IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1902 Filed September 28, 2016
SUZANNE I. SCHLEIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TYLER KEINER, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Edward A.
Jacobson, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the district court’s ruling vacating a temporary
injunction. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Suzanne I. Schleis, Mapleton, appellant pro se.
Sabrina L. Saylor of Crary Huff Law Firm, Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Suzanne Schleis appeals from the district court’s order vacating a
temporary injunction that controlled the contact Tyler Keiner could have with
Suzanne and the parties’ minor child. Additionally, the order modified Tyler’s
child support obligation. On appeal, Suzanne maintains the district court abused
its discretion in vacating the injunction and the court should have made the
modification of the child support obligation retroactive to the date the application
was filed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
These parties have been involved in protracted litigation. We outline the
prior proceedings only where relevant.
The minor child was born in 2006. Per a 2009 court order, Suzanne and
Tyler shared legal custody of the minor child. Suzanne had physical care of the
child, and Tyler was to receive liberal parenting time.
In October 2010, Suzanne filed a petition for modification. A hearing on
the modification was held in September 2011.
Following the hearing on the modification but before an order was entered
on the matter, Suzanne filed an application for a temporary injunction. She
asked that Tyler be prevented from contacting her and the parties’ minor child
due to Tyler’s alcohol and drug abuse and his resulting erratic behavior. On
November 17, 2011, the district court entered the temporary injunction, which
prohibited Tyler or any actor on his behalf (aside from counsel) from contacting
Suzanne or the child “until further order of the court.” The court included a 3
written note on the order stating that Tyler could request a hearing on the
injunction if he wished to do so; Tyler never requested a hearing.
On December 2, 2011, the court granted Suzanne’s request for a
modification of the prior decree. Suzanne was given sole legal custody and
physical care of the child. Tyler’s visitation with the child was only to occur “at
such times and places as approved by” Suzanne. Additionally, “Suzanne [was]
authorized to provide a visitation schedule up to 60 days in advance and then to
follow that schedule, so long as Tyler is doing what he is expected to do in terms
of visitation.”
Sometime later, Tyler petitioned for contact with the child. When no action
was taken regarding his pro se request, Tyler filed a petition for modification,
seeking restoration of joint custody and parenting time with a “specific” schedule.
He also requested termination of the temporary injunction.
A hearing was held on the petition. Suzanne maintained the injunction
should remain in place.
On April 1, 2014, the court filed its “ruling and order.” In it, the court found
Tyler had not met his burden to establish a material change in circumstances
regarding the legal custody of the child. Additionally, the court found “some
credence should be applied to [Tyler’s] claim of change from the individual he
was in 2011 and the individual that he is in 2014.” However, the court did not
believe that Tyler could “step back into the life of his [child] as though two years
apart” did not occur. The court ordered co-parent counseling as well as
counseling with Tyler and the child. The court stated the therapist was to
determine when the sessions between Tyler and the child were no longer 4
necessary, and then the previous order—allowing Suzanne to provide a visitation
schedule if Tyler was acting appropriately—was to control. The court modified
the temporary injunction “to allow necessary telephone contact between the
parties to arrange the therapy services. The parties may also have contact
during any counseling or therapy sessions.”
Tyler appealed the district court’s modification ruling, challenging the
denial of visitation and the district court’s refusal to set forth a visitation schedule.
While Tyler’s appeal was still pending, both parties filed at least one
motion or application to initiate contempt proceedings against the other.
Additionally, Suzanne filed a petition for modification, seeking to modify Tyler’s
obligations regarding child support and medical support. Suzanne also filed a
motion for “clarification of court orders” regarding the scope of the modified
temporary injunction.
