Sutton v. DirectTV LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedMarch 16, 2022
Docket2:19-cv-00330
StatusUnknown

This text of Sutton v. DirectTV LLC (Sutton v. DirectTV LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sutton v. DirectTV LLC, (N.D. Ala. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

FARRELL STEVEN SUTTON, } } Plaintiff, } } v. } Case No.: 2:19-cv-00330-MHH } DIRECTV LLC, } } Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION In this Title VII action, Farrell Sutton asserts claims for alleged Title VII violations against his former employer, DIRECTV. Mr. Sutton contends that DIRECTV violated Title VII when the company failed to accommodate his religious beliefs and practices and then terminated him. DIRECTV contends that it could not accommodate Mr. Sutton without running afoul of its collective bargaining agreement with the union to which Mr. Sutton and his fellow wire technicians belong. DIRECTV also contends that its proffered reason for terminating Mr. Sutton was legitimate, not pretextual. DIRECTV has asked the Court to enter judgment in its favor on Mr. Sutton’s claims. (Doc. 22). This opinion resolves DIRECTV’s motion for summary judgment. This opinion begins with a discussion of the standard that a district court uses to evaluate motions for summary judgment. Then, consistent with the summary

judgment standard, the Court identifies the evidence that the parties have submitted, describing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Sutton. Finally, the Court evaluates the Title VII claims against DIRECTV, considering first Mr. Sutton’s failure to accommodate claim and then Mr. Sutton’s retaliation claim.1

1 In his complaint, Mr. Sutton asserted three Title VII claims: intentional religious discrimination, (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7); failure to accommodate, (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9); and retaliation, (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10). DIRECTV moved for summary judgment on all three claims, (Doc. 22), but DIRECTV briefed only Mr. Sutton’s failure to accommodate and retaliation claims, (Doc. 24). Citing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015), DIRECTV argues that “[d]iscriminating against an employee based on his religious practice ‘is synonymous with refusing to accommodate the religious practice. To accuse the employer of one is to accuse him of the other.” (Doc. 29, p. 8) (quoting 575 U.S. at 772 n.2) (emphasis in Abercrombie & Fitch). Citing Jean-Pierre v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 817 Fed. Appx. 822 (11th Cir. 2020), DIRECTV posits that, because Mr. Sutton’s religious discrimination and failure to accommodate claims “are essentially the same, claim, they do ‘not require separate analysis.’” (Doc. 29, p. 8) (quoting Jean-Pierre, 817 Fed. Appx. at 828). In Jean-Pierre, the Eleventh Circuit explained that an employee asserting a claim relating to religious beliefs or practices “may plead two separate claims for discrimination—one based on his employer’s failure to accommodate and another based on other grounds,” but to do so successfully, the employee must allege a distinct factual basis for each claim. Jean-Pierre, 817 Fed. Appx. at 828. When, as here, the facts the employee alleges in his complaint in support of a religious discrimination claim and in support of a failure to accommodate claim are the same, the claims are duplicative and do not require separate analysis. Jean-Pierre, 817 Fed. Appx. at 828. Therefore, the Court regards Mr. Sutton’s Title VII intentional discrimination claim as a failure to accommodate claim and analyzes the merits of that claim.

The Court notes that in his first EEOC charge, Mr. Sutton asserted that AT&T provided accommodations to similarly situated co-employees to allow them “to observe their religious beliefs,” but he was not afforded the same terms and conditions. (Doc. 23-1, p. 46). Had Mr. Sutton alleged similar facts in his complaint, he may have been able to pursue both a discrimination claim and a separate failure to accommodate claim. I. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court

“shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that a genuine dispute as to a material fact

precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).

When considering a summary judgment motion, a district court must view the evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the Court views the evidence in the light most

favorable to Mr. Sutton and draws all reasonable inferences from the evidence in his favor. II. Much of the evidence in this case is undisputed. Mr. Sutton is a wire

technician. He installs television satellites and provides related services. (Doc. 23- 1, p. 4, tp. 11). In 2002, he began working as a contract wire technician for Bruister and Associates. (Doc. 23-1, p. 4, tpp. 11-12). Later, Bruister hired him as an

employee. (Doc. 23-1, p. 4, tpp. 11-12). DIRECTV acquired Bruister in 2008, (Doc. 23-1, p. 4, tp. 12), and AT&T acquired DIRECTV in 2015, (Doc. 23-1, p. 5, tp. 16). Throughout, Mr. Sutton’s job involved either installing television satellites or servicing them. (Doc. 23-1, p. 5, tpp. 13-16). Mr. Sutton was an exemplary

employee. (Doc. 23-2, pp. 6, 22, tpp. 16, 79-80). While he worked for DIRECTV, Mr. Sutton became a Seventh-day Adventist. (Doc. 23-1, p. 6, tpp. 17-19). “Seventh-day Adventist Christians are committed to

keeping the seventh-day Sabbath which is Saturday. The Bible says the Sabbath starts at sunset Friday and ends at sunset Saturday. During the Sabbath [Seventh- day Adventists] refrain from any type of work and secular activities whether it is labor for money or doing work for one’s own self for free.” (Doc. 23-1, p. 42).

According to Mr. Sutton’s pastor, Mr. Sutton is “a loyal employee who is willing to work on Sundays or overtime during the week if needed. It is his conviction to keep the seventh-day Sabbath as God has commanded from sunset Friday to sunset

Saturday in worship at the Shoals Seventh-day Adventist Church in which he is a member.” (Doc. 23-1, p. 42). Until 2017, Mr. Sutton was not scheduled to work on Saturdays. (Doc. 23-1, pp. 6-7, tpp. 20-21).

In late 2016, the Communications Workers of America – the CWA – reached an interim collective bargaining agreement – CBA – with Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, which does business as AT&T Alabama, Mr. Sutton’s

employer. (Doc. 23-4, p. 19, tpp. 68-69; Doc. 23-1, pp. 35-38). Mr. Sutton was subject to the agreement. (Doc. 23-4, p. 19, tp. 69). Under the CBA, wire technicians had to bid on work schedules; senior employees received preference. (Doc. 23-2, p. 8, tp. 24; Doc. 23-1, p. 37). Wire technicians were “guaranteed one

(1) weekend off per month.” (Doc. 23-1, p. 38). Under all available work schedules, wire technicians had to work three Saturdays a month. (Doc. 23-1, p. 12, tpp. 41- 42; Doc. 23-2, p. 8, tp. 24).

When he learned that he could not have a schedule that allowed him to have every Saturday off, Mr.

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