Susan Gelb v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided September 14, 2022·No. SF-1221-21-0267-W-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SUSAN L. GELB, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-1221-21-0267-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: September 14, 2022 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Brook L. Beesley, Alameda, California, for the appellant.

Vanessa Lichtenberger, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied her request for corrective action under 5 U.S.C. § 1221. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 On review, the appellant argues that she was improperly deprived of her right to a hearing. In an individual right of action (IRA) appeal, an appellant generally has a right to a hearing when, as in this case, the appeal was timely filed and the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.6(b); see Ormond v. Department of Justice, 118 M.S.P.R. 337, ¶ 4 (2012) (“If the appellant establishes Board jurisdiction over his IRA appeal by exhausting his remedies before [the Office of Special Counsel] and making the requisite nonfrivolous allegations, he has the right to a hearing on the merits of his claim.”). However, it is well established that an appellant may forfeit the opportunity to a hearing by inexcusably failing to attend. See Callahan v. Department of the Navy, 748 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The question of whether failure to appear at a hearing is excusable is “comparable to the issue of whether good cause has been shown for extension by the [Board] of a regulatory time limit.” Id. ¶3 We discern no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to establish good cause for her failure to attend the hearing. During an April 22, 2021 prehearing conference, the administrative judge informed the 3

parties that the hearing would take place using the Zoom for Government (ZfG) videoconferencing platform. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 4. At that time, the appellant’s representative expressed concern about the appellant’s ability to access the necessary equipment and internet connection and asked if the appellant could appear in person at the regional office. Id. The administrative judge indicated that the Board’s then-current COVID-19 protocol precluded an in-person appearance, and he ordered the appellant to review the ZfG information she had been provided and determine whether she could successfully use ZfG using the equipment available to her. Id. He ordered the appellant to notify the Board in writing by May 14, 2021, if she could not use ZfG and indicated that if the appellant did not make such a submission by that date, the hearing would, absent extraordinary circumstances, proceed as scheduled using ZfG. Id. The appellant failed to make such a submission by the May 14, 2021 deadline. ¶4 In a subsequent pleading, the appellant belatedly claimed that she was unable to appear by video and requested that she be allowed to participate in person or by telephone, using the ZfG dial-in option. IAF, Tab 18. The administrative judge denied the appellant’s untimely request to appear other than by video and also denied her request for reconsideration of that ruling. IAF, Tabs 19, 22. He repeatedly warned the appellant that failure to appear as ordered could result in sanctions under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43. IAF, Tabs 19, 22, 25. ¶5 The appellant entirely failed to appear at the hearing, either by video or telephone. When asked to explain his client’s absence, her representative gave no indication that the appellant was unavailable for reasons beyond her control. Instead, the representative reiterated his objections to the administrative judge’s order directing the appellant to appear by video and stated that the appellant had made other plans for the day. IAF, Tab 28, Hearing Audio Recording. Under 4

these circumstances, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show good cause for her absences. 2 ¶6 Moreover, even if we were to find that the administrative judge erred in cancelling the hearing, an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no legal consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s substantive rights. Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981). In her close of record submission below, the appellant explicitly conceded that no material facts were in dispute and that she would have presented only oral argument had the hearing taken place. IAF, Tab 30 at 8. Hence, the appellant has not shown that the cancellation of the hearing affected her substantive rights. ¶7 The appellant further argues, for the first time on review, that the administrative judge’s appointment was invalid under the Appointments Clause. The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016). In the absence of such a showing, the appellant’s new argument provides no basis for further review.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C.

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Susan Gelb v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2022).

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