obtain this result by an entirely different means, name-' ly, through the application of heat to manifolds based upon the prior art, as exemplified by Matheson and Fiat. The use of heat had been the solution recommended for the problem in a committee report published in the Journal of the Society of Automotive Engineers for July, 1920, page 25, and while this method was not employed in practicable manner prior to the former cases, it is the contention of appellee that it uses this method of vaporization in the devices in suit.

Appellant urges that certain inter partes tests of appellee’s and other engines show that the accused devices have an operation identical with that of Swan; that numerous material findings of the District Court were erroneous, due to its misunderstanding of the evidence resulting from failure to observe these tests, and that the District Court, in finding non-infringement, has failed to follow the rulings of this and other courts with reference to infringement of the same patents by devices substantially identical with appellee’s manifolds.

Road tests covering hill climbing, fuel economy, and acceleration were conducted with great detail by both parties. In appellant’s tests the Dodge and Plymouth downdraft manifold was compared with the downdraft manifold of the Swan preferred form.2 The heating device, or “hotspot” used by appellee on all its manifolds was employed in all of appellant’s inter partes tests, not only upon the accused manifolds, but upon the Swan manifolds. In appellee’s tests the Dodge and Plymouth manifold was given road tests in comparison with manifolds constructed in exact conformity with the prior art, namely, [393]*393Matheson and Fiat, all equipped with exhaust heaters similar to those used in the accused devices. Dynamometer tests for power, torque and volumetric efficiency were also conducted by appellee upon an original Matheson engine, and an original Fiat engine using the original manifolds in comparison with manifolds of Swan’s preferred form, appellee’s heating means being applied in every case. In these tests all the manifolds compared are agreed by both parties to have achieved substantially the same results in performance and to have given good commercial distribution. This general statement must be qualified by the fact found by the District Court, that the volumetric efficiency of appellee’s engines decreased about ten per cent at the higher speeds with the application of heat.

We think that under this record the court’s absence from the tests in no way impairs the validity of its conclusions as to their significance. Since both parties admit that substantially identical performance was secured under all the inter partes tests, and since the District Court’s findings emphasized this fact, the circumstance that the District Court was absent when the tests were conducted is immaterial.

We are not impressed by the appellant’s contention that the substantially identical results secured by the operation of these various manifolds demonstrates infringement. All of the inter partes tests were conducted upon manifolds which were equipped with and employed appellee’s heating device, and the claims in suit do not provide for the use of any heating means. It is settled law that a claim for a result will not support a patent. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 19 Wall. 287, 86 U.S. 287, 22 L.Ed. 125; Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 48 S.Ct. 474, 72 L.Ed. 868. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 58 S.Ct. 899, 82 L.Ed. 1402. The securing of substantially the same result is only one element entering into the question. In absence of evidence that the result was secured by the same or equivalent means, the fact that the result is similar or even identical does not justify a holding of infringement.

It is not inconceivable that the same desirable result in vaporization of the heavy particles of gasoline secured by Swan’s peculiar form of manifold might be achieved by totally different means. The fact that Matheson and Fiat, which did not use heat, were classed as failures because they did not solve the problem does not require the conclusion that the problem never could be solved by the application of heat to Matheson and Fiat and that it has not been solved by appellee. The holding of this court that Swan solved the problem in one way does not exclude the conclusion that with the rapid advance of the automotive arts a similar result could be and was achieved through forms of manifolds theretofore found to be failures in handling a wet fuel mixture, to which an efficient and carefully controlled heating means is applied. The District Court found that appellee’s manifolds follow the prior art instead of Swan, that they secure efficient results in equally distributing the fuel mixture through the use of a “hot-spot” exhaust heat jacket at the junction of the header and riser, and that appellee’s manifolds are dependent upon this heating device for their satisfactory operation. Ex parte tests conducted by the appellant in which the operation of the heating means was modified or practically eliminated were relied upon to support a contrary conclusion. These tests were incomplete, and the District Court was free to accept appellee’s testimony, based on other tests, that appellee’s devices would not operate successfully without the application of heat.

Appellant argues that heating devices were used upon manifolds adjudicated in prior cases, and that a holding of non-infringement disregards the former holdings of this court. But the former cases involved totally different heating units.

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Bluebook (online)
130 F.2d 391, 54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swan-carburetor-co-v-chrysler-corp-ca6-1942.