Susan Renee Wright Williamson v. John Houston Williamson

Opinion

I N THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN SECTI ON FILED October 1, 1996

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

SUSAN RENEE W GHT W LLI AM RI I SON, ) C/ A NO. 03A01- 9602- DR- 00073 )

Pl a i nt i f f - Appe l l a nt , ) BLOUNT GENERAL SESSI ONS )

v. ) HON. W LLI AM R. BREW I ER, J R. ,

) J UDGE

J OHN HOUSTON W LLI AMI SON, )

) MODI FI ED AND

De f e nda nt - Appe l l e e . ) REMANDED

PERRY P. PAI NE, J R. , PAI NE, GARRETT & BRAY, M r yvi l l e , f or

a

Pl a i nt i f f - Appe l l a nt .

J ERRY G. CUNNI NGHAM KI ZER & BLACK, M r yvi l l e , f or De f e nda n t -

, a

Ap p e l l e e .

O P I N I O N

Fr a nks . J .

I n t hi s di vor c e a c t i on t he Tr i a l Cour t a wa r de d ?t o e a c h p a r t y a n a bs ol ut e di vor c e f r om t he ot he r on t he gr ounds o f i n a ppr opr i a t e ma r i t a l c onduc t . ? The Cour t a wa r de d t he c u s t o d y of t he pa r t i e s ’ t wo mi nor c hi l dr e n t o t he mot he r , o r d e r e d t he f a t he r t o pa y c hi l d s uppor t ba s e d upon t he g u i de l i ne s , a nd i n d i vi di ng t he pa r t i e s ’ ma r i t a l e s t a t e

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c o n c l ude d t ha t t he i r home wa s a gi f t f r om t he hus ba nd’ s p a r e n t s t o hi m a l one , a nd t he r e f or e s e pa r a t e pr ope r t y. Fr o m t hi s l a t t e r d e t e r mi na t i on, t h e wi f e ha s a ppe a l e d.

The Tr i a l Cour t f ound:

The p a r t i e s , a t t he t i me of t he i r ma r r i a ge , l i v e d i n a r e s i de nc e t i t l e d t o t he De f e nda nt ’ s f a t he r . The pa r t i e s pa i d no r e nt a nd no pr ope r t y t a xe s on t he r e s i de nc e t hr oughout t he i r ma r r i a ge . Appr oxi ma t e l y t wo ( 2) ye a r s a go t he De f e nda nt ’ s f a t he r c a us e d t h e r e s i de nc e t o be t i t l e d t o t he pa r t i e s . . . I t i s t he p l a i nt i f f ’ s c ont e nt i on t ha t t he r e s i de nc e wa s a gi f t t o bot h t he pa r t i e s a nd t he r e f or e a n e qui t a b l e di vi s i on of t he r e s i de nc e s houl d be a n e qua l one .

I t i s t he De f e nda nt ’ s c ont e nt i on t ha t t he r e s i de nc e wa s a gi f t onl y t o t he De f e nda nt a nd t ha t t he Pl a i nt i f f i s not e nt i t l e d t o a ny s ha r e of t he r e s i de nc e . The Cour t f i nds t ha t t he pr oof on t hi s i s s ue pr e ponde r a t e s i n f a vor of t he De f e nda nt .

W c onc l ude t he e vi de nc e pr e ponde r a t e s a ga i ns t t h i s

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f i nd i ng o f f a c t . T. R. A. P. Rul e 13( d) .

The hus ba nd’ s pa r e nt s , by wa r r a nt y de e d, de e de d t h e p r o p e r t y t o t he hus ba nd a nd wi f e a s t e na nt s by t he e nt i r e t y , t h e d e e d r e c i t i ng t he s t a nda r d c ons i de r a t i on of $1. 00 a nd o t h e r good a nd va l ua bl e c ons i de r a t i on. The hus ba nd’ s f a t he r t e s t i f i e d t ha t h e pl a c e d t he wi f e ’ s na me on t he de e d ?a s a ma t t e r of c onve ni e nc e ?, e xpl a i ni ng t he pur pos e wa s t o e na bl e t h e p a r t i e s t o bor r ow mone y a nd f or i ns ur a nc e pur pos e s , a nd f u r t h e r e xpl a i ne d t ha t he di dn’ t wa nt he r t o ha ve a ny of t he p r o p e r t y be c a us e of ?t he wa y s he done , t he l i f e s he l i ve d?, wh i c h he s a i d h e be c a me a wa r e of a f t e r he de e de d t he pr ope r t y .