On March 4, 2015, the district court held a hearing on the all of the
outstanding issues. At the hearing, the court advised the parties its ruling was
pending the result of Tyler’s earlier appeal. Suzanne testified the counselor had
released Tyler and the child from therapy sessions, and unsupervised visitation
was now taking place between Tyler and the child. Additionally, Suzanne asked
whether the child was allowed to be around Tyler’s family and girlfriend, or
whether the injunction proscribed that. When the court inquired whether
Suzanne thought it was improper or had concerns about the child being around
those people, she stated her concern was about being in violation of the
injunction. She further testified that she would agree to or allow the child to be 5
around Tyler’s family and girlfriend if the court stated that was allowed under the
injunction.
On May 6, 2015, a panel of our court decided Tyler’s appeal. See Schleis
v. Keiner, No. 14-1258, 2015 WL 2089690, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015).
The panel determined the district court had a duty to modify the visitation, rather
than allowing the therapist to determine when visitation should begin. The court
remanded the issue, ordering the district court to “set forth a specific visitation
schedule.”
On July 29, 2015, the district court entered an order setting forth the
visitation schedule. Among other things, Tyler was to receive alternating
weekend parenting time.
On August 10, 2015, the court entered its ruling on Suzanne’s petition for
modification. In it, the court stated, in part:
The petition for modification before the court was filed August 28, 2014, by Suzanne Schleis through her attorney. . . . It occurred within a baffling number of filings both before and since relative to the litigation between the parties. At the hearing both parties acknowledged a desire to end the litigation permanently. The court cannot think of a more noble undertaking than to end the feud that has existed between these parties. .... The court notes that this court imposed an injunction in favor of Suzanne and against Tyler preventing any communication by him to her at a time when Tyler was totally out of control in his attitude and actions toward Suzanne. Although two courts have looked at the injunction since, the injunction has never been quashed. It was modified by [another judge] in her ruling, which is part of the ruling that was on appeal.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1902 Filed September 28, 2016
SUZANNE I. SCHLEIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TYLER KEINER, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Edward A.
Jacobson, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the district court’s ruling vacating a temporary
injunction. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Suzanne I. Schleis, Mapleton, appellant pro se.
Sabrina L. Saylor of Crary Huff Law Firm, Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Suzanne Schleis appeals from the district court’s order vacating a
temporary injunction that controlled the contact Tyler Keiner could have with
Suzanne and the parties’ minor child. Additionally, the order modified Tyler’s
child support obligation. On appeal, Suzanne maintains the district court abused
its discretion in vacating the injunction and the court should have made the
modification of the child support obligation retroactive to the date the application
was filed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
These parties have been involved in protracted litigation. We outline the
prior proceedings only where relevant.
The minor child was born in 2006. Per a 2009 court order, Suzanne and
Tyler shared legal custody of the minor child. Suzanne had physical care of the
child, and Tyler was to receive liberal parenting time.
In October 2010, Suzanne filed a petition for modification. A hearing on
the modification was held in September 2011.
Following the hearing on the modification but before an order was entered
on the matter, Suzanne filed an application for a temporary injunction. She
asked that Tyler be prevented from contacting her and the parties’ minor child
due to Tyler’s alcohol and drug abuse and his resulting erratic behavior. On
November 17, 2011, the district court entered the temporary injunction, which
prohibited Tyler or any actor on his behalf (aside from counsel) from contacting
Suzanne or the child “until further order of the court.” The court included a 3
written note on the order stating that Tyler could request a hearing on the
injunction if he wished to do so; Tyler never requested a hearing.
On December 2, 2011, the court granted Suzanne’s request for a
modification of the prior decree. Suzanne was given sole legal custody and
physical care of the child. Tyler’s visitation with the child was only to occur “at
such times and places as approved by” Suzanne. Additionally, “Suzanne [was]
authorized to provide a visitation schedule up to 60 days in advance and then to
follow that schedule, so long as Tyler is doing what he is expected to do in terms
of visitation.”
Sometime later, Tyler petitioned for contact with the child. When no action
was taken regarding his pro se request, Tyler filed a petition for modification,
seeking restoration of joint custody and parenting time with a “specific” schedule.
He also requested termination of the temporary injunction.
