Susan Peck v. County of Orange

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedFebruary 25, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-04654
StatusUnknown

This text of Susan Peck v. County of Orange (Susan Peck v. County of Orange) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Susan Peck v. County of Orange, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 BDaarnb Sartao rEmnelro,e E Hsqa.d [sSel.lB, .E #s1q0. 1[S9.6B7.] #086021] 2 David Clay Washington, Esq. [S.B. #305996] HADSELL STORMER RENICK & DAI LLP 3 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue Pasadena, California 91103 4 Telephone: (626) 585-9600 Facsimile: (626) 577-7079 5 Emails: bhadsell@hadsellstormer.com dstormer@hadsellstormer.com 6 dwashington@hadsellstormer.com 7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 SUSAN PECK, COURTNEY MONO, and Case No.: 2:19-cv-04654 DSF (AFMx) WHITNEY MONO, individually and as 13 surviving heirs and successors in interest of [Assigned to the Honorable Dale S. PAUL MONO (deceased), Fischer – Courtroom 7D] 14 Plaintiffs, 15 AMENDED JOINT [PROPOSED] vs. STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 16 ORDER COUNTY OF ORANGE, SHERIFF- 17 CORONER SANDRA HUTCHENS, in her individual and official capacities, MATTER FOR DETERMINATION 18 ANTHONY MONTOYA, MICHAEL BY THE HONORABLE JOHNSON, BRAD CARRINGTON, ALEXANDER F. MACKINNON 19 BRENT LIND, JOHN FREY, AARON McFATRIDGE, and DOES 1-10, 20 Complaint filed: May 31, 2019 Defendants. Trial Date: December 8, 2020 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 [Continued from first page] 2 Norman J. Watkins, Esq. S. Frank Harrell, Esq. 3 Jesse K. Cox, Esq. LYNBERG & WATKINS 4 1100 Town & Country Road, Suite #1450 Orange, California 92868 5 Telephone: (714) 937-1010 Facsimile: (714) 937-1003 6 Email: nwatkins@lynberg.com sharrell@lynberg.com 7 jcox@lynberg.com 8 Attorneys for Defendants COUNTY OF ORANGE, SHERIFF-CORONER SANDRA HUTCHENS, in her individual and official capacities, ANTHONY MONTOYA, 9 MICHAEL JOHNSON, BRAD CARRINGTON, BRENT LIND, JOHN FREY, AARON McFATRIDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 2 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, 3 or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use 4 for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the 5 parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated 6 Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket 7 protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords 8 from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are 9 entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further 10 acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3 below, that this Stipulated Protective Order 11 does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 12 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied 13 when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 14 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 15 This action is likely to involve information which one of more of the parties 16 contend special protection from use for any purpose other than litigation of this action is 17 warranted. 18 Plaintiffs contend that such confidential information includes decedent’s medical 19 records and those of his surviving family, personal information relating to the nature of 20 the relationship between spouses and children of the Decedent, autopsy photographs and 21 other graphic records, and personal financial records, disclosure of which may violate the 22 privacy rights of Plaintiffs, Decedent and potentially third parties. Defendants contend 23 that such confidential information includes internal policies, procedures, and training 24 materials, which are generally not available to the public. This information may be 25 privileged, and its disclosure may impact the County Sheriff’s Department’s operations 26 and safety. Defendants may also be producing documents that contain personal and 27 confidential information regarding individuals which information is generally unavailable 28 to the public, including peace officer personnel records. The disclosure of this 1 information to the public may violate these individuals’ privacy rights. Accordingly, to 2 expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over 3 confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are 4 entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary 5 uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their 6 handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for 7 such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that the 8 information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be 9 so designated without a good faith belief that is has been maintained in a confidential, 10 non-public manner, and there is a good cause why it should not be party of the public 11 record of this case. 12 C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL 13 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this 14 Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information 15 under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and 16 the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file 17 material under seal. 18 There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial 19 proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good 20 cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of 21 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 22 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 23 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause 24 showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper 25 evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected 26 Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure 27 or Discovery Material as CONFIDENTIAL does not—without the submission of 28 competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under 1 seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute goodcause. 2 Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then 3 compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the relief 4 sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. See Pintos 5 v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n., 605 F.3d 665, 677-79 (9th Cir. 2010). For each item or type 6 of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or introduced under seal in 7 connection with a dispositive motion or trial, the party seeking protection must 8 articulate compelling reasons, supported by specific facts and legal justification, for the 9 requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence supporting the application to file 10 documents under seal must be provided bydeclaration. 11 Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable in its 12 entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be redacted. If 13 documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public viewing, omitting only 14 the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable portions of the document, shall be 15 filed. Any application that seeks to file documents under seal in their entirety should 16 include an explanation of why redaction is notfeasible. 17 18 2. DEFINITIONS 19 2.1 Action: this pending federal lawsuit.

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Related

Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
Susan Peck v. County of Orange, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/susan-peck-v-county-of-orange-cacd-2020.