Suzuki Performance of Huntington, Ltd. v. Utica Mutual Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Suzuki Performance of Huntington, Ltd. v. Utica Mutual Insurance

121 A.D.2d 530, 504 N.Y.S.2d 25, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 58506

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 16, 1986

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 121 A.D.2d 530 (Suzuki Performance of Huntington, Ltd. v. Utica Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Suzuki Performance of Huntington, Ltd. v. Utica Mutual Insurance, 121 A.D.2d 530, 504 N.Y.S.2d 25, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 58506 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages, inter alia, for negligence, the defendant Long Island Lighting Company (hereinafter LILCO) appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.), dated May 9, 1985, as directed it to produce a named employee for a second deposition and to produce a knowledgeable employee to testify concerning certain expert reports.

Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Special Term acted properly in issuing the instant discovery order. LILCO’s arguments concerning the admissibility of such evidence at trial are premature. The rules governing disclosure differ from those concerning admissibility, and questions [531]*531of admissibility are to be reserved for the trial court (see, McKinney v State of New York, 111 Misc 2d 382, 387; Siegel, NY Prac § 344). Moreover, "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all evidence material «and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (see, CPLR 3101 [a]). Since the information sought by the plaintiff is material and relevant, it should be disclosed. Finally, we note that LILCO has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the information sought to be disclosed is privileged (see, Yannick v Tube City Iron & Metal Co., 77 AD2d 623). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages, inter alia, for negligence, the defendant Long Island Lighting Company (hereinafter LILCO) appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.), dated May 9, 1985, as directed it to produce a named employee for a second deposition and to produce a knowledgeable employee to testify concerning certain expert reports.

Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Special Term acted properly in issuing the instant discovery order. LILCO’s arguments concerning the admissibility of such evidence at trial are premature. The rules governing disclosure differ from those concerning admissibility, and questions [531]*531of admissibility are to be reserved for the trial court (see, McKinney v State of New York, 111 Misc 2d 382, 387; Siegel, NY Prac § 344). Moreover, "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all evidence material «and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (see, CPLR 3101 [a]). Since the information sought by the plaintiff is material and relevant, it should be disclosed. Finally, we note that LILCO has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the information sought to be disclosed is privileged (see, Yannick v Tube City Iron & Metal Co., 77 AD2d 623). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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121 A.D.2d 530, 504 N.Y.S.2d 25, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 58506, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/suzuki-performance-of-huntington-ltd-v-utica-mutual-insurance-nyappdiv-1986.

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