Sutton v. Noel

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania·Decided July 18, 2022·No. 1:19-cv-02080·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KELVIN SUTTON, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-2080 : Plaintiff : (Judge Conner) : v. : : DR. PAUL NOEL, DR. HARESHA : PANDYA, : : Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Kelvin Sutton (“Sutton”), an inmate who was housed at all relevant times at the State Correctional Institution at Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI- Frackville”), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants failed to provide medical care for his Hepatitis C. (Doc. 1). Named as defendants are Dr. Paul Noel and Dr. Haresha Pandya. Before the court is defendant Pandya’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 63). For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the motion. I. Factual Background & Procedural History1 Hepatitis C is a viral infection that causes inflammation of the liver. See

Bush v. Doe (I), 858 F. App’x 520, 521 (3d Cir. June 8, 2021) (nonprecedential) (citing Hepatitis C Fact Sheet, World Health Organization (July 27, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/hepatitis-c)).2 Hepatitis C may be described as acute (meaning a new infection) or chronic (meaning a long-term infection). See Hepatitis C Information, Centers for Disease Control (July 28, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hcv/index.htm. An acute infection will often lead to a

1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise noted, the factual background herein derives from defendant Pandya’s Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. (Doc. 64). Sutton did not file a response to defendant Pandya’s statement of material facts. The court accordingly deems the facts set forth by defendant Pandya to be undisputed. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1; see also Doc. 69 ¶ 3 (advising Sutton that failure to file a responsive statement of material facts would result in the facts set forth in defendant Pandya’s statement of material facts being deemed admitted). We supplement defendant Pandya’s statement with certain background factual information about Hepatitis C supplied by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ nonprecedential decision in Bush v. Doe (I), 858 F. App’x 520, 521 (3d Cir. June 8, 2021) (nonprecedential) (collecting information from World Health Organization (“WHO”) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”))).

2 The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding upon federal district courts. Citations to nonprecedential decisions reflect that the court has carefully considered and is persuaded by the panel’s ratio decidendi. 2 chronic infection,3 which can cause liver damage, fibrosis (scarring), cirrhosis (extreme scarring), liver cancer, or death. Id. Thus, the benefit of early treatment

of Hepatitis C includes the ability of the body to stave off further liver deterioration. Id. In 2011, the Food and Drug Administration approved new direct-acting antiviral drugs (“DAADs”) for treatment of Hepatitis C. Bush, 858 F. App’x at 521 (citations omitted). Treatment success for Hepatitis C is defined as sustained virological response, which means the Hepatitis C virus (“HCV”) is not detected in the blood for twelve or more weeks after treatment. Id. at 521 n.2. DAADs have a

90 to 95 percent success rate of producing a sustained virological response. Id. at 521 (citations omitted). As a result, in 2015, both the American Association for the Study of Liver Disease (“AASLD”) and the Infectious Diseases Society of America began to recommend that all patients with chronic Hepatitis C receive DAAD treatment, “except those with limited life expectancy because of nonhepatic conditions.” Id. (citations omitted). DAADs are an effective but costly treatment method. See id. (noting that DAADs “cost[] up to $100,000 per treatment”).

Sutton alleges that he contracted Hepatitis C in 2007, while incarcerated, and that defendant Pandya failed to provide adequate medical treatment. (Doc. 64 ¶¶ 2- 3). Specifically, Sutton alleges that he has not received any medical treatment for

3 According to the CDC, more than half of the people infected with the Hepatitis C virus will develop a chronic infection. See Hepatitis C Information, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 28, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hcv/index.htm. 3 his Hepatitis C and has been denied medical treatment pursuant to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) Hepatitis C Protocol, despite

having a high viral load and consistent, diminished low platelet counts. (Id. ¶ 3). During the relevant time period, defendant Pandya was employed by the medical contractor for the DOC to provide medical services to inmates. (Id. ¶ 4). Defendant Pandya has submitted an extensive summary of the medical care Sutton received while incarcerated. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6). The undisputed material facts of Sutton’s care and treatment are set forth in detail below. This detailed factual recitation reflects that Sutton received over seven years of extensive medical treatment for a variety of

ailments including but not limited to Hepatitis C. On January 7, 2014, Sutton was treated by certified registered nurse practitioner (“CRNP”) Chris Collins for renewal of medications, including Allopurinol, Naproxen, and Vitamin D ointment. (Id. ¶ 7). On February 21, 2014, CRNP Nelson Iannuzzi treated Sutton regarding complaints about his orthopedic boots. (Id. ¶ 7). Thereafter, on March 3, 2014, Sutton was seen by CRNP Iannuzzi for a follow-up regarding his boots, and

otherwise had no medical issues. (Id. ¶ 9). On March 14, 2014, at SCI-Mahanoy, Sutton was seen by CRNP Collins. (Id. ¶ 10). At that time, he requested gel insoles for his shoes and complained of sinus congestion. (Id. ¶ 11). CRNP Collins examined Sutton and prescribed a nasal spray and ordered a new pair of gel insoles. (Id. ¶ 10). On March 31, 2014, Sutton received his antihistamine prescription and gel insoles. (Id. ¶ 11). 4 On April 23, 2014, Sutton was transferred to SCI-Frackville. (Id. ¶ 13). On May 5, 2014, Dr. Adrian Harewood treated Sutton for complaints of nasal stiffness,

prescribed an antihistamine, and ordered that Sutton be seen in the foot clinic. (Id. ¶ 14). On May 15, 2014, Sutton was evaluated in the Hepatitis C Clinic. (Id. ¶ 15). Upon presentation, he did not have any complaints. (Id.) With respect to his Hepatitis C, his August 20, 2013 lab results revealed that his white blood count (“WBC”) was 3.65, hemoglobin was 14.5, hematocrit (“HCT”) count was 50.1, absolute neutrophil count (“ANC”) was 1.12, platelet level was 16, bilirubin was 0.4,

AST was 48, alkaline phosphate level was 57, BUN/CR count was 11/1.00, and his viral load was recorded as 5,175,830. (Id.) Also on May 15, 2014, Dr. Harewood ordered Sutton to have a comprehensive metabolic pane (“CMP”) and complete blood work (“CBC”) performed every four (4) months and a prothrombin time test with an international normalized ratio (“PT/INR”) performed every twelve (12) months beginning in April of 2015. (Id. ¶ 16). He also ordered testing for Hepatitis A and HIV testing. (Id.)

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