Suzuki v. Marinepolis USA, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 25-499
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAISAKU SUZUKI; KAZUYA OMOTO, No. 25-499 D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellants, 2:21-cv-01229-KKE v. MEMORANDUM* MARINEPOLIS USA, INC., an Oregon corporation; MARINEPOLIS CO LTD, a Japanese corporation; MITSUYOSHI INOHARA, an individual; ICHIRO MACHIDA, an individual,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Kymberly K. Evanson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 9, 2026** Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, PAEZ, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Plaintiffs-Appellants, Daisaku Suzuki and Kazuya Omoto (“Plaintiffs”)

appeal the district court’s order denying their motion to vacate the dismissal of

their lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and enforce their

settlement agreement with Marinepolis U.S.A. Inc., Marinepolis Co. Ltd.,

Mitsuyoshi Inohara, and Ichiro Machida (collectively, “Defendants”), after

Defendants breached the parties’ settlement agreement.

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we “review de novo

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading

Corp., 581 F.3d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 2009). We review for abuse of discretion the

district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the dismissal order under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188,

1191–92 (9th Cir. 2009). We reverse and remand with directions to grant

Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

1. We agree with the district court that it lacked ancillary jurisdiction to

enforce the settlement agreement, because the order of dismissal neither retained

jurisdiction nor “incorporat[ed] the terms of the settlement agreement.” Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).1 However, the

district court mischaracterized the nature of relief Plaintiffs sought. Plaintiffs’

1 As in O’Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1995), the district court also lacked an independent jurisdictional basis for enforcing the settlement agreement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381–82.

2 25-499 motion requested that the district court first vacate the dismissal order under Rule

60(b) and then enforce the settlement agreement. The district court retained

jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion. Because we ultimately

direct the district court to grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion, on remand the

district court must consider whether it may properly enforce the settlement

agreement after vacating the dismissal order. See All. for the Wild Rockies v.

Petrick, 68 F.4th 475, 490 n.4 (9th Cir. 2023) (stating that issues not previously

resolved are “better left for the district court in the first instance on remand”).

2. While Plaintiffs moved to vacate the dismissal order under Rule 60(b)(3)

and Rule 60(b)(6), the district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion solely on the basis of

Rule 60(b)(3). The district court’s failure to consider whether to vacate the

dismissal order under Rule 60(b)(6) was legal error. That is, the district court

failed to apply the “correct legal standard” and “to consider the factors relevant to

the exercise of its discretion” under Rule 60(b)(6). United States v. $11,500.00 in

U.S. Currency, 710 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013).

We exercise our discretion to “decide the merits of a Rule 60(b) motion in

the first instance on appeal,” because “all of the facts relevant to our analysis are

fully set forth in the record” and “this appeal presents unusual circumstances”

warranting timely resolution. Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir.

3 25-499 2009). We reverse and direct the district court to grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6)

motion on remand.

“Rule 60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power” that “affords courts

the discretion and power ‘to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate

to accomplish justice’” where there are “extraordinary circumstances.” Phelps,

569 F.3d at 1135 (citation omitted).

The circumstances in this case are “sufficiently extraordinary” that we

“perceive[]” Defendants’ conduct “as bad faith noncompliance” with the

settlement agreement and the litigation process, warranting vacatur of the dismissal

order under Rule 60(b)(6). Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Ass’n, 937 F.2d

408, 410–11 (9th Cir. 1991). Defendants’ “specific acts” frustrated the purpose of

the settlement agreement and were consistent with an attempt to evade judicial

process and their obligations under the agreement. Id. at 410–11. For instance, the

same day Defendants breached the settlement agreement, their U.S. counsel

informed Plaintiffs that he no longer represented Defendants and was not

authorized to accept service of process on their behalf, notwithstanding the clause

in the settlement agreement establishing his “irrevocabl[e]” authorization to accept

such service. Defendants failed to hire replacement counsel. In fact, in this

appeal, Defendants did not file an answering brief and altogether declined to

participate in these appellate proceedings.

4 25-499 Further, Defendants’ conduct is consistent with an attempt to force Plaintiffs

to pursue service of process under the Convention on the Service Abroad of

Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (“Hague Convention”) of a new breach of

contract action. It took Plaintiffs at least nine months to accomplish service of

process of this action under the Hague Convention. In turn, Defendants’

revocation of counsel’s authorization to accept service of process creates a

substantial “risk of injustice” to Plaintiffs, who have yet to receive any of the

money Defendants agreed to pay them in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit.

Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 123 (2017) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Services

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)). For these reasons, we reverse and

remand with directions to grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion.2

3. Plaintiffs’ request for fees is denied without prejudice. 9th Cir. R. 39–

1.6.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO GRANT

2 In light of our disposition, we need not address Plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(3) motion.

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