A hearing was held on the petition. Suzanne maintained the injunction
should remain in place.
On April 1, 2014, the court filed its “ruling and order.” In it, the court found
Tyler had not met his burden to establish a material change in circumstances
regarding the legal custody of the child. Additionally, the court found “some
credence should be applied to [Tyler’s] claim of change from the individual he
was in 2011 and the individual that he is in 2014.” However, the court did not
believe that Tyler could “step back into the life of his [child] as though two years
apart” did not occur. The court ordered co-parent counseling as well as
counseling with Tyler and the child. The court stated the therapist was to
determine when the sessions between Tyler and the child were no longer 4
necessary, and then the previous order—allowing Suzanne to provide a visitation
schedule if Tyler was acting appropriately—was to control. The court modified
the temporary injunction “to allow necessary telephone contact between the
parties to arrange the therapy services. The parties may also have contact
during any counseling or therapy sessions.”
Tyler appealed the district court’s modification ruling, challenging the
denial of visitation and the district court’s refusal to set forth a visitation schedule.
While Tyler’s appeal was still pending, both parties filed at least one
motion or application to initiate contempt proceedings against the other.
Additionally, Suzanne filed a petition for modification, seeking to modify Tyler’s
obligations regarding child support and medical support. Suzanne also filed a
motion for “clarification of court orders” regarding the scope of the modified
temporary injunction.
On March 4, 2015, the district court held a hearing on the all of the
outstanding issues. At the hearing, the court advised the parties its ruling was
pending the result of Tyler’s earlier appeal. Suzanne testified the counselor had
released Tyler and the child from therapy sessions, and unsupervised visitation
was now taking place between Tyler and the child. Additionally, Suzanne asked
whether the child was allowed to be around Tyler’s family and girlfriend, or
whether the injunction proscribed that. When the court inquired whether
Suzanne thought it was improper or had concerns about the child being around
those people, she stated her concern was about being in violation of the
injunction. She further testified that she would agree to or allow the child to be 5
around Tyler’s family and girlfriend if the court stated that was allowed under the
injunction.
On May 6, 2015, a panel of our court decided Tyler’s appeal. See Schleis
v. Keiner, No. 14-1258, 2015 WL 2089690, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015).
The panel determined the district court had a duty to modify the visitation, rather
than allowing the therapist to determine when visitation should begin. The court
remanded the issue, ordering the district court to “set forth a specific visitation
schedule.”
On July 29, 2015, the district court entered an order setting forth the
visitation schedule. Among other things, Tyler was to receive alternating
weekend parenting time.
On August 10, 2015, the court entered its ruling on Suzanne’s petition for
modification. In it, the court stated, in part:
The petition for modification before the court was filed August 28, 2014, by Suzanne Schleis through her attorney. . . . It occurred within a baffling number of filings both before and since relative to the litigation between the parties. At the hearing both parties acknowledged a desire to end the litigation permanently. The court cannot think of a more noble undertaking than to end the feud that has existed between these parties. .... The court notes that this court imposed an injunction in favor of Suzanne and against Tyler preventing any communication by him to her at a time when Tyler was totally out of control in his attitude and actions toward Suzanne. Although two courts have looked at the injunction since, the injunction has never been quashed. It was modified by [another judge] in her ruling, which is part of the ruling that was on appeal. Based upon the evidence before this court, the comments made by [the other judge] and the fact that the Court of Appeals has now ordered imposed a regular visitation schedule between Tyler and his [child], the court find that for at least the past year, the temporary injunction (which was meant to be temporary in the first place) serves no useful purpose. In fact, the court finds that 6
Suzanne has utilized the injunction to communicate with Tyler and allow Tyler to communicate with her when it suited her needs and to file contempts against Tyler when it did not. The injunction empowered Suzanne far beyond what the court had intended in 2011, and the need to do so no longer exists.
The court dissolved the temporary injunction. Additionally, the court increased
Tyler’s child support obligation to $1040 per month, effective September 1, 2015.
