S.V. v. County of Riverside

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 14, 2023
Docket5:23-cv-00860
StatusUnknown

This text of S.V. v. County of Riverside (S.V. v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S.V. v. County of Riverside, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 THE SEHAT LAW FIRM, PLC 2 Cameron Sehat, Esq. (SBN: 256535) Cameron@sehatlaw.com 3 5100 Campus Drive, Suite 200 4 Newport Beach, CA 92612 Telephone: (949) 825-5200 5 Email: cameron@sehatlaw.com 6 Attorney for Plaintiffs, S.V., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem 7 Elba Cervantes, Naomi Bravo and Esteban Viramontes 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 S.V., A Minor, Individually, And As ) Case No.: 5:23-cv-00860–SSS-KK ) 12 Personal Representative Of The Estate ) Of Cristian Viramontes, By And ) STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 13 Through Her Guardian Ad Litem, Elba ) ) ORDER 14 Cervantes; Naomi Bravo, Individually, ) [NOTE CHANGES BY ) COURT] 15 Esteban Viramontes, individually ) ) 16 Plaintiffs, ) ) 17 vs. ) ) 18 ) COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a ) 19 Governmental Agency; RIVERSIDE ) COUNTY SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO, ) 20 ) in his individual and official capacity, ) 21 Deputy DUNCAN, individually; DOES ) ) 22 1-3, DOES 4-6, and DOES 7-10, ) inclusive, 23 Defendants. 24 25 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 26 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 27 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 28 1 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation 2 may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the 3 Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties 4 acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all 5 disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from 6 public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that 7 are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The 8 parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3 (Filing Protected 9 Material), below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to a 10 file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the 11 procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a 12 party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 13 14 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 15 Defendants’ Statement of Good Cause: 16 1.1. Contentions re Harm from Disclosure of Confidential Materials. 17 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for 18 a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in 19 peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential 20 records for the following reasons. 21 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 22 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy 23 therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess 24 protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 25 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 26 27 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while 28 “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent 1 significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); 2 Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace 3 4 officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not 5 inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 6 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that 7 uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the 8 safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 9 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 10 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 11 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney- 12 client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the 13 personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace 14 officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal 15 deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the 16 purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially 17 including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs 18 type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or 19 reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 20 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; 21 22 Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092- 23 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San 24 Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 25 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 27 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file 28 records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records 1 pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to 2 result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of 3 4 third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law 5 enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest 6 discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode 7 a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures 8 that may be required. 9 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 10 rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is 11 contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release 12 of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los 13 Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 14 Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt 15 resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately 16 protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that 17 the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in 18 preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of 19 the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such 20 information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that 21 22 information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that 23 nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained 24 in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not 25 be part of the public record of this case. 26 27 28 1 2. DEFINITIONS 2 2.1 Action: S.V., a minor et al. v. County of Riverside, et al, 5:23-cv- 3 0860 SSS (KK) 4 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the 5 designation of information or items under this Order. 6 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless 7 of how it is generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for 8 protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above 9 in the Good Cause Statement. 10 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well 11 as their support staff).

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)

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S.V. v. County of Riverside, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sv-v-county-of-riverside-cacd-2023.