The r e c or d e s t a bl i s he s t ha t whi l e t he pa r t i e s di d n o t p a y a ny moni e s f or t he pr ope r t y or pa y t a xe s , t he y ha ve e x p e n d e d moni e s i mpr ovi ng t he pr ope r t y. T. C. A. §36- 4- 121 d e f i n e s ?ma r i t a l pr ope r t y? a s ?a l l r e a l a nd pe r s ona l pr ope r t y , b o t h t a ngi bl e a nd i nt a ngi bl e , a c qui r e d by e i t he r or bot h

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s p o u s e s dur i ng t he c our s e of t he ma r r i a ge . . . ? ( 1) ( A) . Se p a r a t e pr ope r t y i s de f i ne d i n pe r t i ne nt pa r t a s ?pr ope r t y a c q u i r e d by a s pous e a t a ny t i me by gi f t , be que s t , de vi s e , o r d e s c e nt ? ( 2) ( D) .

The a c qui s i t i o n of t hi s pr ope r t y wa s by gi f t .

Ho we v e r , t h e g i f t wa s t o ?bot h s pous e s dur i ng t he c our s e of t h e ma r r i a ge ?. Unl e s s a de e d i s a mbi guous , t he i nt e nt i on of t h e g r a nt or i s t o be de t e r mi ne d f r om t he f our c or ne r s of hi s

d e e d, Be nne t t v . Langham, 214 Te nn. 674, 383 S. W 2d 16 ( 196 4 ) .

.

Th e r e c or d e s t a bl i s he s n o ba s i s t o c ons t r ue t he de e d a s i t s c l e a r t e r ms e s t a bl i s h a c onve ya nc e of t he home t o bot h pa r t i e s . Ta ki ng i nt o a c c ount r e l e va nt c i r c ums t na c e s s e t f or t h i n T. C. A. §36- 4- 121, C1- 10, we f i nd t ha t a s a ma t t e r of e q u i t y , t hi s ma r i t a l pr o pe r t y s houl d be e qua l l y di vi de d b e t we e n t he pa r t i e s . I f t he pa r t i e s c a nnot ot he r wi s e a gr e e , t h e p r ope r t y wi l l be s ol d a nd t he pr oc e e ds wi l l be di vi de d b e t we e n t he pa r t i e s .

W r e ma nd t o t he Tr i a l Cour t t o e nt e r a n or de r

e

mo d i f y i ng t he j udgme nt i n a c c or da nc e wi t h t hi s opi ni on. Th e c os t s of t he a ppe a l a r e a s s e s s e d t o a ppe l l e e .

________________________

He r s c he l P. Fr a nks , J .

CONCUR:

_ _ _ _ _ __________________ ____

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Ho u s t o n M Godda r d, P. J .

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ __________________ ___ Ch a r l e s D. Sus a no, J r . , J .

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

SUSAN RENEE WRIGHT WILLIAMSON,) C/A NO. 03A01-9602-DR-00073 ) BLOUNT CO. GENERAL SESSIONS COURT Plaintiff-Appellant,)

)

)

)

FILED

v. )

) October 1, 1996 )

) Cecil Crowson, Jr.

) Appellate C ourt Clerk JOHN HOUSTON WILLIAMSON, )

) HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BREWER, JR., Defendant-Appellee. ) JUDGE

CONCURRING OPINION

I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Franks’ opinion.

I concur that the evidence preponderates against the trial

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court’s determination that the deed in this case “was a gift only to the [husband].” On the contrary, the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of a finding that the conveyance was a gift to both parties. Furthermore, it seems clear to me that the deeded property is marital property. I believe it is equitable in this case to divide this property equally. I write separately to explain why I do not believe this gift is a “gift” as defined in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) but rather marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

It seems to me that once it is determined that this is a joint gift to the parties, one must go further and ask this question: does this conveyance, being a warranty deed creating a tenancy by the entirety, represent a gift to each spouse of an undivided fifty percent interest in real property and should those interests be considered separate property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D); or should the property conveyed be treated as marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4- 121(b)(1)(A)?

In this case, we have found that this asset should be divided equally so the result here would be the same regardless of how the above question is answered; however, in some cases, the answer to this question would be critical. For example, this would be true in those cases where the court determines that the marital estate should be divided in an unequal manner.

Turning to the question posed above, it must be recognized that this conveyance to husband and wife does not create an undivided fifty percent interest in each party as would be the case with property held as tenants in common. In the instant case, the deed creates a tenancy by the entirety, a joint interest with right of survivorship--an expectancy.

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Generally speaking, this latter concept is at odds with the general concept of separate property, i.e., property owned unconditionally by one party. This militates against a finding that the subject property interests are separate property.

Since this was a gift, does this fact mandate the conclusion that the respective interests of the parties are interests that fall within the ambit of the “gift” section of the separate property definition at T.C.A. § 36-4- 121(b)(2)(D)? I think not. In fact, I believe a gift made jointly to a married couple clearly falls without, rather than within, the definition of separate property set forth at T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D), i.e., “[p]roperty acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” (Emphasis added). I believe the sole type of gift referred to in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) is a gift to an individual spouse. Since the gift in this case is a gift to husband and wife jointly, I do not find that it falls within the definition of separate property. Inasmuch as the property came to the parties through a joint conveyance during their marriage, I agree with Judge Franks that it is properly classified as property “acquired by . . . both spouses during the course of the marriage,” and hence marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

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Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.