Suzanne appeals. Tyler does not participate in the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
The district court's authority to issue injunctive relief arises in equity, and
our review is de novo. See Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., 621 N.W.2d 178,
180 (Iowa 2001). Yet, the decision to issue, vacate, or modify an injunction rests
largely within the discretion of the district court. See id. “Thus, we will not
generally interfere with the district court decision unless the discretion has been
abused or the decision violates some principle of equity.” Id.
Because the modification action was tried in equity, we also consider the
modification of the child support obligation de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
III. Discussion.
A. Injunction.
Suzanne maintains the district court abused its discretion when it vacated
the temporary injunction. She maintains the court failed to follow proper
procedure, and a hearing was necessary to determine whether the injunction was
still warranted.
We acknowledge that typically a separate hearing is held to determine
whether a temporary injunction should be dissolved. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1509.
However, here, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion by 7
dissolving the injunction without one since the parties appeared before the court
on a variety of issues, including the establishment of unsupervised visitation
between the father and son and the ongoing communication between the parents
to accomplish the visitation.
The request for temporary injunction was granted in 2011, without a
request for a hearing from Tyler, due to Tyler’s abuse of substances and erratic
behaviors. While there was no hearing held specifically to discuss the injunction,
multiple hearings were held to determine whether Tyler was again fit to parent
the parties’ minor child. In the April 2014 modification, the court noted that “some
credence should be applied to [Tyler’s] claim of change from the individual he
was in 2011 and the individual that he is in 2014.” Additionally, according to
Suzanne’s testimony at the hearing in March 2015, the counselor who had met
with Tyler and the child had released them from the need for counseling, and
unsupervised visits between Tyler and the child were occurring. At the hearing,
the court specifically asked Suzanne about her concerns, and she expressed
some regarding whether or not she would be in violation of the temporary
injunction by meeting with Tyler’s relatives. Following the hearing, she filed pro
se documents stating her perception of the need for an injunction.
Suzanne complains that the court did not ensure that the need for the
injunction had passed, but this complaint seems to invoke procedure for
procedure’s sake. As we stated above, the parties have already been involved in
protracted litigation, and the court was well-versed in their relationship and
history; we do not believe another hearing was necessary. 8
B. Modification of Child Support.
Suzanne maintains the district court should have ordered the increase in
Tyler’s child support obligation—from $585 to $1040 each month—to be effective
retroactively. She maintains it should have become effective the date she filed
her petition to modify, August 28, 2014.
Iowa Code section 598.21C(5) (2013) provides, “Judgments for child
support or child support awards . . . which are subject to a modification
proceeding may be retroactively modified only from three months after the date
the notice of the pending petition for modification is served on the opposing
party.” In other words, while the court may order the modification to be effective
retroactively, at the earliest it is applicable three months after Tyler received
service. See In re Marriage of Ober, 538 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)
(stating the word “may” gives the trial court discretion in determining the effective
date of the modification order). After reviewing the record, we note that the
return of service lists September 5, 2014, as the date Tyler was served with
Suzanne’s petition for modification. Thus, the district court could have ordered
the increased child support to become effective December 5, 2014.
Here, we believe the increase should have been applied retroactively.
Based on his testimony at the hearing, Tyler had earned more than $130,000 in
both 2013 and 2014, while Suzanne’s only income was from social security
disability. Tyler could afford to pay the retroactive increase, and we believe it is
in the best interests of the minor child. Cf. In re Marriage of Belcher, 582 N.W.2d
510, 513 (Iowa 1998) (“The purpose of the child support guidelines is to provide
for the best interests of the children by recognizing the duty of both parents to 9
provide adequate support for their children in proportion to their respective
incomes.”).
C. Costs.
Suzanne maintains that we should assess costs of this appeal to Tyler.
We decline to do so.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dissolving the temporary
injunction. We remand this case for entry of a modified support order, making
Tyler’s child support obligation effective retroactively to December 5, 2014.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.