Suzanne A v. Clarke

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 459
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 19, 1994
DocketNo. 92-2140-D
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 459 (Suzanne A v. Clarke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Suzanne A v. Clarke, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 459 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

Neel, J.

Plaintiffs allege sexual misconduct by a treating physician, William F. Clarke, M.D., now deceased. In addition to suing his estate, they have sued, inter alia, North Adams Regional Hospital, Inc. (“NARH”), where Clark was a member of the medical staff; Dr. Michael Gerrity, who was allegedly informed of the misconduct; and Patrick L. Muldoon, president of NARH, whom Gerrity allegedly told of the misconduct. Plaintiffs claim that Gerrity, Muldoon and NARH initiated and participated in peer review proceedings as a result of Patricia B’s complaint, but failed to carry out the peer review properly. Plaintiffs claim that this failure caused harm to the other two plaintiffs, who allege that they were subsequently abused by Clarke.

Plaintiffs seek a variety of records and information pertaining to the peer review committee (“PRC”) proceedings convened by defendants. Defendants assert that such materials are privileged under G.L.c. Ill Sec. 204. Plaintiffs have moved to compel production. After hearing, the Court allows plaintiffs’ motions in part, in accordance with the procedure set forth below.

DISCUSSION

G.L.c. Ill Sec. 204(a) provides that, “(e)xcept as otherwise provided in this section," the proceedings, reports and records of a medical peer review committee “shall be confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery, in any judicial. . . proceeding . . . ;” and “no person who was in attendance at a meeting of a medical peer review committee shall be permitted or required to testify ... as to the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluation, opinions, deliberations or other actions of such committee or any members thereof.”

The relevant exceptions to confidentiality of documents are set out in subsection (b):

1. Documents, incident reports or records otherwise available from original sources shall not be immune from subpoena, discovery or use in any such judicial . . . proceeding merely because they were presented to such committee . . .
2. “[PJroceedings, reports, findings and records” of a PRC “(shall not] be immune from subpoena, discovery or use as evidence in any proceeding against a member of such committee to establish a cause of action pursuant to [G.L.c. 231 Sec. 85N) "2

The relevant exceptions to confidentiality of testimony are set out in subsection (c):

1. A person who testifies before such committee or who is a member of such committee shall not be prevented from testifying as to matters known to [460]*460such person independent of the committee’s proceedings, provided that. . .
(a) . . . except in a proceeding against a witness to establish a cause of action pursuant to [G.L.c. 231 Sec 85N], neither the witness nor members of the committee may be questioned regarding the witness’s testimony before such committee . . .
(b) . . . committee members may not be questioned in any proceeding about the identity of any person furnishing information or opinions to the committee, opinions formed by them as a result of such committee proceedings, or about the deliberations of such committee.

A. “Documents . . . otherwise available from original sources ...”

Section 204 has been cited in only a few reported cases, none of which are similar to the present case. The statute clearly excludes from its protection documents which were not generated by a PRC, but rather were presented to the PRC from other sources and are “otherwise available” from such original sources. Sec. 204(b). Less clear is whether the legislature, by this exclusion, intended to indicate that production of such documents may be compelled from the original source, but not from the PRC.

The Court concludes that production may be compelled from either source. The statute extends its protection only to “proceedings, reports and records of’ a PRC, G.L.c. Ill Sec. 204(a), and appears to distinguish from such records the “documents, incident reports or records otherwise available from original sources” referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 204(b). Moreover, the conjunction which begins the second sentence of Sec. 204(b)3 implies that certain internally generated records in a PRC’s custody pertinent to a claim under c. 231 Sec. 85N, like externally generated records in its custody, are not immune from discovery.

It might be argued that the “otherwise available" language of Sec. 204(b) requires that a party seek those records from the other “available” source, not from the PRC. Of course, plaintiffs would have no way of knowing what those records were unless the PRC identified them sufficiently to allow plaintiffs to find and subpoena the various originators of such documents. That seems a needlessly cumbersome and wasteful requirement, which the Court concludes was not contemplated by the legislature. Moreover, where the documents sought originated from outside the PRC but are no longer “otherwise available" (e.g., the PRC has the original and no copies exist), the legislature cannot have intended that such records gain protection solely because they were submitted to the PRC; such a result is precisely what the first sentence of Sec. 204(b) seeks to avoid.4 Thus, the Court construes “otherwise available" to refer to the originator of the record sought, not the party from whom it must be obtained.

B. “Proceedings, reports, findings and records” of a PRC

Even documents generated by a PRC in the form of “[pjroceedings, reports, findings and records” may be discovered in any proceeding against a member of a PRC to establish a cause of action under G.L.c. 231 Sec. 85N.5 Sec. 204(b). Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims arise not under c. 231 Sec. 85N, but instead under c. Ill Sec. 203, which was enacted together with Sec. 204, and later than c. 231 Sec 85N. Because Sec. 204 does not except from its protection information sought in an action under Sec. 203, defendants argue that the protection afforded the discovery sought by plaintiffs is absolute.

The Court does not accept either defendants’ premise that c. 231 Sec. 85N pertains only to credentials cases, or their premise that plaintiffs may proceed under either that statute or c. Ill Sec. 203, but not both. Contrary to defendants’ argument, the “good faith" and “reasonable belief’ defenses in the two statutes are substantially similar, supporting the conclusion that cases brought under c. 111 Sec. 203 may be a subset of cases brought under c. 231 Sec. 85N. Moreover, the “absolute prohibition” against discovery of PRC opinions and deliberations, enunciated in Birbiglia, protects against disclosure which might chill those deliberations. In view of that protection, defendants offer no persuasive justification for reading these statutes so as to allow physicians, but not patients, to discover information which PRC members acquire independently of PRC deliberations. See, e.g., Birbiglia, supra at n. 4.

ORDER

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motions to compel are ALLOWED IN PART, and it is further ORDERED:

1.

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